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Abstract 
 
The current military-media relationship, in which war reporters face greater 
challenges accessing operational zones, is marked by destabilisation. The key 
focus of this thesis is to describe the struggle of the military and the media in a 
British context, one that involves keeping up with the pace of massive 
developments in: (a) the nature of warfare, (b) the revolution in military affairs, 
and (c) information and communications technologies. I argue that the 
relationship between operational security, digitalisation, and moral obligations is 
vulnerable in today’s conflicts – considering those aspects of journalistic values 
which claim truthfulness and objectivity. Grounded theory is used to analyse 
qualitative semi-structured interviews and official documents by employing 
comparative methods and coding. Research questions are grouped into three 
themes outlining my key methodological arguments: (1) a revolution shown in 
military documents in the forms of new war; (2) the characteristics of war 
journalism in post-Iraq War; and (3) the impact that the digital revolution has had 
on the role of war reporters. 
       
My findings illustrate some implications and recommendations for military policies 
and journalistic practices. In theory, the military’s media policy is aimed at 
securing journalistsʼ safety and operational security. However, in practice, the 
loss of autonomy, a lack of clear objectives, and editorial restraints have made 
journalistic work more complicated. The analytical framework utilised has 
identified two emergent themes: (1) the post-embedding era recognises the 
struggle of the military to incorporate the media into today’s conflicts because of 
the extent of violence in the ‘War Amongst the People’ (WAP); and, (2) the classic 
form of war reportage has become vulnerable to a new type of asymmetric threats 
as wars are often fought in a hybrid style. The latest typology of ‘new war’ has 
reinforced a sense of uncertainty and ambiguity in the process of war reportage, 
and information management, which can create instability pertaining to the role 
of the media in conflicts. In conclusion, the risk of uncontrollable and 
unmanageable media reportage can only be eliminated by the military if 
journalism becomes an integral part of the military’s command and control 
structure.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
  
 
The aim of my research is to investigate the evolving military-media relationship 
to describe the process of integrating wartime journalism into the military’s media 
management strategies in a British context. I do so by considering significant 
developments in the paradigm of the new war, and a revolution in military affairs. 
Journalists are facing substantial challenges in reporting today’s war including 
technological and structural aspects. Reporting conflict goes beyond the 
traditional practices of journalism, in which the journalists are subject to 
different types of control by the military. However, digital developments open 
new opportunities for both the media and the military to develop new tactics to 
incorporate the media into war effort, but it also poses challenges for the work of 
journalists.  
 
My thesis seeks to explore how Western war reporters have been integrated by 
the UK military into the complexity of the new model of war, in situations where 
they are not answerable to the same socio-political structures as they used to be 
in conventional conflicts. This argument will be addressed in this thesis through 
three key research questions that will be mapped out in three chapters of my 
findings (Chapters Four to Six) as follows: 
1. How have new tactics been devised by the military to incorporate journalism 
into the war effort while minimising disruptive forms of reporting? 
2. In what ways has war journalism changed since the occupation of Iraq in 2003? 
3. How has the development of a hybrid media ecology made the role of 
professional war reporters vulnerable in a fast-changing situation? 
 
In this opening chapter, it is essential to capture the dominant concepts that are 
central to the research questions, such as the new war paradigm, war journalism, 
media-military relations, and global governance. These concepts have evolved 
within a complex international system since the end of the Cold War (1989), and 
have been affected by the 9/11 attack (2001), the Iraq War (2003), and geo-
strategic developments in the global system over the last two decades. Chapter 
One indicates the research problem and the primary objectives to define the 
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parameters of this study. I shall explore the central concepts that have an impact 
on the practice of war journalism and, therefore, analyse these implications from 
the perspective of the military’s media strategies. A clear understanding of the 
terms widely used in this research is a first step so that no misunderstanding arises 
when interpreting the data. 
 
The New War Paradiem 
 
What is 'new war'? How does it differ from 'old wars'? The term of 'new war' has 
emerged since the end of the Cold War to describe the changes in the environment 
of armed conflicts among other features of the 21st century such as globalisation, 
new communications technology, and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Suganami, 
2002; Kaldor, 2013). The key players in this type of armed conflicts are non-state 
actors, who may seek to establish sovereign states (Kaldor, 2013). The condition 
of the 'new war' is characterised by the growth of hybridity in war actors, such as 
in the Ukraine crisis of 2014, which involves the use of a mixture of different 
tactics, the usage of proxy wars between major and minor powers such as in Syria 
and Yemen, the urbanisation movements as megacities become playgrounds for 
conflicts, and the complexity of employing Info Ops that generate new challenges 
for the national security (Chadwick, 2013; Dunham, 2016). It is crucial to 
understand that certain types of wars, such as counterinsurgency operations 
(COINs) become more common and ambiguous. The tactics used in COINs ensures 
the necessary structure of a command and control system (CCS), new military 
technologies, and utilising small and agile forces on the ground (Hazel, 2008; 
Thornton, 2015). 
 
The concept of 'new war' is central to the analytical framework of this thesis. The 
logic of 'new war' operationalises throughout my research to focus on the degree 
of tension present in the military-media relationship and conflict management. A 
discussion defines the causes and consequences of the 'new war' into the work of 
journalism that has helped to develop an analytical approach that considered 
institutional roles, field challenges, and future opportunities into the structure of 
the military-media relationship either in strategic or tactical levels. In this 
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research, I provide reflections on the condition of warfare that has been presented 
by the British academic Mary Kaldor.  
 
Kaldor (2013, p.vi) emphasises that new war involves a 'networks of state and non-
state actors, and most violence is directed against civilians'. This definition 
includes a few key characteristics that distinguish 'new war' from 'old war'. In fact, 
organised violence had replaced traditional forms of inter-state conflict (Kaldor, 
2007; Smith, 2007). To support the claim that intra-state conflicts are on the rise, 
we can observe that transnational terrorism and insurgents dominate military 
doctrines.  
 
Additionally, we must note the claim that the digital revolution has resulted in 
the end of military control over information in the post-Iraq War of 2003, and that 
the leading actor in today's conflicts is non-organised militia and that civilians are 
at the forefront of conflict (Kaldor, 2007; Rigterink, 2012; Medynskyi, 2015; 
Merrin, 2018). Kaldor (2013, pp.23) classified today's wars as distinct from the old 
version of warfare, according to specific categories which include actors, goals, 
methods, and forms of finance. Actors: the main actors of new war are a 
combination of state and non-state actors which include the regular armed forces, 
private security contractors, mercenaries, jihadists, warlords, paramilitaries, 
etc., whereas on the whole old war took place between regular armed forces of 
states. Goals: the aims of old war were to achieve geo-political interests and to 
spread ideologies and values. However, new wars are associated with the rise of 
new communications technologies and fights for identity (ethnic, religious or 
tribal) and political interests. Methods: old wars were fought in particular 
territories through military means. In new wars, the frontline is everywhere. A 
typical technique to capture a territory is through political means, where violence 
flourishes amongst the people rather than being used against enemy forces. Forms 
of Finance: in old wars, states usually financed troops. New wars are financed by 
different means, such as private finance, the taxation of humanitarian aid, and 
by illegal activities such as cybercrime, terrorism, piracy, kidnapping, and the 
smuggling of oil, drugs, people, etc. Thus, understanding the concept of new war 
as a mixture of wars within the context of globalisation, global power, and 
revolution in military affairs (RMA) fitted into my analytical framework.  
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Further discussion focuses on the technologies of warfare. Developments in 
communications and information technologies have emerged as a result of the 
relationship between media and war, a relationship that has shaped a new form 
of warfare (McLuhan 1964; Postman, 1970; Baudrillard, 1995; Virilio & Lotringer, 
2000; Chadwick, 2013; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015). McLuhan’s terms of ‘global 
village’ and ‘the medium is the message’ had sparkled the thinking of the effect 
of dominant communications technologies, especially television, on cultural and 
political life (Levinson, 2000). Since Baudrillard (1929–2007) developed his theory 
entitled 'The Gulf War did not take place in 1991', the world has been concerned 
about the changes in the war paradigm, including the relationship between war 
and the media in the post-Cold War era. The importance of Baudrillard's 
theoretical work stems from his central claim that the Gulf War is a 'non-war' or 
'virtual war' that was marked by the uncertainty of real-time coverage, the lack 
of credible news and the struggle of exercising full control over information 
(Baudrillard, 1995). In contrast, Paul Virilio (1932–2018) has emphasised the 
importance of total control of the electro-magnetic space and the speed of the 
weaponry which become a central strategy in Western doctrines for gaining the 
upper hand on information to win the war (Merrin, 2018). Virilio, who is inspired 
by the work of Marshall McLuhan in his theory of media ecology, considers the 
relationship between war, cinema and the logistics of perception are essential 
elements for information operations (infops) where wars are 'no longer about 
confrontation' but about movement – the movement of 'electro-magnetic waves' 
(Armitage, 2001, p. 3). His primary interest was on the impact of intelligent, 
smart, and advanced weapons on influencing people's perception of new wars 
besides the damage that unauthorised images about war can do to the reputation 
of the armed forces (Armitage, 2001; Merrin, 2018). As such, it can be argued that 
the concept of a new war poses a fundamental challenge for the military and the 
media concerning access, technology, and information control. 
 
War journalism can be conceptualised in relation to the military's media 
management strategies within the context of Kaldor's perspective on the new war. 
The next subsection will highlight how the term 'war journalism' can be situated 
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in a wider context that describes the evolution in the military-media relationship 
since the Iraq War of 2003 regarding accreditation, access, and censorship. 
 
War Journalism 
 
War reporting in the old, liberal school of journalism was viewed as an essential 
component to strengthen democracy, social responsibility, and good governance. 
Liberal theorists attributed the press with the role of safeguarding freedom of 
expression, as the existence of a responsible and independent press was 
considered vital to the process of democracy (Norris, 2008; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 
2014; Barnett & Townend, 2015). Although liberals advocated that the role of free 
press was to act as a watchdog on the government (Ward, 2014), in recent years 
relations between the press and the military have often fluctuated due to 
restrictions made by military forces in the US and UK to control the flow of war 
news after the Vietnam War (1955–1975).  
 
There has been a debate over the role of the press to influence public opinion 
about the war effort: consider the anti-war messages surrounding the Vietnam 
War compared to those supporting the military’s war efforts, such as the interest 
in reporting war activities in the post-Cold War era since 1989 (Boylan, 2011). The 
role of the media in the Vietnam War was a product of many issues around, the 
institutional role of embedded reporters, information control, and censorship 
(Spector, 2018). Spector (2018) claimed the Vietnam War had not been directly 
censored by the US military, but what made the Americans and the media less 
supportive regarding this war was the increased number of American casualties. 
It has been estimated that 57,939 members of the US armed forces died or were 
recording missing, and around 1.1 million North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters 
died (Spector, 2018). Since the Vietnam War, great attention has been given to 
the role of war journalists during times of conflict, and their battles over gathering 
information from war zones. British restrictions placed on reportage of the 
Falklands War in 1982 inspired the US military to limit journalists’ access to the 
frontline, unless they were attached to military forces (Morrison & Tumber, 1988; 
Knightley, 2004; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014). The policy of journalists’ 
attachments has taken place when war correspondents have agreed to align with 
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aspects of American and British battlefield policy. This established an ‘information 
vacuum’ in the Falklands War in 1982, a ‘press pool’ in the First Gulf War in 1991, 
and the ‘embedded system’ in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, which gave 
the military more control over the flow of information in order to secure 
operations.  
 
Media and conflict studies literature has questioned the practice of war journalism 
in regard to its positive/negative influence, whether the press is war-or peace-
oriented, the hierarchy of influence at work, and the professionalism of journalism 
(Larson, 1988; O'Heffernan, 1991; Cohen, 1994; Rees, 2001; Galtung, 2003; Lynch 
& McGoldrick, 2013). For some researchers in media and conflict studies, the 
perspective of the military in managing the media in contemporary conflicts has 
been affected by a dramatic transition in the post-Cold War era as an aftermath 
of the 9/11 attack. The media has been the subject of debate amongst academics, 
military thinkers, policymakers, and practitioners, essentially asking whether the 
media play an active or passive role in safeguarding people’s right to information 
(Hallin, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Larson, 1988; O'Heffernan, 1991; Cohen, 
1994; Robinson, 2001). For other researchers in media and conflict studies, the 
military is driven by the significant influence of the media on public opinion, 
propaganda that can influence the success or failure of military operations (Rid, 
2007; Jensen, 2014). Because war reporters face great challenges on the frontline 
in contemporary warfare this study aims to understand the existing concept of 
military media management policies, as they have been challenged by several 
factors in war zones. Some challenges, for instance, involve educating a global 
audience about war victims, immigration, violations of international law, physical 
conflicts, and the process of peaceful settlement. Indeed, whether war journalists 
are attached to military units or have restricted access by working independently, 
it seems that the classic concepts of mediatisation, centralisation, and media 
management are being disrupted by the digital age (Maltby, 2012a; Livingstone & 
Lunt, 2014; Corner, 2018). Indeed, Kuhn and Nielsen (2014) claim that the 
emergence of competitive digital news networks has closed the gap between 
politicians and people because top politicians have engaged either with the media 
and the people through their personal and official accounts on many social 
networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and weblogs.  
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In my research, I argue that the term ‘new war’ provides three main thrusts of 
criticism on the practices of war journalism and military's media policies: Firstly, 
the struggle of the military to integrate the media into the war effort due to the 
growing challenges of controlling the information space during today's conflicts. 
Here, I will question the impact of media operations (Media Ops) has as the core 
challenges in the ‘new war paradigm’ where the military has witnessed the end 
of full control over the information space since the Iraq War of 2003 (Merrin, 
2018). This can be done by several methods. A reflection on some of the UK 
military’s documents will be provided as well as an analysis of the perspective of 
selected professionals in Armed Forces on the revolution in war-fighting tactics 
and communications under a centrlised command and control system (CCS) as a 
means to investigate how media ops are evolving. Secondly, the increasing 
centrality of Information Operations (Info Ops) compared to the decentralisation 
of war actors has an impact on how wars are being reported and perceived. The 
institutional role of embedded reporters provides insights into war reporting 
regarding the loss of journalists’ autonomy, the policy of denying access to the 
frontline, and a lack of diverse accounts because of censorship. Finally, the 
difficulty of bearing eyewitness in a complex hybrid media ecology can destroy 
the credibility of war reporting as information becomes a weapon for influence 
and disinformation. The idea that there is no need for embedded journalists 
because war can be shot either by soldiers or the military's media teams 
themselves has affected the role of war reporters to report the truth.  
 
 For this research, the terms ‘war reporter’, ‘war correspondent’, ‘broadcaster’, 
and ‘wartime journalist’ are used interchangeably to make the content easy to 
understand.  Certainly, usage of one term cannot increase clarity and precision in 
my subject area because all of these terms are often used by media researchers 
to describe the acts of a person who reports on the war from the scene of action. 
 
A clear distinction will be made in the following section about the role of the 
media in military doctrines. 
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The Military-Media Relationship 
 
The focus of this thesis, when considering civil-military relations, is the role of 
media in military doctrines, and how military doctrines have been defined, 
outlined, and managed in real conflicts. This thesis examines the perspective of 
official documents that include policies, guidelines, and regulations, regarding the 
natural line of communications and a hierarchy of command and control systems 
in armed conflicts. Also, this thesis presents the views of military experts, who 
have significantly augmented their role in the production of several military 
documents that outline the armed forces’ approach in managing the media at war, 
such as Media Operations, Information Operations, Psy Ops, and Strategic 
Communications. 
 
The involvement of the media in the foreign policy decision-making process is 
complex, but it is acknowledged as a valuable source of information for decision-
making, and as a platform that leaders or elites take into consideration at the 
time of taking decisions (Naveh, 2002). Dandeker (2000, pp. 38–40) suggests that 
media-state-military relations must be built on mutual trust and not be subjected 
to manipulation by any side. He asserts that journalists are capable of supporting 
military policy and maintaining public support for current military activities at 
their time of deployment with the armed forces, and of gaining full access to 
updated information. Dandeker (2000) has described the relationship between the 
two institutions during the colonial wars as being adversarial on both sides, shaped 
by suspicion, and distrust. However, the relationship between the media and the 
military has demonstrated some improvement in the post-Cold War period, as 
military professionals became more aware of the role of media to influence public 
attitudes towards soldiers on the battlefield.   
 
Relations between UK Armed Forces and British society have shown some 
developments since British forces allied with US ones in the War on Terror (WOT); 
notably with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan 2001 
and throughout intense operations in Iraq 2003 (Rid 2007; Jensen 2014; Hines et 
al., 2014). The UK Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) attempted to bridge the civilian-
military gap and make their various audiences more understanding of the armed 
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forces’ business. Evidence for this includes the decision to withdraw British forces 
from Afghanistan in 2014, the low profile deployment of forces in the civil war in 
Syria, and after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) suffered a vital 
defeat in Mosul, Iraq (Hines et al., 2014; Jensen, 2014; Cockburn, 2018a). 
However, these types of Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) have also 
destabilised the relationship between war reporters and joint military 
commanders at an operational and tactical level. One reason for this is that 
military operations are mainly conducted covertly by special units which are 
trained to operate independently during this kind of confrontation. There is less 
military support offered to journalists, and because of that the risk of a journalist 
being detained, tortured, and killed is becoming higher. A report by Reporters 
Without Borders indicates that 702 professional journalists have been killed in the 
past 10 years, and 80 journalists were killed worldwide in 2018 (RSF, 2018). The 
world’s deadliest country for journalists and media workers in 2018 was in 
Afghanistan with 15 killed. In Syria 11 were killed, and 8 were killed in Yemen. 
However, for the first time since 2003, no media fatalities were recorded in Iraq 
in 2018 (RSF, 2018). Additionally, there is a lack of communication, particularly 
at a strategic level (The Prime Minister, 2015), that affects how a war is presented 
when there is a division in public opinion about the act of war. The proposition of 
new war facilitates grounds for both regular and irregular war actors to utilise the 
media, especially the new media for their benefit to exert an influence over vast, 
heterogeneous audiences that would not be reachable within the limited scope of 
the Western mainstream media.   
  
Considering these developments, my study will provide a distinctive approach to 
explore various relations between military’s media management strategies and 
wartime journalism. I focus on significant events that have shaped world politics 
since 9/11 in 2001. These events have been shaped by the rise of global media 
and the internet in the 21st century. Significant examples will include the post-
Iraq War (from 2003 to 2011), the war in the Ukraine (2014 until the present), and 
the civil war in Syria (2012 until the present). The institutional work of Journalim 
goes under developments regarding organisational context and culture. This 
included the emerging of new actors, new methods of collecting information and 
new forms of engaging with audiences (Harris & Williams, 2019). War reporters 
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while embedded during their assignments at the forefront of these conflicts, 
experienced a great variety of circumstances with the troops. They shared the 
same food, slept in tanks or ships together, and exchanged information, 
snapshots, and views with each other through such social media networks as 
Facebook, YouTube, and weblogs. Yet journalists were also subjected to the 
tightest restrictions on their movements and broadcasts. They were forced to sign 
a contract that all their reports should be reviewed by the military before being 
broadcast, and that they should be guarded and protected by the military, and 
might be dismissed by the government at any time (Lindner, 2009). 
A rising level of intensity in the era of new war synchronises with a transition in 
the central role of the state in emerging global governance and security systems. 
 
Changes in the Global System  
 
It is a common observation that a tremendous transformation has taken place 
since the end of the Cold War in 1989 in the structure of the global system. A 
transformation regarding both ideology and practice, which has brought new 
complexities, vulnerabilities, and uncertainties to foreign policy, global security, 
media studies, and international relations. In fact, this transformation is 
threefold, including (1) the fragmentation of power in international systems, (2) 
changes in the role of the state, and (3) advances in communications and 
information technology. Navigating such a structural transition is essential to 
understand how the media fit into this complex set of power transformations.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, we can identify three main points in the 
international system regarding the notion of shifting global power: 
 
1) The growth of US economic and military power that dominated the international 
security paradigm, the rise of China, and the re-emergence of European Union 
(EU) as economically powerful but politically divided (Ikenberry, 2008; Friedman, 
2013) were the main features of transition in the global system since 1989. In 
particular, the primary debate of this feature has been about what kind of grand 
strategy the USA should apply, and what kinds of strategy the other great powers 
should pursue. In fact, the US, China, and the EU are currently the leading players 
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of the global system. The choices made by US administrations since the 1990s have 
been made between those who recommended a policy of ‘primacy’, that dealt 
with contested zones unilaterally by use of US physical power, and those who 
recommended a policy of ‘selective engagement’ that promoted cooperation and 
active diplomacy (Posen, 2003, pp.5–46). The EU is facing significant challenges. 
The CRS’s (2018) report indicated that the most prominent challenges in EU are 
the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU or ‘Brexit’ alongside issues on 
integration, migration, and a heightened threat of terrorism. In contrast, given its 
one-party state, China appears more able to implement domestic and 
international policies under the current leadership of Xi Jinping. For instance, 
China has promoted its future growth prospects as well as expanding international 
business (Gill, 2017). 
 
2) Globalisation affects the role of states in the 21st century. The state actor is no 
longer the only active player in economic and political systems, as other active 
and non-state players have emerged, who have restated their roles and positions. 
For example, paramilitary forces, NGOs, media organisations, and corporates 
(Karaca, 2011; Breslin & Nesadurai, 2018). However, the state remains a critical 
actor in dealing with domestic and international arenas, particularly concerning 
national identity and security, despite the widespread assumption that the state 
is losing its sovereignty (Bertucci & Alberti, 2001).  
 
3) Information and communication technologies that are affected by digitalisation 
have offered new types of production and consumption. Owen (2011) indicates 
that massive developments in communication, information technology, and the 
globalisation of the new media have made the world more connected, 
interdependent and, consequently, decreased the dominance of Western media 
organisations in covering international events. Additionally, these technological 
developments permit the live and faster production and transmission of reports, 
putting more pressure not just on governmental decision-makers but on all 
management sectors around the world (Hulme, 1996).  
 
I will now briefly address the research questions alongside methodological 
considerations.  
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Research Objectives  
  
This thesis focuses on integrating wartime journalism into the UK MoD’s strategies 
for media management. My research has relied on a qualitative approach, which 
has benefited from a grounded framework. Through my research I aimed to 
achieve the following objectives: 
 Identify the UK military’s strategy and techniques in managing and 
incorporating journalism into the war effort to minimise disruptive forms 
of reporting. 
 Reflect war journalists’ views in reporting complex, unstable, and 
changeable armed conflicts such as Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN), 
and to explore the concerns of war journalists regarding objectivity, 
professionalism, self-censorship, and their own safety. 
 Draw academic insights from qualitative research, in order to maximise 
the depth of data collected to describe the lived experiences of 
journalists and the military’s media staff in reporting contemporary wars.   
 Develop an analytical framework in relation to the media-military 
perspective on the massive developments in military affairs, global 
governance, and digitalisation, with respect to their impact on the role of 
media in conflicts.  
 
This project seeks to contribute to a gap in the academic literature, by combining 
and contrasting the perspectives of war correspondents and military media staff 
at the UK MoD. This enables us to understand how the military and the media have 
responded to developments in the war paradigm, as well as information and 
communication technologies. 
 
The intention for this research to contribute to media studies and military policies, 
drawing on notable interviewees representing several leading British media 
outlets (the BBC, The Guardian and Channel 4), as well as the collection of 
updated versions of military documents across the UK, the USA and NATO. A 
qualitative approach within the guidelines of grounded theory enabled genuine 
reflection on the extensive personal experiences that war correspondents and 
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military media staff encountered while negotiating their roles and resources 
within the typology of the ‘new war’.  
 
The following section outlines the organisation of this study. 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter One provides an overview of the research paradigm, the methodology, 
and the research questions. It begins by conceptualising the fundamental themes 
of this research, countering common criticisms, and reviewing literature that has 
examined the war-media debate. Additionally, it proposes research strategies, 
objectives, and goals, suggesting an appropriate framework for analysis by 
focusing on the area of military-media policies within the typology of ‘new war’, 
it helps to identify the method of collecting data and, finally, what type of 
analytical tools need to be employed to tackle these issues. In this chapter, I 
address the gaps in the research, my study’s contribution to knowledge and its 
limitations.  
 
Chapter Two engages with various arguments emphasised in the existing literature 
on war journalism and the military-media relationship. These are outlined in three 
central themes describing in depth how the media have adapted to changes in 
contemporary conflict. Part One examines the war paradigm debate, analysing 
how the 21st century introduced a new form of warfare due to a revolution in 
military affairs, so that the media became a central component in its structure. 
Part One also asks whether this ‘new form’ of warfare is just a modified version 
of the old industrial model. Part Two establishes a connection with the role of 
media in the process of decision-making. In fact, this relationship is essential to 
understand the different positions that media scholars have taken to analyse the 
relations between the state and the media on various issues of national security. 
Part Three investigates the line of communications between war reporters and 
the military, particularly at an operational level, and whether this facilitates more 
access to information in the form of embedded programmes, or poses more 
restrictions and complexities to maintain the security of operations.  
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Chapter Three provides a guide to the methodology, research design, and data 
collection used in this thesis. Based on a multidisciplinary approach, this research 
has analysed the military, media, and journalism using a qualitative methodology. 
Research questions were designed to provide a comprehensive approach to both 
media and military policies, incorporating trends and existing challenges that have 
questioned the classic concept of war following the typology of the new war. 
Chapter Three aims to show the emergence of challenges, ethical codes, and 
cultural norms – including objectivity, fairness, lack of strategic communications, 
professionalism, and the real practice of war reporters and military doctrines in 
the digital revolution – mainly when nations are politically divided over the use of 
their military forces to support humanitarian operations and democracy.  
 
The analysis is carried out in Chapters Four to Six. In Chapter Four, I discuss my 
findings around military tactics which incorporate journalism into the war effort 
as much as possible, and which aim to minimise disruptive forms of reporting. 
Chapter Four makes a connection between the military’s media doctrines and 
journalistic work in a British context. Chapter Five presents war reporters’ 
reflections on the way that US and UK Armed Forces handled the media during the 
Iraq military operation, and the implications of the ‘embedded system’ used. 
Following changing world politics and the digital revolution that warfare is 
experiencing, Chapter Six describes the formation of a new milestone in this 
transformed relationship between war journalists and the armed forces.  
   
Finally, Chapter Seven gives a comprehensive discussion of what has been 
presented in this research. It emphasises the central arguments, research 
problems, methodology, and findings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Aside from the complexity of war as a social phenomenon that engages other 
domains in a country’s social, economic, and political life, war entails multi- and 
interdisciplinary methods to study it from diverse viewpoints. Tracing the 
interplay of the challenges of military media management strategies and 
journalists’ reflections on their experiences in war zones requires more attention 
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to be paid to the broad context of media-government relations, the international 
relations system, the professional paradigm of ‘new war’ journalism, and the 
framework of media doctrines. 
 
The shock and horror of 9/11, and the aftermath of the War on Terror, opened 
the way for the USA, the UK, and their allies to mount military responses, which 
have tightened restrictions on enabling war reporters to gain access to the 
frontline and to classified information. Have these tactics been justified as 
‘unquestionable’? And to what extent should armed forces have such power to 
restrict information in the context of the ‘new war’? This thesis argues that the 
implications of the ‘new war’ paradigm, primarily in the post-Iraq war period, are 
evident in the methods and manner in which current conflicts are reported in 
traditional and online media.   
 
The next chapter, Chapter Two, will review the main arguments in war journalism 
that have featured in media-war literature among journalists, politicians, and 
scholars since the Vietnam War. The majority of studies of state-media relations 
raise concerns over the media’s performance in a democratic system (Althaus et 
al., 1996) and reveal the importance of the nation-state in the new world system. 
However, the interconnected and interdependent global system and the 
emergence of the non-state actor (transnational advocacy networks) challenge 
the idea of that governments should have a monopoly on news (Aday & Livingston, 
2008). In fact, there is a lack of an explicit cognitive model for the relationship 
between the media and the military with respect to the role of the media in the 
new war – a digital revolution that has been accompanied by an explosion of 
information and communications technology. In a digital revolution the classical 
model of wartime reportage is disrupted and challenged by the notion of a 
network-user content-centric approach, which I will discuss in more detail under 
War and Technology in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two:  
Conflicts, Military Doctrines, and War Journalism 
  
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant academic literature regarding 
developments in the war paradigm, such as the military-media relationship, war 
journalism, revolutions in information and communications technologies, and 
military doctrines. Existing media studies concern the future of an embedded 
journalism system that has been constructed by the military to secure media 
access to battlefields and operational security. My review critically considers the 
consequences of the UK’s military media operations strategies, especially in the 
post-Iraq War period (from 2003 to 2011). The post-Iraq War marked a new 
milestone in the military-media relationship, when the classical fight against Iraq's 
dismantled armed forces, and other militia groups in the Middle East, was 
transformed into a counterinsurgency operation. 
 
This chapter is composed of three major parts. I begin by introducing the main 
features of journalistic work in the 21st century, such as those concerned with 
institutional roles and communication technology. Then, I discuss moments in 
contemporary relations between the state and the media at a strategic level, how 
these arguments began and developed, and what areas of conflict between the 
state and the media remain in dispute – in respect of war reportage. The last part 
explores the latest dimensions of the ‘new war’ paradigm that, since the end of 
the Cold War 1989, have offered a new space for the military and the media to 
exercise their advanced capabilities for influencing audiences. The military and 
the media have developed certain types of influence to control access to 
information, but inadequate space has been offered by the military to allow 
integration on a tactical level. In the concluding section, I discuss the implications 
of integration policy and its impact on the practice of war journalism. 
 
I shall first outline an approach by reference to previous research to illustrate the 
challenges that war reporters are facing in conflicts. Then we will observe the 
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critical aspects of media management strategies that have been designed to 
structure media access to the frontline. 
 
Reporting War 
Reporting war is a part of reporting global crises. The literature on media and 
conflict studies emphasises the role of the media as one which constructs the 
reality of war and global events in our cognitive processes. This construction 
becomes apparent when we consider aspects of journalistic ethics which aim to 
provide balance, objectivity and credibility in war stories (Hallin, 1986; Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988; Larson, 1988; Morrison & Tumber, 1988; O'Heffernan, 1991; 
Cohen, 1994; Zaller & Chiu, 1996; Rees, 2001; Galtung, 2003; Lynch & McGoldrick, 
2003; Norris, 2008; Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). The significant role of journalists 
– whether you call them foreign reporters, war correspondents, war junkies, 
parachute journalists, local producers, stringers, citizen journalists, or bloggers – 
is at the heart of live broadcasting. Such media events present suffering, violence, 
political policies, and combat efforts, from distant locations by providing specific 
meaning, context, and values in their news (Galtung, 2003; Lynch & McGoldrick, 
2003; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014).  
However, uncertainty exists around journalistic ethics as to whether the media 
play a positive or negative role in war reporting while attached to military units. 
Some researchers/journalists in this area of study argue that it is a ‘mediatised 
war’ where war and media go hand in hand to influence, construct, and 
communicate military actions for local and international consumption – in terms 
of enhancing the communicative power between top politicians, military, and 
local and international audiences (Cottle, 2009; Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). For 
other researchers/journalists (the liberal school), journalistic codes are essential 
for democracy by freeing journalists from any obligations or alliances that affect 
their accountability, freedom, and independence (Berry, 1990; Wolfsfeld, 1997; 
Robinson, 2001). To be precise, liberal journalists believe that they should be 
observers and not participants in any events they are reporting (Ward, 2009).1 
                                                           
1 Ed Vulliamy of The Guardian gave his testimony before the International Criminal Tribunal about the 
atrocities during the war in Bosnia in 1990. However, other journalists refused to be part of the investigation, 
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Considering the complicated situation of organising media-military cooperation, 
such as embedded and post-embedded systems, to understand the intersection 
between war journalism and the military's media policy within the typology of new 
war is vital, especially considering the above-mentioned areas, which remain in 
dispute.   
 
Therefore, what has changed in military thinking to propagate engaging traditional 
and new media in combat? 
 
Journalism in the 21st Century 
 
If we think about the framework of global transformation that occurred after the 
end of the Cold War in 1989 that has influenced the state-media relationship 
today, the nature of the international political system affects how journalists 
report conflicts. Changes in world politics do not need to be seen as a radical 
divorce from classical models of warfare, changes are a part of the governance 
system and the role of journalists in modern warfare, but it would be better to 
examine this from the perspective of the evolving military-media collaboration in 
the 21st century to manufacture an institutional role, regulations, and identity 
according to standard ethical norms in the liberal political system. Indeed, these 
changes in world politics explain areas of conflict and overlap in the relationship 
between war journalism and the military particularly when conventional and new 
media are presented in the era of new war as a governmental weapon for 
influence, commercialisation, manipulation, entertainment, and disinformation 
(Singer & Brooking, 2018).  
 
Ascertaining the interaction between war reporters and military media teams 
under a centralised military command and control system is essential for 
understanding the fundamentals of wartime journalism that operates in a rigidly 
controlled political-economic culture. As we are mainly concerned with the latest 
challenges of today’s war journalism, the literature on media and war is broken 
down into two segments: first, the institutional role of independent journalism is 
                                                           
for instance Jonathan Randal of The Washington Post who didn’t appear before the ICT in 2002 for the same 
case. 
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vital for democracy, and for the success or failure of combat operations – 
regardless of whether the media are being viewed as an influencer in political 
decision-making or being criticised for being manipulated by governments. 
Secondly, war journalism in military documents is being treated either as a 
weapon to support combat operations or as a threat to national or friendly forces 
due to its capacity to reach global audiences. Journalists in a post-embedding 
system within the context of the new war paradigm are faced by stressful 
situations where they lack access, funding, and security. In what follows, I will 
present these two perspectives in more detail. 
 
Institutional Roles 
 
The literature on journalism studies has generated much debate around 
journalistic practices in terms of professionalism, global values, and ethical 
obligations (Deuze, 2005; Hanitzsch, 2007; Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Willnat et al., 
2013). Deuze (2005) illustrates that the role of journalists in society is crucial for 
practising real journalism without restrictions in the context of multiculturalism 
and multimedia by providing contrary sources to facilitate public debate, and its 
implications for the exercise of professionalism as a legitimate representative of 
the people. Threats to today’s journalism comes in various forms as an industry 
and a profession. Althaus et al. (1996) pointed out that practising good journalism 
is vital for freedom of expression within the context of Western professional norms 
by empowering public debate around issues that are fundamental for their lives. 
To do so, Deuze (2005) indicates that free journalism must protect free speech 
and the right ‘for people to know’ all the available information about an armed 
conflict. He insisted that journalists must enjoy editorial autonomy, freedom, and 
independence in order to be impartial, neutral, objective, fair, and credible 
within a liberal political system that ensures stability and fairness in their work 
(Deuze, 2005). Journalists deploy to the deadliest countries, and place themselves 
in dangerous situations in order to enact their values regarding reporting the truth 
and disclosing wrongdoings. Consequently, they are imprisoned, hijacked, face 
harassment, abuse, and intimidation, and are even executed in front of the 
camera for doing their job (Wahl-Jorgensen et al., 2016). States have to protect 
journalists’ safety as they could be targeted whilst reporting on sensitive issues 
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like corruption, terrorism, organised crime, and violations of human rights 
(Pedersen, 2015). However, the rights to protect the freedom of the press have 
never been absolute. For example, Stone and Volokh (2019) claim the First 
Amendment of the US Constitution has protected freedom of speech and the press, 
but governments have the power to restrict freedom of speech in certain 
circumstances, such as confronting threats to national security, false statements 
that damage a person’s reputation, hate speech, blasphemy, etc.  
 
Journalistic values bequeath journalists the legitimacy and credibility to defend 
their professional identity (Rees, 2001; Deuze, 2005). In reporting global crises, 
journalists struggle to preserve their value-neutrality in the long term, falling 
between objectivity and subjectivity in their commentary. Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 
(2016) indicate that there are institutional threats to journalism. The status of 
foreign reporting is in decline due to economic factors since the global recession 
of 2007 (Cottle, 2009; Wahl-Jorgensen et al., 2016). This has implications for the 
quantity and prominence of international news coverage in the media, and results 
in the reduction of the number of foreign reporters who report from a fixed 
international office (Willmott, 2010). Wahl-Jorgensen et al. (2016, p. 802) state 
that the economic crisis of 2007 led to the ‘demise of some of long-established 
and well-regarded institutions, [which] includes most recently The Independent 
in the United Kingdom and the Tampa Tribune in the United States’. Thus in an 
era of globalisation and information credible sources are being challenged. Based 
on a study across 9 Western countries, Newman et al. (2016) indicate that the 
public’s trust in news media and social media is falling due to bias, spin, and 
agendas that favoured powerful people’s political or economic interests, rather 
than being representative of ordinary people’s opinions. However, those who have 
trusted the news media in the past appreciate the role of journalists in ‘checking 
sources, verifying facts, and providing evidence to back up claims’ (Newman et 
al., 2016, p.5). 
 
Despite variations in demography, working conditions, values, trends, and global 
or local challenges, the ethical role of journalism in societies has been spread 
across the globe, perhaps as an effect of globalisation and digitalisation (Cottle, 
2009; Willnat et al., 2013). The results of a 31-nation comparative study on 
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competence and professionalism in journalism showed that incompatibility exists 
between journalistic ideals and practices that makes journalists feel that they are 
less professional, especially when they lack confidence and integrity in doing their 
job (Willnat et al., 2013). Another study by Hanitzsch et al. (2011) of 1800 
journalists from 18 countries demonstrated the difference between Western 
journalists and their counterparts in other countries in terms of values. On the 
one hand, Western journalists are generally less supportive of the active 
promotion of particular values, ideas, and social change, and adhere more to 
universal principles to guide their ethical decisions. Journalists from non-Western 
contexts, on the other hand, tend to be more interventionist in their perceptions, 
and more flexible in their ethical views (Hanitzsch et al., 2011, p.1). 
 
Securing safety and logistical aids in battlefields are a central concern of conflict 
reporting because journalists put themselves at risk while deployed with local 
forces, militia or aid agencies in areas of military violence (Markham, 2010). War 
journalism-based practices focus on violence, a reactive stance, while peace 
journalism-based practices are more attractive for journalists as they focus on 
people, a proactive stance, avoiding ethnic differences and promoting peaceful 
solutions (Galtung, 2002; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Nohrstedt 
& Ottosen, 2014; Neumann & Fahmy, 2016). Its treatment of news forces war 
reportage to be sensationalist and commercial (Seaton & Allen, 1999). Coverage 
of violence has dominated the news in some non-Western countries. Also, the 
greater the lack of balance in international news, the less chance of receiving 
media coverage. For instance, conflicts in non-Western countries, such as those 
in Africa and Asia, have received less attention from the Western mainstream 
media because of political and economic interests in the West. As Harvey (2012) 
indicates, Israel-Palestine conflicts, between 1987 and 2007, and the war in 
Kosovo, in 1999, received 50 times more coverage by the Western mainstream 
media than all of Africa’s humanitarian emergencies combined. Lee and Maslog 
(2005) studied 1,338 stories from 10 newspapers in four Asian countries (India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines) involved in regional conflicts 
at the turn of the century. Their analysis reveals that war reportage is dominated 
by a war journalism frame. Lee and Maslog indicate that the three top most 
indicators of a war journalism frame are: the focus on an escalation of violence 
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on the ground, an elite orientation, and a people-oriented image (good or bad). 
In contrast, according to the Institute for Economics & Peace’s report which 
analysed the output of 37 TV news and current affairs programmes from 23 
networks in 15 countries, positive peace journalism made up just 2.4 per cent of 
coverage globally over the past 12 years (IEP, 2018). The IEP’s report (2018, p.3) 
states ‘without peace, it will not be possible to achieve the levels of trust, 
cooperation, or inclusiveness necessary to solve these challenges, let alone 
empower the international institutions and organisations necessary to address 
them. Therefore, peace is the prerequisite for the survival of humanity as we 
know it in the 21st century’. 
 
With regard to social media, it seems that traditional war reporters are fighting 
for their identity in modern warfare. The increasing availability and accessibility 
of social media has created new threats to traditional war journalism and, from a 
military perspective, to operations security. But social media have also offered 
influential platforms for groups, non-state actors and individuals to interact, 
recruit, spread ideologies, and disseminate sensitive information, away from the 
traditional methods of direct censorship. Social media platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc., used to be reserved for communication tools 
between people around the globe, but more recently have been widely used by 
politicians, insurgents, NGOs, and non-state actors for elections, advertising, and 
social mobilisation. Patrikarakos (2017), who reported on the Ukraine and Gaza 
conflicts, gives an account of the power of social media in determining the 
strategic ends of military campaigns in 21st century wars. For example, he talks 
about a seven-year-old girl, Bana Alabed, from Aleppo in Syria, who tweets about 
airstrike attacks on her city by al-Assad's forces and her call for peace in Syria. 
Her tweets as evidenced by 332K followers on Twitter had more power than the 
official propaganda run by the state. She was offered a book deal to tell her story 
to the world (Goldman, 2017). She tweeted on her account on Twitter (Alabed, 
2017): ‘I am happy to announce my book will be published by Simon & Schuster. 
The world must end all the wars now in every part of the world’. 
 
Thus, technology has disrupted the government’s monopoly over conflict 
reportage. Although technology provides satellites, smartphones, drones, and 
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social media with sufficient space and power to access information and reach a 
global audience, violations of human rights are not decreasing. In fact, human 
rights violations are increasing with the use of complex weaponry systems in 
today’s wars, so I will now focus on war and technology and their connections to 
war journalism. 
 
War and Technology 
 
War and technology have always been connected to each other. Technology 
defines warfare. It drives innovation in weaponry systems and increases our 
understanding of the tactical usage of the ‘principles of war’, such as intelligence, 
surprise, the fog of war, friction, manoeuvres, command and control, terrain, etc. 
(Roland, 2009). The relationship between war and technology has evolved 
throughout history in terms of planning, executing, evaluating, and managing 
conflict. In today’s wars, ‘technology’ refers to the collective usage of precision 
weapons, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, drone aircraft, spy satellites, agile 
ground forces, and real-time communications networks (Shachtman, 2007). 
Interestingly, some fundamental changes in the ‘revolution in military affairs’ are 
in the form of information management. 
 
Technology has improved communications, changed the way people exchange 
ideas, and affected the way the media represents wars within the context of 
media ecology theory. Ecology in this context refers to the role of the media as 
educators and providers of moral orientation in which the environment of 
communications requires looking at the complex message system regarding its 
structure, its content and its effectiveness on people’s perception (McLuhan 1964; 
Postman, 1970; Baudrillard, 1995; Virilio & Lotringer, 2000; Chadwick, 2013; 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015). Postman (1970) was influenced by the work of the 
founder of the media ecology theory Marshall McLuhan. Postman’s development 
of the media ecology is based on the idea of the effect of the media on education 
and culture (Gencarelli, 2000). His interest was on ‘how technologies and 
techniques of communication control the form, quantity, speed, distribution, and 
direction of information; and how, in turn, such information configurations or 
biases affect people's perceptions, values, and attitudes’ (Postman, 1979, p. 186, 
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cited in Gencarelli, 2000). In other words, every medium in Postman’s perspective 
changes and biases the message itself. Changes in information ecology followed 
by changes in how information is being monopolised to distract people from seeing 
the truth in order to evoke a particular kind of response. Postman indicated that 
technological innovations in the media had altered people’s attention span for 
information, entertainment and misinformation, so the people are willing to 
change their definitions of family, childhood, education, intelligence, knowledge 
etc. to accommodate the demands of new technology (Rubin, 2001).  
 
Baudrillard (1995) provides interesting thoughts regarding war, technology, 
violence and the media in his work 'The Gulf War did not take place'. He argued 
that the Gulf War was a false war in which the major TV networks such as the CNN 
played an important role in transforming the images of war into a real-time model 
of simulation that can end the war without resistance (Baudrillard, 1995). He 
pointed out that the coalition forces during the First Gulf War exploited 
technological means to gain information superiority. These included excluding the 
role of the enemy, so the armed forces can operate by their strategy to defeat an 
enemy with minimal resistance and limited casualties (Merrin, 2018). This side of 
the argument divides into two dimensions: (1) the reality of fighting appears to 
be imperfect and fragile in the eyes of global audiences because of the western 
technological superiority that has transformed the enemy into a computerised 
target due to the logic of 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA), and (2) in the face 
of the huge flow of information and news about conflicts, the latter becomes 
captive to the news. Thus, it has become difficult to gauge its actual reality. 
 
Today, the risk of the digital revlotion goes beyond the effect of television in 
shaping people perception about war reporting. In fact, the media – whether 
radio, television, internet, press, or social media – have become constitutive of 
war rather than a mediator. In Cottle’s words (2009, p.110), ‘war is being 
conducted in and through the news media as well as being communicated by it. 
This is a mediatised world’ (italics in original quotation). New war has emphasised 
the notion of mediatised war, a form that spreads fear and hatred as a result of 
humanitarian catastrophes, and becomes conflict-oriented, systematising 
violence through the brutality of war actors (Kaldor, 2003; Cottle, 2009). 
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Chadwick (2013) argued that changes in media environments due to the rise of 
digital media can be understood through the lens of hybridity. He suggests that 
the new media is better to be seen as a hybrid of newer and older media in which 
the media in general is ‘bundeled of cultural, social, economic, and political 
practices’ (Gainous & Wagner, 2015). Chadwick (2013) indicated that the 
interaction between new and old media can be characterised by journalistic 
practices which represent the work of a multiple social actors. This included 
journalists, activists, and politicians who operate into the new hybrid system to 
acquire power by an attempt to control the flow of information.  
 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2015) use the term ‘arrested war’ to describe the 
involvements of media in creating symbolic events that have been designed to 
influence politics and global crises as the world has passed through broadcast and 
defused phases of mediatisation in the last two decades. The term ‘mediatisation’ 
in Hoskins and O’Loughlin’s (2013) approach refers to changes in globalised media, 
as a consequence of the rise of the media’s influence that is part grounded in 
theories of media ecologies and part in multi-methods that integrate interviews 
with policy-makers, journalists and other elite actors, and content and discourse 
analysis of actual reporting. Hoskins & O’Loughlin (2015) claim that the 1990s 
marked the final stage of a broadcasting war, as satellite television, and 
governments played a pivotal role in providing real-time coverage. This enabled 
their control over information through the introduction of the military’s pooling 
system for organising the media access and the growing usage of real-time 
streaming devices such as robots and drones. It is through the media that the 
perception of war is constructed, defended or challenged (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 
2013). The broadcast phase is defined by the idea of a CNN effect in which Western 
satellite television and global audiovisual each was reinforced through the 
military’s media operations (Hoskins & O′Loughlin, 2013). However, 9/11 and its 
aftermath in the War on Terror (WOT) allowed for the emergence of Hoskins and 
O’Louhglin’s second phase: ‘diffused war’ (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010). Diffused 
war refers to ‘a new paradigm of war in which the meditization of war makes 
possible more diffuse causal relationship between action and effects, creating 
greater uncertainty for policymakers in the conduct of war’ (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 
2013, p.3). This phase is defined by the advent of the digital media (Web 2.0), a 
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weaponization of media with more government control, and a rise of regional 
(pan-Arab) media (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2013). In this phase, digital content is 
easily documented, searched, shared, and indexed (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010). 
In other words, the media become part of the practices of warfare in which wars 
are shared through a complex web of communications technologies. These 
technologies, I suggest, create a confusion in our perception of the war and media 
relationship in the era of new war, affecting views on proximity, immediacy, 
credibility, and time, and space. The consequences for the practice of war 
journalism will be presented in Chapter Six. 
 
The third ‘arrested phase’ of the mediatisation of war involves collaboration 
between the military and the mainstream media in managing media operations 
(Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2013). This phase enables both military institutions and 
mainstream media organisations to exercise their monopoly on the media content 
for the purpose of influencing local and international audiences about the 
military’s actions (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015; Boyle, 2016). The arrested phase 
is marked by confusion over dominant military doctrines that are primarily 
designed to fight counterinsurgency operations instead of conventional combat 
(Hoskins & O′Loughlin, 2013). Related to the arrested phase, the findings of 
Boyle’s study demonstrate that mainstream media ‘continue to exhibit the re-
arresting of agenda setting capabilities that were previously disrupted by the 
emergence of unintended content’ (2016, p 1). As such, methods of war reportage 
are influenced by an unfolding debate about the emergence of ‘new war’, ‘hidden 
war’ and ‘asymmetric war’ compared to classic concepts of war such as ‘old war’, 
‘total war’ and ‘limited war’ (Cottle, 2009, p.114). 
 
The implications of the ‘arrested phase’ critically reflect the nature of 
information that has flooded to heterogeneous audiences across the globe. 
Indicators of the third phase – among military, insurgent, and civilian user groups 
since the Iraq War – include consumers (user-generated content [UGC]) and 
marketers (market-generated content [MGC]) who operate widely on web 
platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and blogs, and criticise the 
economic and social values of available social media content (Fiore-Silfvast, 
2012).  
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This thesis focuses on the British context, where the editors of UK newspapers are 
concerned with reputation, trust, and legal liabilities that remain complications 
of accepting UGC and MGC contributions (Hermida & Thurman, 2008). One 
challenge is aligned with the risk of becoming involved with double standards, in 
reporting global events such as wars, because of the negative impact of the influx 
of citizen materials through social media. Negative in the sense that they disrupt 
the relationship between audiences and military leaderships. For example, BBC 
policy insisted on avoiding trading down the quality of content by publishing 
unsourced materials because one associated risk is that of losing the license fee 
payers’ support (Bennett, 2011, cited in Gagnon, 2015, p.3). Some evidence 
indicates that the BBC war correspondents who were attached to British forces in 
Iraq in 2003 avoided releasing images that contained violence to British television 
(Wells, 2003). Audiences in the UK, who watched programmes produced by large 
media outlets such as the BBC, ITV, Channel 4, and Sky News alongside hundreds 
of international news networks such as CNN, Fox News, Al-Jazeera, etc., have 
been concerned with the right of the individual to watch, listen, and read factual, 
impartial, informative and exciting media coverage (Gunter, 2009). For example, 
Choi et al. (2006) found that opponents of the Iraq War recognised internet 
accounts as inconsistent with the official pro-government narrative line, and 
subsequently viewed these internet sources as more credible than pro- and 
neutral-government positions.   
 
In summary, this section discuused three key features caused by the technological 
revolution of ‘mediatising’ war: (1) technology shapes war and determines the 
course of military action, (2) it affects the way media represent wars, and, (3) it 
makes finding information out more accessible to people and has quickly become 
central part of their life. 
 
In the next subsection, I will address why it is essential to explore literature about 
military strategy in engaging with the media in areas of conflict; namely, because 
it is necessary to balance the public’s ‘right to know’ with the risk of publishing 
sensitive information which might endanger national security. 
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Military Media Management Strategies 
 
Each modern military force has developed an approach to deal with the media in 
times of war. The strategy of military media management in modern warfare is 
proactive, in accordance with the media's activities and its demands. It attempts 
to orient military performance in contemporary conflict as a means of engaging 
with the press, to avoid any criticism among war journalists by denying access 
(Maltby, 2012a, p.35). It has been argued that war reporters struggle with their 
dissatisfaction about the way the military has handled information on the 
frontline, as they experience much tension and have sceptical relations with the 
military (Maltby, 2012a). For example, the military have ensured access for the 
press in the limited operations that the US military, the UK military, and NATO 
were involved with in the second half of the last century outside North America 
and Europe, such as in Central, and Latin America, North and East Africa, and the 
Middle East. Indeed, the Iraq War marked a new milestone in this military-media 
relationship that introduced an ‘embedded programmeʼ, one which legitimised 
the presence of war journalists, photographers, and freelance journalists in 
military units.  
 
Reviewing the military's media policies in US combat operations forced the 
Pentagon to accelerate introducing a ‘pooling systemʼ in the First Gulf War in 
1991, and an ‘embedded programme’ in the Iraq War in 2003. Steuck (1992) 
pointed out that the ‘pooling system’ organised by the coalition forces to facilitate 
journalists access in the First Gulf War in 1991 failed to build trust between the 
military and the media, particularly around logistical problems, censorship, 
briefing delays, and access difficulties. The US military decided to fix this tension 
between the military and the media by offering more incentives for war reporters 
to integrate the media into war planning by attaching them into military forces, 
known later as the embedded system. 
 
The concept of ‘embedded journalism’ characterised a new dimension of military-
media collaboration, particularly during a time of war and peace-building 
operations; however, embedded journalism was not a post-Cold War invention. 
Some researchers argue that it can be traced back to the First World War; 
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nonetheless, embedded journalism became more important during the war against 
Iraq in 2003, as more than 3000 journalists registered to cover the war, of whom 
over 500 were attached to coalition forces (Tumber & Palmer, 2004, pp.1–2). The 
British government had prior experience in embedding journalists in their naval 
fleets during the Falklands War in 1982, having adopted a new strategy of 
cooperating with journalists – unlike the American government’s unsuccessful 
dealings with the American media during the Vietnam War (1955-1975). 
Information management was used effectively by the British government under 
the term ‘operational security’, which gave the military the right to delay and 
censor information, and conduct deception operations (Tumber & Palmer, 2004b, 
pp.1–2). The Task Force Group selected the journalists who would embark on the 
naval fleet; even the British MoD was worried about the negative impact of 
transmitted images from the battlefield, which might harm the troops and their 
families (Tumber & Palmer, 2004a). Ultimately, the military strategy of managing 
warfare information conflicted with demands from civilian officials in 
Westminster. These officials wanted to counter enemy propaganda whereas 
military officers strove to limit the dissemination of operating losses (Schlesinger, 
1989).  
 
The embedded system raises ethical issues concerning media independence and 
accountability. Through this system, although journalists enjoyed access to the 
frontline and protection, there were limitations on their movements and 
broadcasting. Conflicts of interest were a major concern. Journalists argued with 
unit commanders, as they had to sign an agreement that gave the military the 
right to check on any materials before they were broadcast and this often led to 
disagreements (Froneman & Swanepoel, 2004). The US/UK argument of protecting 
national security was used widely by governments after 9/11 to attack the public’s 
privacy and suppress freedom of opinion and expression (Taylor & Cobain, 2013).  
  
To conclude this section, a review of the literature reveals that modern warfare 
has two critical dimensions: the revolution of military technology and the advance 
in communications technology. Both have serious impacts on how war is 
conducted, and the way it is reported both in the traditional and social media. 
Although the military have experienced different types of media management 
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since the Victorian era, in order to avoid interference in operations, from either 
journalists or the enemy, it has been observed that there has been an attempt in 
US and British military approaches since the Iraq War in 2003 to foster reciprocal 
relations with the media. The implications of these relationships have challenged 
journalists in war reporting, as they have had to balance the public’s ‘right to 
know’ with the risk of publishing sensitive information which might endanger 
national security (Kampf & Liebes, 2013).  
 
The next section provides a critical review of the complexity of discourse on the 
state-media relationship through the lens of three trends that have shaped the 
debate about the media’s effect in the process of foreign policy decision-making. 
 
Media and State 
 
The debate over the relationship between the media and war is centred on three 
trends of thought within the context of state-media relations: (1) the active 
player, (2) the passive player and, (3) the neutral player. Drawing on previous 
research, I argue that these three models are in conflict over where the media 
should be positioned in the decision-making process. Yet the models demonstrate 
an agreement on the media as powerful entities and their persuasive influence in 
public perception about security events (Bennett et al., 1982; Glišic, 2008). The 
outcome of this review will help to explain which model arguably fits this study.  
 
Media Influence Model (Active Player) 
 
The first trend of thought views the role of media as an active one in setting 
foreign policy agenda. Livingstone and Lunt (1994) indicate that Western societies 
enjoy the benefit of having several types of media and the free flow of 
information, providing a forum for voices, diverse opinions and ideas, and a 
diversity of multicultural expression through print, radio, and broadcasting. The 
notions of ‘citizenship’ and ‘public sphere’ dominated the debate about the 
involvement of ordinary people in democratic political communications to express 
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their opinions and to question established power (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994).2 
Can the mass media provide a positive public forum that can be exploited for 
critical discussion of national security issues particularly around foreign policy and 
the act of war? 
 
The active role of media in the foreign policy decision-making process, and the 
media’s high degree of professionalism when performing as a watchdog for the 
public in mediating, collecting, and monitoring the government’s behaviour and 
policies is a widely-shared ideal. However, a main threat to media pluralism is the 
issue of media monopoly beside the commercial and entertainment elements of 
media productions (Peruško, 2013).  
 
For a long time, policymakers have realised the powerful presence of media, 
especially television, in covering local and international relations both in times of 
peace and in times of war. Cohen’s statement (1963) that the mass media ‘may 
not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’, may explain to 
what extent scholars defend their arguments about the active role of media in 
setting news and foreign policy agendas in the US (Perloff, 2013, p.122). Cohen's 
statement is highly quoted in most of the media literature when referring to the 
impact of media on policy and public opinion. His statement opened the window 
for Maxwell McCombs to produce his approach on ‘agenda setting’, when he 
hypothesised that the media have the power to reflect the political content and 
order the priority of issues in each political campaign (Naveh, 2002).  
 
It seems that the impact of the media on the foreign policy process tends to be 
more active as further advances in media technologies are developed. An 
argument began over the effect of real-time coverage on the political agenda 
                                                           
2 The work of Habermas (1984) on the ‘public sphere’ provides a critical theory of the role of the citizen in 
social life and modernity. Habermas (1984, p.49) illustrates that ‘by ”the public sphere” we mean first of all 
a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed 
to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private 
individuals assemble to form a public body’. As a result of changing communications environment in the era 
of information, Habermas’s concept of the ’public sphere‘ has lost much of its original meaning from a 
platform of social and political participations to a realm of commercialisation, entertainment and advertising 
(Boeder, 2005). 
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when Cable News Network (CNN) provided real-time coverage of the Tienanmen 
Square demonstration in 1989 (Hoge, 1994, cited in Balabanova, 2007). Moreover, 
the remarkable presence of 24/7 news in the Gulf War (1991), Kosovo (1998), 
Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003) that may have offered intelligence 
information, is significant in the debate about the effect of CNN and other news 
channels in provoking reactions from domestic audiences and political elites to 
international crises (Robinson, 1999; Gilboa, 2005).  
 
The term ‘CNN effect’ describes the power of the media to influence the 
formulation of foreign policy (Robinson, 2013). CNN effect refers to how 
policymakers seem to lose control of international policy because of the 
significant impact of the media on public opinion (Hammond, 2007, cited in 
Franco, 2012). Livingston (1997) provides three variations of this effect: (a) 
agenda setting as a reflection of news content; (b) policy impediments that affect 
the operation of security and may undermine morale; and, (c) an acceleration of 
decision-making by shortening the time of response. He indicates that these 
variations may apply to different types of intervention, ranging from conventional 
warfare to consensual humanitarian operations. 
 
It can be argued that the media have forced democratic governments to be 
accountable for solving humanitarian crises (Jacobsen, 2000), as well as elite 
decision-makers’ loss of policy control to news media (Livingston & Eachus, 1995, 
cited in Srivastava, 2009). Jakobsen (2000) argues that the CNN effect is only 
relevant to small cases, but the media could apply additional pressure when the 
decision about the use of force is not on the top of the Western government's 
agenda. Jakobsen shows that the direct influence of the media is limited during 
pre- and post-conflict periods because the media are more likely to focus on actual 
fighting during the war. Therefore, it is understandably difficult for people to 
support any military action needed because the success stories of conciliations, 
international negotiations, and humanitarian aid are neglected, and news is 
almost always concerned with violence, death, and destruction from the 
perspective of the war-oriented model (Jakobsen, 2000). Gibbs (2000, cited in 
Gilboa, 2005) studied the intervention in Somalia by applying a realist approach 
and found that the USA’s own national interest, to secure the passage of US oil 
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tankers through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait was behind the government's decision to 
intercede in Somalia, not the CNN effect. Additionally, Zingarelli (2010) found no 
CNN effect regarding American policy towards the war in Gaza. For other 
researchers, the media may have a visible impact on national policy. Shaw (1996, 
cited in Gilboa, 2005) indicates in his study of the coverage of the Northern Iraq-
Kurdish crisis that the British print and electronic media had a significant impact 
on public opinion, by representing the victims of violence. Soon after 9/11, CNN 
and the BBC were challenged by the rise of the ‘Al-Jazeera effect’, as the Qatari 
network channel (Al-Jazeera) attempted to replace the Western media for the 
first time in reporting wars by holding the advantage of information and exclusive 
images (Franco, 2012, p.168). 
 
The second school of thought, ‘passive player’, portrays a different account of the 
role of media in foreign policy and conflict management.  
 
The Manufacturing Consent Model (Passive Player) 
 
The second trend views the media as a passive player in the foreign policy sphere, 
falling into the hands of the government’s monopoly. Several scholars in media 
studies view the US media as ‘no more than a pawn in the political game played 
by the powerful political authority and establishment in Washington’ (Chang, 
1993, cited in Malek, 1997, p.5). Robinson (2001) divides this ‘passive player’ 
trend into two versions: the executive and the elite (italics in original source). In 
the executive version, the media are not expected to stand against the executive 
official policy and agenda lines of the government/military, and therefore, will 
not influence National Security Policy.  
 
The elite version considers that influential members of society influence the 
media, whether or not they are part of the executive or represent other key groups 
in society. In his seminal work The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam, 
Hallin (1986, p.4) points out that the relationship between the media and 
government during the Vietnam War was a conflict that changed the dynamics of 
the war. The term ‘national security consensus’ that Hallin referred to in his study 
played a hegemonic role in framing government activities and presenting to the 
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audience an official discourse of countering communist expansion in South 
Vietnam. Hallin explained that the media turned against the official government 
when some government members expressed their disagreement with the war. This 
division in the US administration encouraged the media to criticise the US 
government for the rise of casualties in the US troops. The lessons that the US 
learned from the British policy in the Falklands War pushed the US administration 
to adopt a tight policy towards war journalists in war zones, and excluded the 
media from the war on Grenada in 1983 (Hallin, 1986, p.5). Referring to Cohen’s 
argument about the great influence of the media to persuade people about what 
to think, Entman (2007) claims that the elite want people to act and behave in 
certain ways in order to secure their own political agenda. The framing of political 
news is essential to achieve this goal; as Entman (1993, p.53) indicates, media 
framing focuses on parts of reality through selection, giving them salience in order 
to ‘define problems’, ‘make moral judgments’, and ‘suggest remedies’, through 
a process of ‘making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or 
memorable to audiences’. 
 
Accordingly, an official leadership is keen to be presented by the media in a 
positive way, through many editorial features such as transmitting an official 
storyline, the means of disseminating issues, the framing of cases, the selecting 
of information, and emphasis and tone (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, cited in Segev, 
2003). Because of their contributions in explaining how mainstream media content 
is structured, Herman & Chomsky (1998) argue that the news in the ‘Propaganda 
model’ or ‘Manufacturing Consent model’ is filtered by money and power, so that 
elites can sustain control via maintaining their economic and political interests 
and increase profits (Gilboa, 2005). The media ‘serve mainly as a supportive arm 
of the state and dominant elites, focusing heavily on themes serviceable to them, 
and debating and exposing within accepted frames of reference’ (Herman, 1993, 
p.25, cited in Gilboa, 2005). Therefore, the government acts as the primary source 
of propaganda materials, having the ability to set the agenda, because of its 
advantageous position to monopolise information sources. 
 
Schlesinger (1989) argues that the above model is flawed because Herman & 
Chomsky assumed that the US media functioned like its counterparts in communist 
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countries. The US model is not controlled by one single party, as in a totalitarian 
system, but rather by the influence of the government and agents of power such 
as political, economic, and cultural entities operating as primary information 
sources, and the dominant mass media firms.  
 
Similarly, Robinson et al. (2010) found that the notion of patriotism acts as a more 
essential driver of supportive coverage than relying on information from the 
government in the context of war. Even if anti-war newspapers were more critical 
towards progress on the frontline or government policy, the media needed to show 
support and sympathy towards the soldiers and their sacrifice. This finding 
connects with Zaller and Chiu's claim (2001) that culture and patriotism are more 
critical driving factors of the news media’s support for official elites than indexing 
news. Indexing is a theory of news content and media-state relations according to 
the US political system. It refers to the ‘norms used by news organizations to 
select news sources and frames’ (Bennett, 2016, p.1).  Wolfe (2013) indicates that 
other sources may appear in media coverage, such as foreign sources as opposition 
voices, but that journalists have no choice but to marginalise these non-official 
sources when a positive consensus on government’s policies is dominated.  
 
The third school of thought has proposed a neutral position to construct its 
arguments about the relations between the media and war.  
      
The Policy of Uncertainty Model (Neutral Player) 
 
Both models discussed thus far (media influence and manufacturing consent) have 
distinct views on the media’s position and responsibilities in terms of a National 
Security Strategy. The third trend advocates that the media-government 
relationship is neither an active nor passive player in the policy-making process.  
Berry (1990) argues that both media and government are not working hand in hand 
to manipulate public opinion, because journalists have developed comprehensive 
knowledge throughout their careers about foreign policy and its processes, so they 
are aware of the government's intentions to manipulate their beliefs and become 
fully capable of resisting that manipulation. He concludes that journalists reflect 
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in a story what they have seen on the field without intervention or guidance from 
the government, yet they lack sufficient power to influence foreign policy.  
  
The press aims to inform and update their audience on the progress of foreign 
policy. Wolfsfeld (1997, p.2) asserts that news media became a critical factor in 
political conflicts. He studied the mutual relationship between government and 
media in different types of conflicts, such as the war in Bosnia, the conflict in 
Somalia, the Gulf War, and the Palestinian Intifada. He argues that each 
antagonist within the conflict has their own explanation and interpretation of 
using a particular media framework in order to achieve their goals and gain public 
support. Robinson (2000; 2001; 2002, cited in Segev, 2003) developed the ‘Policy-
Media Interactionʼ model in order to better understand the role of the media in 
the foreign policy process. He criticises both the CNN effect approach that views 
the media as an active player in foreign policy, and the ‘propaganda model’ that 
claims that media is a passive player in foreign policy-making. Robinson (2000) 
identified four factors that determine the role of media in such a complex 
environment: elite consensus, elite dissensus, policy certainty, and policy 
uncertainty. He argued that when there is a consensus among the elite over a 
certain issue, it is difficult for the media to oppose this consensus, but if there is 
a confrontation in the elite over a debate then the media will have a major 
opportunity to contribute in that debate by aligning with one side over the others. 
In addition, uncertainty over a policy will make policymakers less likely to 
influence the media.  
 
Robinson (2000) applied his model to two cases: the US intervention in Bosnia in 
1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. Robinson (2000) indicates that the media succeeded 
in affecting the US's decision to deploy forces in order to protect the Gorazde safe 
area in Bosnia when uncertainty in policy was visible. However, in Kosovo critical 
media coverage could not alter the Clinton Administration's air-war policy to 
protect Albanian refugees when a particular policy line was already taken. In 
short, media coverage may influence the process of decision-making, particularly 
with cases of humanitarian intervention when uncertain policy exists but media 
coverage does not work effectively in uncertain situations. 
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To conclude, this section has engaged with the literature to outline the state-
media relationship debate, and the possibility of media influence in Western 
foreign policy decision-making processes and security issues. The consequences of 
wars as ‘good business for media’ (Taylor, 2000, p.183, cited in Balabanova, 2007, 
p.145) have been a matter of concern for many scholars about the role of media 
in setting foreign policy agendas. The CNN effect claims the influence of reporting 
round-the-clock from battlefields regarding the national government policy is 
supported by new technology, while the Manufacturing Consent model argues that 
the media are controlled by money and power. The validity of the CNN effect and 
Manufacturing Consent model in different political, economic, and social contexts 
has been examined throughout different military campaigns over the last few 
decades (Balabanova, 2007, p.145). The Policy of Uncertainty model offers an 
interactive account, claiming that media coverage can affect military intervention 
when uncertain policy exists, but media influence is unlikely when established 
policies are considered.  
 
Indeed, this thesis acknowledges the significant role of journalistic practices in 
shaping people’s perception of military action during times of conflict. However, 
it does not look at the role of the media from the perspective of the CNN effect 
or the Manufacturing Consent model. It is more supportive of the Uncertainty 
model, which has argued that the influence of the media on the decision-making 
process depends on the political context. The media may or may not influence 
military intervention decisions for humanitarian efforts. Journalists, while 
attached to troops in traditional conflicts, are aware of the consequences that 
being under military control has on their freedom, independence, and credibility. 
I will discuss in this thesis the journalists’ concern about the impact of the military 
control has had on their journalistic practices in situations where they were 
embedded by established forces in the form of conventional conflicts such as the 
Iraq War. I compare this with the emerging dynamics of reporting today’s 
conflicts. Indeed, war reporters have developed in-depth knowledge on how the 
media might be considered as an asset within the structure of the military’s 
command and control system. However, new technology and the nature of today’s 
wars make journalism a dangerous job which enables other players such as 
bloggers, activists, and non-state actor’s media machines to shape war stories. 
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Understanding the connections between the war paradigm and the media directs 
attention to the structure of military media management strategies in 
contemporary war.  
 
Making Connections with the New War Paradigm  
 
Due to the changing face of war and the evolving nature of communications, the 
current term ‘military media management’ may no longer reflect new types of 
21st-century conflict. I propose to use, instead, the term ‘modern media 
operations and national security’ to describe this new form of relations between 
media and military during contemporary conflicts. In addition, this description 
provides a broad framework for how military communications interact with other 
instruments of national power (e.g. diplomatic, economic, and media). As the 
communications network seems to be disrupted in contemporary warfare, due to 
the complexity of violence in counterinsurgency operations (COINs), there is a gap 
between people’s perceptions of the war effort and the challenges of national 
security. My research explores such consequences through examining the friction 
between the military and the media in COIN, concerning the war paradigm and 
media doctrines.   
 
The New War Paradigm  
 
The strategic execution of the military campaign in contemporary warfare is to be 
understood by reference to the paradigm of the ‘old war’, and the shift to ‘new 
war’ school of thought (Kaldor, 2007). I will review how a classic war theorist like 
Clausewitz described the concept of war in the Napoleonic era, and then explore 
the concept of new war in the 21st century. Clausewitz stresses in On War that 
war is the continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz, 1989), which 
essentially means that the end state of going to war is to securely govern a 
country, not simply for the aim of achieving victory (Gray, 2005). Clausewitz 
claims that military campaign is an ‘act of violence to compel our opponent to 
fulfil our will’ (Clausewitz, 1989, p.12). The centre of gravity (COG) in Clausewitz's 
old model of industrial warfare refers to physical objects such as the enemy’s 
military power which is considered as a source of strength (Echevarria, 2003). 
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Clausewitz states that the four elements of war are danger, exertion, uncertainty, 
and chance (Gray, 2005). As Clausewitz indicates, each era has its own style of 
war (Potter, 2013). Modern military forces such as the US, the UK, and NATO have 
expanded Clausewitz’s concept, offering a comprehensive approach to this battle 
compact system. Of course, elements of war remain relevant in today’s conflicts 
whether the battle takes place in the air, on land or sea, or any other physical 
space, because the final desired mission of any military campaign is to destroy the 
enemy’s capabilities by any means (Fowler, 2002). The military’s attempt to 
influence people's perception through the structure and the process of information 
and media operations doctrines is among these means of war.  
 
However, massive developments in military technology have awarded the concept 
of new war more weight in war literature since the end of the Cold War in 1989 
(Rigterink, 2012), a period that is associated with the emergence of a new world 
order, the rise of globalisation, and the rise of transnational terrorism. While 
nuclear weapons were a significant feature of the 20th century, a revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) driven by developments in new technologies, 
communications, and military doctrines are what influence today’s conflicts. The 
character of war has begun to change since the end of the Second World War 
(Kaldor, 2007; Rigterink, 2012), as the number of inter-state wars has decreased, 
while intra-state conflicts have become more frequent (Medynskyi, 2015). To be 
specific, the Cold War ended the war between developed countries because of its 
implications for both the democratic system and those countries’ economic 
interests. Indeed, the focus of military doctrines has shifted from the concept of 
old war to the notion of new war, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, developing 
an analytical model during wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to include asymmetric 
techniques – especially the use of disproportionate force in combat operations 
(Suganami, 2002). Certainly, the WOT and other military operations against non-
state actors – such as military operations in Afghanistan, North Iraq and Syria – 
provide examples of how military forces aim to accomplish military objectives and 
produce decisive results by minimising the risk of human casualties or the waste 
of military resources.  
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The perception of threat and its consequences to Western countries has changed 
since 9/11 followed by bombings in several European cities such as London, 
Brussels, and Paris, bombings that were named ‘terror attacks’ which have been 
driven by political and ideological factors (Goodwin et al., 2005). The level of 
response to imminent and perceived threats and engagements with other war 
actors has potentially changed along with the media and audiences (Thussu & 
Freedman, 2003). Recently, it is noted that state-to-state conflict is in decline as 
international trends show an increase in confrontation and conflict in the last few 
decades (Thussu & Freedman, 2003). Smith (2007) indicates that industrial 
warfare, where war took place between state armies, is no longer in existence as 
the ‘War Amongst the Peopleʼ (WAP) can engage organised violence of non-state 
components in a complex political context. The WAP in Smith's proposal does not 
follow the sequence of the old paradigm of conflict: peace-crisis-war-resolution-
peace, but rather is comprised of continued confrontation and conflicts. To be 
more precise, WAP is characterised in Smith's (2007) proposal by five features:  
1) Military action does not end with the destruction of the enemy but 
continues through the process of political mobilisation, such as 
negotiations, economic sanctions, and humanitarian operations. 
2) People become military targets; either, because they support the enemy 
or stand against the state's forces. 
3) Conflict tends to be timeless; possibly unending, because of the idea of 
continuous confrontation. 
4) The military commander strives to preserve his forces rather than 
accomplish his combat action at any cost. 
5) The revolution in military affairs allows powerful countries to arm their 
forces with high-tech weapons, which may not be used. 
 
Nations are more likely to fight as a multinational force under the umbrella of 
international or regional organisations, such as the United Nations (Gulf War), 
NATO (Kosovo, Libya), informal alliances (ISAF in Afghanistan), Western and Arab 
coalitions (Syria, Iraq and Yemen), and national groups allied against non-state 
groups, whether they are Hamas, Hezbollah, the Taliban, or the IRA. Because the 
old concept of conventional war had failed to achieve a decisive end to the war 
in Iraq in 2003, the governments of the USA and UK developed specific military 
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counterinsurgency doctrines against any adopted enemy who fights in an 
insurgency and also adopted asymmetric methods (Kilcullen, 2005).  
 
Relating to my first research question – to investigate the revolution in military 
thinking – it is important to have an awareness of the existing literature that has 
been written on military policy. The following subsection will discuss the changes 
in military policies that have had a significant impact on military intervention into 
other countries.  
 
Military Policy 
 
There are several changes in the nature of intervention strategy in modern war, 
which include: the ‘Pre-Emptive Strike’ strategy in the US National Security 
Strategy (Bush-Doctrine), changes in the NATO Strategic Concept from ‘one of 
flexible response to one of flexible intervention’, Revolutions in Military Affairs 
(RMA), and the emergence of asymmetric warfare against non-state actors (Kutz, 
2013).  
 
Although the US military budget has been limited by many constraints since the 
2011 Budget Control Act (BCA), American strategy focuses more on particular 
challenges than others (Cancian & Harrison, 2015). It is important to remember 
that the USA has shifted its overall strategy to enforce its presence in the Pacific 
region and to assist NATO in countering the Russian threat and defending the Baltic 
States (Cancian & Harrison, 2015). For instance, although the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy indicates that countering terrorism is not a primary concern for 
the US, the complexity of the global security environment, characterised by the 
digital revolution, inter-state strategic competition, new concepts of warfare, and 
increased global disorder are central concerns (Mattis, 2018). Additionally, The 
National Cyber Strategy document recognises fundamental threats from the US’s 
strategic adversaries, such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which are 
capable of challenging US security (USNCS, 2018).  
 
From the perspective of the USA, mainly since 9/11, the US military has adopted 
a ‘Pre-Emptive Strike Strategy’, which takes into consideration the possibility of 
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rogue states or terrorist organisations using weapons of mass destruction as their 
first choice (Haine & Lindström, 2002). Accordingly, the Pentagon has been using 
these strategies as a justification for raising and expanding military expenditure 
(Friedman & Logan, 2012) to secure its territory and to be prepared to counter 
any threats before they reach their borders. This is what is meant by conducting 
asymmetric warfare against state or non-state actors. Asymmetric warfare is an 
old technique, but the modern version has predominantly evolved since the 
beginning of the Cold War, which required operating in small, covert groups, and 
engaging in lethal and violent activities (Long, 2008). 
 
The US military information doctrine stresses the impact of the media in the 
surrounding information environment. It acknowledges the capabilities of both 
state and non-state adversaries to utilise their communication technology to gain 
information superiority (USINFO, 2014). However, the doctrine addresses the 
importance of information management and advocates acquiring information 
superiority (USINFO, 2014).  
 
The NATO Strategic Concept places greater emphasis on the geographical 
dimension, expanding its scope to deal with a diverse set of threats away from 
central Europe and beyond the NATO borders, particularly around the Euro-
Atlantic area (Lesser et al., 2000). Therefore, the Mediterranean regional crises 
that might affect the European security agenda have increasingly become part of 
NATO's agenda (Larrabee et al., 1998). The Information Operations (Info Ops) 
doctrine of the NATO military sets a framework for NATO forces in operating with 
other NATO partners and NGOs (AJP-3.10, 2009). The doctrine also identifies the 
role of Info Ops in supporting NATO operations. NATO adopts a US definition by 
identifying Info Ops as a ‘military function to provide advice and coordination of 
military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, 
understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC 
approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives’ (AJP-3.10, 2009, pp.1–
3). A revolution in military affairs (RMA) took place in the early 1980s, and was 
mainly about the effect of modern technology on the battlefield and how to 
conduct warfare in four dimensions – length, breadth, elevation, and time 
(Hauschild, 1999). The high capabilities of RMA have been evident on the ground 
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since the Gulf War in 1991, which allowed the coalition forces to accomplish their 
tasks with a high degree of confidence and within a set timeline, because of higher 
efficiency, while reducing the risk of collateral damage using smaller forces, and 
the ability to conduct precision strikes with the use of active information 
distribution systems (Ibrügger & Rapporteur, 1998). Highly capable information 
systems have been identified as another dimension of modern warfare, although 
information has been acknowledged as critical since ancient times, information 
systems are being used heavily in contemporary warfare to disrupt adversaries’ 
information assets, and for physically destructive means (Ibrügger & Rapporteur, 
1998). Accordingly, Western armies, particularly the US and the UK, have become 
smaller, more agile, and professional, to deal with small groups in irregular 
warfare in different and remote locations, like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, and ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Thornton, 2015). 
 
Information has always been regarded as a valuable weapon on the battlefield. 
The Chinese thinker Sun Tzu (~400–320 B.C.) emphasised in The Art of War the 
importance of knowing one’s enemy by obtaining information dominance, which 
is the crucial factor in winning a war without fighting battles (Cavelty, 2008). 
Therefore, how have the British military doctrines addressed conducting 
information operations (IO) during times of conflict?  
 
Historically, the British Armed Forces have much experience in the production of 
counterinsurgency operations (COIN) doctrines. The traditional UK COIN doctrine 
can be traced back to the 1890s (Hazel, 2008). Since the end of the Cold War, the 
UK’s primary goal has developed from the defence of the homeland into more 
engagement with allies, and the international community as part of multi-lateral 
missions (Hines et al., 2015). This development has driven the Armed Forces to 
review and update the COIN several times in different periods to meet the 
operational challenges in war zones. In fact, one of these missions is to conduct 
COINs into other nation's territories that have experienced domestic insecurity 
issues. Issues caused by several potential factors, such as political and economic 
problems, instability and humanitarian crisis (Uzun, 2014). As a result, the British 
Armed Forces published a 2008 version of COIN, by a new generation of military 
practitioners, to understand the challenges of global insurgency (Hazel, 2008). 
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The period between 2001–2007 was crucial for COIN because of the previous belief 
among military scholars that the classical form of ‘the use of force’ is no longer 
valid in modern warfare (Dixon, 2009) due to the complexity of war and the 
decline of inter-state conflicts. Understanding the operational lessons of putting 
COIN doctrine into practice in several operations outside of the UK’s territory – 
mainly in WW2 1945, Malaya 1960, Dhofar 1976, Northern Ireland 1995, and Sierra 
Leone 2001 – has provided the British government with other elements to support 
civil-military coordination over the division in domestic opinion on the latest 
conflicts such as post-Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003 (Hazel, 2008).    
 
To conclude this section, the period of transition in the global system since the 
end of the Cold War has had a significant impact on military strategies and 
journalists’ ways of thinking and dealing with high or low intensity conflicts far 
from their countries. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has aimed to build and construct arguments from different 
disciplines, such as war studies, international relations, politics, journalism, and 
media studies that all analyse current trends in media and war. This chapter has 
provided a review and critique of the existing work on the media and war within 
the context of war journalism, with the aim of creating a conceptual structure for 
this thesis.  
 
The key argument that I am drawing from the previous media and war literature 
is the growing concern regarding the shifting nature of mutual relations between 
media and government – with regard to the transformation in both military affairs 
and war reporting in terms of intent and execution. Studies of the relations 
between the media, government and military had two aspects: (1) the media are 
a major player in modern warfare and have great influence in the process of 
decision-making in security and foreign policy issues, and in shaping the public’s 
perception of war. Therefore, the military has adopted new strategies in 
information operations, within the compact strategy that considers cooperation 
with war journalists, in the field or at home, as one of the elements of a war 
  
-54- 
 
campaign's plans, which are exposed to a series of measurements and evaluations 
during different phases of a war. Furthermore, the military introduced the 
‘embedded programme’ to facilitate their access to journalists on the frontline, 
and to control as much as they could of a war’s content and photography. 
Traditionally, as the secrecy of operations shapes successful warfare, 
governments expected a high degree of support and compliance from the media 
during periods of tension with other states or non-state actors, while the military 
enjoyed its monopoly over the stream of information by imposing a set of 
guidelines to restrict journalists' movements on the frontline, and enforcing 
censorship over their content. Interpreting the implications of the state-media 
relationship models have helped to design a framework of analysis which enables 
examination of the friction within journalism and war relationship in spaces of 
democratisation that widely promote notions of diversity, the plurality of 
information, and multiplicity of voices (Barnett & Townend, 2015). My framework 
of analysis will consider development in the UK military’s media doctrines since 
the Iraq War of 2003 that includes the war paradigm, the integration contest, and 
organisational structure, which will be discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis in 
the part entitled ‘War journalism in a Contested Military Space’. (2) The 
emergence of new styles of war such as asymmetrical warfare, insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, and cyber warfare, sometimes in the absence of total war, 
make war journalism risky to operate without the help of the government either 
to access information, or to provide logistical and administrative support. Here, 
the media found themselves contained within military supervision over their 
content and movements unless they chose to work independently.  
 
This comprehensive reading of the literature will help in formulating the key three 
research questions of this thesis and planning the study. This research aims to 
provide new insights into the challenges that war correspondents are facing in 
modern warfare within the framework of the new war. It focuses on how war 
correspondents have responded to the threat of the revolution in military affairs 
(RMA); the impact new media have had on redefining the relationships between 
war and the home front since the end of the Iraq War of 2003; the challenges new 
technology has brought to the narrative of war reporting; and which factors have 
redefined the boundaries between journalists, including those between bloggers 
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and the military, as well as journalists’ concerns about objectivity, 
professionalism, self-censorship, and their own personal safety within war zones.  
 
The next chapter will outline the methods used in this thesis. 
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Chapter Three:  
Research Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This research looks at various implications of the new war paradigm that has, in 
turn, brought about a new form of evolving military-media relations, regarding 
significant developments in military thinking, and digitalisation. I have aimed to 
investigate the intersection of a centralised UK military’s media operation policy 
with the practice of war journalism since the Iraq War of 2003. Additionally, I will 
present a comprehensive perspective on war reporters who have represented 
major British media outlets by examining how they have accommodated 
themselves into the latest imperatives of the new war.  
 
Much of the debate in the existing literature is centred around the broken 
relationship between the media and the military since the end of the Cold War of 
1989 due to political, economic, and technological developments. As Chapter Two 
outlined, the classic model of organising media access to frontlines such as the 
embedded programme was adopted to incorporate the media into state-to-state 
conflicts, but has been less suited to the new era of warfare. To fill the void in 
the literature, this thesis will provide a better understanding of the impact of 
changing the war paradigm has had on journalist autonomy in situations where 
war journalists are forced to operate in non-conventional warfare by powerful 
entities which have some leverage in war zones whether they are regular or 
irregular forces. Further concerns arise where war correspondents struggle for 
free access to the frontline, ensuring balance in war stories, by being able to 
freely talk to paramilitary groups and civilians, by responding to the demands of 
real-time coverage, by reporting the suffering with less military control, and by 
ensuring their safety in war zones. Other concerns capture reputation, trust, and 
legal liabilities that remain unfolding challenges.  
 
This chapter employs a qualitative research methodology to investigate how the 
military and the media have adapted to the changes of the new war paradigm in 
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the 21st century. I will engage with both the research questions and the research 
paradigm through the lens of grounded theory. The process of data collection was 
facilitated by using qualitative semi-structured interviews as well as document 
analysis. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections: (1) research design, (2) data collection; 
and, (3) data analysis. I shall begin by outlining the research design.  
 
Research Design 
 
The aim of the research design is to explain how all key parts of the research work 
together to articulate the research questions. This includes the research sample, 
data management, and the analytical framework. The way research questions are 
addressed is vital to identify philosophical approaches and to address the central 
research problem. The research design provides ‘a framework for the collection 
and analysis of data’ (Bryman, 2012, p.46), therefore it must be robust, 
accessible, relevant, ethical, and concise, with practical strategies for collecting 
and managing qualitative data in an iterative process (Creswell, 2014; Green & 
Stoneman, 2016). Gubrium and Hoolstein’s phrase ‘method talk’ (1997, cited in 
Travers, 2001, p.9), is a useful tool to describe the rationale of the epistemology 
of this study. For instance, choosing philosophical viewpoints provides a useful 
approach to construct an analytical framework, and offer a rich and inclusive 
interpretation of the data through the lens of peoples’ experiences.  
 
In the first part of this chapter I will give a brief summary of the methodological 
concepts that have been applied to this research. 
 
Qualitative Methodology 
 
As previously mentioned in the introductory chapters, the work presented in this 
thesis is based on a qualitative approach. This research method offers insights into 
aspects of human experience, to seek an in-depth understanding of the particular 
social phenomena of war journalism and military policy from the perspective of 
the people who are being investigated via multiple systems of inquiry (Langdridge, 
2007; Hennink et al., 2011). The quality of any qualitative study is primarily 
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determined by choosing applicable methods that fit the task, data, and analytical 
framework of the thesis. The design for this study was systematically developed 
with the following question in mind: what type of pieces of evidence do I need to 
collect to support my arguments to ensure the research design ‘deals with logical 
problems and not a logistical problem’ (Yin, 1989, p.29). The principal method of 
my fieldwork was a qualitative. Note that a ‘qualitative approach is well suited to 
investigating work practices and managerial styles and carrying out organisational 
research’ (Doyle & Frith, 2004, p.6) and therefore suited this research topic by 
allowing participants to narrate their stories, experiences, and comments in a 
structured process.  
 
Bryman (1988, p.61, cited in Prior, 1997, p.64) states that ‘the most fundamental 
characteristic of qualitative research is its express commitment to viewing events, 
actions, “norms”, values etc., from the perspective of the people who are being 
studied’. However, other sources are useful to employ in qualitative research, 
such as academic literature, observation, and official documents, to better 
understand the social phenomenon being studied. Indeed, one justification for 
qualitative research is that it is generated from the meaning which emerges from 
the data, unlike a quantitative approach which utilises a numerical method to test 
a hypothesis or questions deduced from theory (Wilmot, 2005). For some, 
qualitative methods are often described as ‘a naturalistic, interpretative 
approach, concerned with exploring phenomena “from the interior”’ (Flick, 2009, 
p. 3, cited in Ritchie et al., 2013). Such methods seek to understand what 
respondents think and how they feel, aiming to address ‘how?’, ‘why?’ and ‘what?’ 
in order to provide valid and reliable data on respondents’ emotional and 
contextual aspects (Dongre et al., 2009).  
 
This research’s focus begins with the query of ‘how can I explore the ways that 
war reporters have developed to engage with the complexity of armed conflicts 
within the context of transformation in the characteristics of new war in the 21st 
century?’. War journalists have experienced multiple challenges based on the 
circumstances that affect their personal judgement as eyewitnesses to conflict 
events. Emerging questions arising from this complex experience will look at other 
factors that have had an influence on war journalists’ field practice, such as 
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emergent trends of war in the period after Iraq War (2003), the role of military 
doctrines in managing information strategies in modern warfare, and the power 
of new communication technology which has influenced how wars are conducted 
and reported. The process of data collection will be demonstrated in Section Two 
of this chapter. The findings of the data are supported by reviewing the challenges 
of the practice of war journalism and the impact of new technology on war 
reportage in the period of post-Iraq War 2003, a period that has marked a new 
milestone in the military-media relationship. Additionally, the civil war in Syria 
and other conflicts in the Middle East region, such as Libya, North Iraq and Yemen, 
and the conflict in the Ukraine, were chosen to further support the research 
questions by providing an in-depth understanding of new trends in war journalism 
practice, and the military's media management policies.  
 
The interpretive paradigm of this study therefore seeks to collect subjective 
interpretations about the social action in war zones (Snape & Spencer, 2006, cited 
in Hennink et al., 2011). In general, these interpretations will be obtained by 
looking at multiple approaches that have attempted to investigate gathering 
knowledge about the social world. A qualitative approach has been applied to 
media research to emphasise the unique experiences of war journalists across 
cultures and synergies with other professionals (Scannell, 2006). 
 
In addition, by acknowledging reflexivity in the process of data collection, my 
position should be understood as being part of the social world that I have 
investigated (Hennink et al., 2011). Consequently, examining the practice of 
journalism in the frontline leads us towards broader issues and rich insights on 
factors that play vital roles in journalists giving meaning to war stories, such as 
the role of values and ideology, human interest, the hierarchy of media 
organisation, media routine, communication skills, identity, and the challenges of 
competitor market factors.  
 
The critical point here is to develop a conceptual framework to conduct 
qualitative research in alignment with grounded theory. 
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Grounded Theory 
 
Grounded theory originated in the work of Glaser and Strauss in 1965, 1968 and 
1970 when they proposed systematic methodological strategies to analyse death 
and dying in hospitals (Charmaz, 2014). Corbin and Strauss (1990) state that 
grounded theory is a research method used to collect and analyse emerging data 
that is derived inductively through the process of studying the social phenomenon. 
At a time when a qualitative approach was losing its momentum in the US, Glaser 
and Strauss proposed their analytic framework to move the research process 
beyond description, which included data collection, and building codes and 
categories from emerging data by employing constant comparison methods and 
memo-writing techniques to define gaps and select samples for theory 
development (Charmaz, 2014). Thus, grounded theory provides an analytical tool 
to direct and manage data collection and construct original analysis (Charmaz, 
2006, p.2). 
 
Charmaz offers a balanced perspective between those who advocate on 
objectivist grounded approach to quantitative studies and constructivist scholars 
who demand grounded theory should be used for qualitative studies (Riessman, 
2006). Charmaz (2014, p.12) claims that ‘constructivist grounded theory adopts 
the inductive comparative, emergent, and open-ended approach of Glaser and 
Strauss’ (1967) original statement’. Indeed, people construct their images and 
perception of events according to their interpretation of what their senses tell 
them. Single events become connected to other events. For example, some of the 
unembedded war reporters and media researchers have described the embedded 
system with the US and UK militaries as a bad agreement that has spoiled the 
notion of credibility of the Western mainstream media during the Iraq War in 2003 
(Tumber & Palmer, 2003a; Cockburn, 2010). However, the US and UK forces have 
conducted a counterinsurgency operation in Northern Iraq and Syria since the fall 
of Iraq in 2003 which made the establishment of an embedded system unlikely 
possible in the frontline in such circumstances due to the extent of violence in the 
battlefields. In this sense, accessing frontlines has become more complicated for 
war reporters without the logistical support from states’ professional military 
forces such as those of the US, UK, or NATO. Developing cumulative knowledge 
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about the social world is based on our self-reflection rather than only on our lived 
experiences (Ormston et al., 2014). Unlike classic grounded theory that gives more 
weight to emerging data to discover a theory, Charmaz (2014, p.17) indicates that 
‘we construct our grounded theories through our past and present involvements 
and interactions with people, perspectives and research practice’. Therefore, it 
has been argued that many shared memories are documented and communicated 
through language, which can be analysed in order to understand the 
phenomenological context of an individual’s social practice (Matheson, 2005, p.4).  
 
Interestingly, working in a complicated situation such as the theatre of war that 
is dominated by powerful agents who are capable of limiting the flow of 
information, explores the dilemma of the act of the war reporting. Here, I will 
describe the significant conflict between ethical journalistic values and reality. 
Grounded theory was selected for this project because the conceptual categories 
can be identified, refined, and integrated throughout the process of analysis to 
establish a relationship between categories to construct theory 'grounded' in the 
data itself.  
 
This project has benefited from a constructivist grounded approach, which aims 
to explain the phenomena under investigation rather than relying on a pre-existing 
theory. Choosing grounded theory for this project has the following benefits 
(Stern, 1994; Glaser, 1998; Charmaz, 2014): 
 It provides flexible guidelines, rather than structured models to identify 
knowledge gaps, make sense of the data and identify the implications of 
the research. Sensitising concepts such as new war, control, 
disinformation, values, bias, etc. should work as a guide to develop ideas 
but should not control the assumptions of the inquiry. The term ‘sensitizing 
concepts’ emerges ‘when the observer discovers something worth 
problematizing, “addressing” the concept to the objects of investigation, 
producing precise and accurate evidence of chosen phenomena’ (Faulkner, 
2009, pp.82–86). 
 Researchers are urged to be reflexive while observing the phenomena, 
including what they record, and how they record and organise first-hand 
information throughout the process of data collection and transcription.  
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 It simultaneously allows the coding and categorising of data from multiple 
sources during the process of data collection. 
 It helps the researcher to develop a research strategy by focusing on 
distinct viewpoints, as the researcher improves their knowledge about 
specific details and particular situations.   
 It helps the researcher to restate the qualitative research problem as 
emergent data appears while interviewing and gathering documents. 
 It provides a feasible approach to analyse documents that are associated to 
the field study.   
 
Qualitative analysis employs different methods such as observation, interviewing, 
ethnographic fieldwork, document analysis, discourse analysis, and textual 
analysis (Travers, 2001, p.2). Due to the limitations of this research, I applied a 
mixed method approach that included interviewing and document analysis. 
Employing mixed methods allowed the findings from different and multiple 
sources to be checked, thereby reducing systematic bias in the process of data 
collection. 
 
Interviewing 
 
Social science scholars take different approaches to deal with issues of how to 
interpret the data that has been collected in interviews. On one side, positivists 
propose that the ‘pure interview’ serves as a ‘mirror of reflection’ to an objective 
understanding of reality in the social world. On the other side, radical social 
constructionists have voiced scepticism regarding knowledge obtained via 
interactive interviews, which are constructed by both participants (interviewer 
and interviewee) to describe ‘out there’, according to their roles in constructing 
their own narrative of the social world (Miller & Glassner, 1997). This research 
cannot provide an absolute reflection of war journalists’ social world, as 
positivists claim, due to its limitations such as sample and geographical 
challenges, but it does attempt to reflect their experiences on the frontline. 
Although an interview is itself a symbolic interaction, the possibility of gaining 
knowledge from practical accounts is feasible (Miller & Glassner, 1997).  
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Therefore, in order to document journalists’ experiences, I employed qualitative 
intensive semi-structured interviews to achieve a depth of mutual, interactive 
understanding. This type of interview is situated between structured and focused 
interviews, where the researcher has the freedom to generate questions beyond 
the interviewee’s answers, and expand on issues as they are raised (May, 1999). 
A semi-structured interview employs methods, techniques and processes that 
reflect a subjective approach; one which analyses the implications of knowledge 
produced from the social world and focuses on the constructed reality of people’s 
understanding of their social world (Sarantakos, 2005). During an intensive 
interview the combination of focused attention and open-ended questions are 
vital for grounded theory, focusing on the emergence of conceptual categories 
and the interpretation of qualitative data (Langdridge, 2007; Charmaz, 2014). I 
aimed to provide an authentic insight into respondents’ lived experiences through 
semi-structured interviews (Silverman, 1993, cited in Miller & Glassner, 1997). 
Thus, my task was to present respondent perspectives in a fair way and describe 
the work aspects that were shaped by their subjective political views and cultural 
understanding. Dealing with multiple and fragmented discourses occurs through a 
long process of conducting qualitative interviews, starting from the moment of 
identifying research coding and categorising units of analysis, scheduling meetings 
and, finally, transcribing, and analysing the findings of the data gathered. 
 
Reflexivity is important throughout the research of this study. Hennink et al. 
(2011, p.20) indicate two aspects of reflexivity that may influence data created 
from qualitative research: personal and interpersonal. As part of a human being, 
‘personal reflexivity’ can be recognised in a researcher’s behaviour, attitude, and 
personal values such as social background, experience, and assumptions. 
However, ‘interpersonal reflexivity’ deals with the general atmosphere of the 
interview setting, as a participant may feel uncomfortable in an interview.  
 
I will explain in the section of Data Collection the process of recruiting 
participants for this study. However, it is vital to mention that this research 
grouped its research population into two categories: (1) distinguished war 
reporters who work for major media outlets in the UK; and (2) media operations 
experts at the UK’s Ministry of Defence. The first phase of my data collection was 
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to select a representative sample of veteran war journalists who had covered 
more than one conflict. I did so via snowball sampling (Dongre et al., 2009). The 
overall purpose was to describe their perspectives, expectations, and perceived 
challenges as a result of their involvement in war reporting. The research 
population incorporated a mixture of full-time and freelance journalists, and ones 
who represented newspapers, broadcasting, and news agencies in the UK. Social 
media users such as activists, bloggers, YouTubers, Twitter users, etc., were 
excluded from this study as the primary focus was on those who represent the 
traditional media in newspapers, broadcasting, and news agencies. 
 
The second phase of my data collection was to approach the UK Ministry of 
Defence. The aim was to meet key military media officers with long-term 
experience in planning, producing, and managing media operation policies in the 
UK Armed Forces, particularly in joint military operations. I assumed that the 
bilateral relationship between my country (Oman) and the UK, which has a long 
history based on mutual strategic interests, would facilitate access to the military 
headquarters in Northwood or other military units. In fact, I had the opportunity 
to work with the UK Armed Forces in September 2001, while 9/11 took place, as 
Oman and the UK conducted the military exercise ‘Swift Sword 2’ in Oman. 
However, none of those assumptions were helpful because my contacts were not 
able to help. 
 
In the following subsection, I shall talk about the second method I employed for 
this research: document analysis.  
 
Document Analysis 
 
Documents provide rich, substantial, and generous data, but also can be too 
subjective, time-consuming and lacking sufficient data (Bowen, 2009). 
Organisational documents, such as yearly reports, doctrines, books, instructions, 
guidelines, etc., offer important details just like other sources for evaluation and 
interpretation. Documents help to extract meanings that are rigorously tested, as 
they produce factual data that helps to support theoretical and empirical research 
(Labuschagne, 2003; Rapley, 2007; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Bowen, 2009). As 
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grounded theory developed through the process of generating themes that emerge 
inductively out of data (Morse and Field, 1995), the rationality of employing 
document analysis in qualitative research is to investigate convergence and 
corroboration as a source of evidence by triangulating data collection. In effect, 
this method minimises the risk of being biased, such as when the study relies only 
on a single source (Bowen, 2009). For the purpose of this research, I was keen to 
support my findings with UK military documents (e.g. doctrines, reports and 
guidelines) alongside other military publications from the US and NATO such as 
the National Security Strategy of the United States, National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism, and NATO Military Public Affairs Policy. Appendex (1) shows 
the list of military and governmental documents used in this research. 
 
It is important to mention that the documents in question contained text, images, 
visuals (charts and graphs), definitions, quotations, and specific discourse 
appropriate to the military community. Therefore, the process of coding the 
language being used in these documents focused on drawing relations between 
concepts, objects, and the process of incorporating war reporters into the war 
efforts as well as constructing positive images about military business (Rid, 2007; 
Maltby, 2012b). Fowler (1991, p.10) claims that ‘anything that is said or written 
about the world is articulated from a particular ideological position: language is 
not a clear window but a refracting, structuring medium’. Thus, documents 
represent an author's perspective, aimed at achieving specific goals in a certain 
time. As Charmaz (2014) has also argued, documents are not just a record of 
events or policies, but a discourse to be read in the right context; whether aiming 
to explore, justify, or to explain actions in relation to structural and situational 
context.  
 
As part of this research, as I was concerned with the structure of the military-
media relationship in a British context, relevant documents were selected based 
on criteria being given by the UK military. The functionality of media operations 
policies within the military’s structure is linked to other military doctrines, such 
as Info Ops, communications, cyber warfare, Psy Ops, and other government 
publications that are relevant to the national strategy. As I adopted an outsider 
approach, my literature review was helpful at the beginning of this research to 
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determine what type of documents I should consider and how they could be 
accessed. Navigating previous empirical studies on the military-media relationship 
in the post-Iraq War of 2003, particularly in the US, the UK, and NATO, was the 
first step to generate a list of documents needed for this project. Soon after I 
gathered all the required information, the Google was used then to check the 
availability of the documents I had identified on the internet. Fortunately, the 
major documents I listed were available to access online, except for some 
classified notes that have restricted access or were not posted, but document 
availability did not affect my findings in general.  
 
One of the most crucial tasks of research design is how to formulate simple, 
concise and answerable questions: these are usually derived from previous 
reading, media reports, personal experience or observation (Green & Stoneman 
2016, pp.45–47). The next subsection highlights the process of articulating the 
research questions. 
 
Research Questions 
 
As I have been engaged with the process of conducting social research in the 
doctorate programme at CCPR, University of Glasgow, since Autumn 2015 I have 
been driven by personal motivation, alongside long-term experience comprised of 
more than 22 years spent in media operation activities in the Royal Navy of Oman 
and Oman's National Defence College. Therefore, the research questions reflect 
my interest in formulating a critical appraisal of the practice of war journalism in 
war zones, and in military media management strategies. Although I approached 
this field broadly, with little knowledge of the relevant literature, I was able to 
develop my research skills as I joined more than 22 academic workshops, attended 
CCPR research sessions, and became involved in regular supervisory meetings, and 
local, and international conferences. The end goal was to maintain a high level of 
motivation and enthusiasm throughout research as studying such sophisticated 
issues became more challenging and demanding.  
 
Blaikie (2000, cited in Green & Stoneman, 2016, p.51) suggests that there are 
three types of research question: the question of what provides descriptions of 
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social phenomena, the question of how concerns the process, and the question of 
why aims to understand causes and reasons. As the central focus of this research 
is to describe the process of integrating war reporters into military culture, a 
mixture of these three types of questions: what, how, and why, were employed 
in respect to the research objectives, and data collected. 
 
The key three research questions of this thesis were structured in three analysis 
chapters as follows: 
 
Chapter Four: How have new tactics been devised by the military to incorporate 
journalism into the war effort while minimising disruptive forms of reporting? This 
question seeks to describe the current relationship between the military and 
media in terms of the new war in the British context, such as the revolution in 
military doctrines, organisational structure, and information management 
strategies. Additionally, it aims to discuss the limitations of incorporating local 
and international journalism into the UK military’s war efforts because of changes 
in the war paradigm and the nature of war tactics.  
 
Chapter Five: In what ways has war journalism changed since the occupation of 
Iraq in 2003? Through this question, the aim is to describe the character of 
wartime journalism as a practice after the invasion/occupation of Iraq, when US, 
and UK forces implemented an embedded system for organising press-military 
relations. Indeed, looking into individual perspectives is vital to map out a set of 
codes related to practising war journalism, as the characteristics of war have 
changed since the post-Cold War era. The findings identify a set of challenges that 
war correspondents encountered in war zones in terms of changing circumstances 
(performance, events and effects) and social interaction (structure, functions and 
social system) either in the form of embedded journalism with military units, or 
in the form of unilateralism (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008).  
 
Chapter Six: How has the development of a hybrid media ecology made the role 
of professional war reporters vulnerable in a fast-changing situation? This question 
looks at the third argument of this project by analysing how the revolution in 
digitalisation has affected the ethical role of wartime journalism. Certainly, the 
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results of the two previous questions will help to articulate the struggle of war 
reporters who represent the UK’s traditional media to mitigate the risk of carrying 
out frontline coverage in ‘new war’ environments. 
 
The next subsection outlines the research approach that has been taken in this 
study. 
 
Challenges of Fieldwork 
 
The key point here is to review methods and strategies that have been applied to 
the collection of field data. What emerges from this journey can be divided into 
three phases, which include planning, executing, and reviewing the collected 
information. As I was about to embark on conducting interviews with selected 
journalists who were directly involved in war reporting over the last two decades, 
I had to ensure that the list of the journalists contained a mixture of staff and 
freelancers who worked for British media outlets. In the meantime, I approached 
the UK's Ministry of Defence to facilitate meeting with military media officers who 
played a substantial role in the production of media operations policy, and had 
been on the frontline associated with military units in running information 
management strategies over the last 20 years. 
 
The process of data collection was divided into two stages: the first stage aimed 
to produce a list of war journalists and to collect their data to ensure their names 
met the purpose of the thesis. In this stage, I adopted an outside-in approach. My 
outsider status offered a general understanding of the complexity of the current 
military-media relationship in a British context. Despite the lack of knowledge on 
the diversity of the UK media culture, as Robson (2002, cited in Gallais, 2003) 
suggests I spent considerable time exploring the ‘environment of the study’ 
(italics in original) the better to know my ‘strange’ world. Certainly, this approach 
provided me with some reflexive tools to avoid bias while collecting information 
about targeted participants. For instance, to avoid labelling them according to 
their organisation, positions, political orientation, ideology, ethnicity, colour, 
age, and sex. It also provided more opportunities to access a wide-variety of media 
institutions across the UK, instead of being constrained with a few limited media 
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establishments. As such, I was confidently able, at that moment, to suggest some 
names representing major media outlets in the UK, such as veteran journalists 
who worked for the BBC, The Guardian, The Times, Sky TV, Channel 4, and other 
distinguished freelancers.   
 
However, as a person from outside the local community, I experienced feelings of 
anxiety, tension, and waves of panic because of the lack of available information 
about British war journalists. I approached several research centres, which were 
supposed to have access to data, such as Chatham House, and the Frontline Club 
in London, but their response was negative as they indicated that British law 
protects the disclosure of personal information. Thus, I rethought my options and 
approached the official sites of my participants' organisations to ask them for help. 
Day after day, I was surprised by the information I gathered through this method 
– which provided me with much personal satisfaction. 
 
Initially, when considering this option, I was worried that the participants I had 
targeted would treat my invitation as spam or a junk mail. I realised from the 
beginning that my participants’ busy schedule would be a significant obstacle and 
lead them to reject or ignore my emails. I sent 29 invitations, I conducted 19 
interviews. Two of the respondents even apologised for not being able to take 
part in this research because they thought their contributions would no longer be 
beneficial to the research, as they had already talked about their experiences of 
war reporting in their own publications, or left the profession some years ago. 
Appendix (2) shows journalists interviewd for this project.  
 
The hardest and longest part of my work was establishing contact with the UK 
Ministry of Defence. Here I adopted several strategies to approach the designated 
military units. Initially, I had to brief them about my projects’ objectives, which 
university I represented, and what kind of support I was requesting. I utilized my 
military background for the purpose of building trust with my participants by 
explaining that I had connections within the UK Armed Forces and some strategic 
studies centres in the UK such as Chatham House and the Frontline Club. Similarly, 
I sent an official letter to the Oman Military Attaché at the Embassy of Oman in 
London, asking him to officially approach the UK MoD to get access to some 
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military units that look at the media and information operations responsible for 
producing, monitoring, and running media operations, especially after the Iraq 
War in 2003.  
 
Unfortunately, after more than year and a half of continuously contacting the 
person who was appointed to facilitate my research requirements, their response 
was inefficient because of poor information provided by the liaison officer. 
Additionally, the MoD’s think tank, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre (DCDC), rejected my application to talk to their staff without providing 
more details – despite the fact that I had relied heavily upon the healthy 
relationship between Oman and the UK especially in defence and military training 
perspectives. The moment I realised that all official doors were closed to establish 
a reliable contact within the MoD, I had no other options left but to make a 
personal call to a senior officer in the British Army who I used to know. I hoped to 
use this connection to break through the inflexible bureaucratic system that was 
providing a barrier to the research. Therefore, an approach to a retired General, 
David Richards, was very helpful to the fieldwork. Baron Richards of Herstmonceux 
used to be the Chief of the Defence Staff, and served as a commander of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Southern Afghanistan between 
2006 and 2008. I have known General Richards since 2014 when he gave a series 
of presentations about national security at the National Defence College in Oman. 
He certainly welcomed my invitation, offering his personal support to the project 
by introducing me to some media officers in the British Army, as well as 
contributing to the thesis by reflecting on his personal experiences as an army 
commander in confronting the media in several conflicts, particularly in Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan. In fact, his arrangements with the office of General Sir 
Nicholas Patrick Carter, Chief of the Defence Staff, to get support from designated 
military departments was very helpful. All correspondence and arrangements for 
meeting Baron Richards included getting a security pass to enter the Peers’ 
Entrance at the House of Lords was arranged through his executive assistant, 
Charlotte Smith, who was very professional and cooperative. Our correspondence 
began in November 2017 until the actual day of meeting which was on Wednesday 
6th February 2018. 
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The second stage of data collection concerned organising my travel to London in 
a way that would help, within the limited span of time we had and within the 
limited access to their units, to arrange inclusive interviews with war 
correspondents. However, the engagement process took more extended time and 
effort than anticipated, and I was under pressure to schedule several meetings, 
arrange travel and secure access. It worked successfully sometimes but, on the 
other hand, it was frustrating as some journalists were travelling because of their 
commitments abroad. I made five visits to London. Each visit lasted between one 
to three days because I was a single parent, at that time, and I couldn’t leave my 
two children on their own in Glasgow so childcare arrangements had to be made 
to cover each visit.  
 
I will now explain the data collection stage in more detail. 
 
Data Collection 
 
The objectives of this research were to analyse individual and institutional 
perspectives to fully reflect complex, unstable and changeable armed conflicts, 
in an ambiguous and uncertain political environment.  
 
The data collection process included sampling and ethical considerations. I shall 
start this section with the method used to select respondents, which includes 
approaching candidates, describing the challenges of fieldwork and explaining the 
rationale behind recruiting research participants.  
 
Participant Recruitment 
 
It is important for qualitative research practices to achieve fair and robust results 
by designing and developing a well-constructed sampling strategy that applies an 
unbiased, accurate reflection of the researched population, and a robust 
framework. As previously described in the section above, I prepared a list of 
names, addresses, contact numbers, and emails of the perspective respondents 
(see Appendixes 2 and 3). The research utilised snowball sampling driven by the 
respondents. This is a method of non-probability sampling where existing 
participants nominate other potential participants to take part in the study; 
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participants who share similar characteristics, meet the eligibility criteria, and 
whose contribution to the study are considered potentially significant (Dongre et 
al., 2009).  
 
I realised from the beginning that the number of participants was going to increase 
in size as more connections were made, but I decided to avoid using a larger 
sample, and focused on a small and select group of professionals which would 
enable me to reach data saturation based on the quality of the interviews, and to 
accomplish the research objectives within the available time span and resources 
(McCracken, 1988; Marshall et al., 2013). I decided on an overall target of 20 to 
30 respondents due to saturation and to ‘facilitate the researcher’s close 
association with the respondents, and enhance the validity of fine-grained, in-
depth inquiry in naturalistic settings’ (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006, p. 1). Glaser 
and Stern (cited in Charmaz, 2014, p.33) claim that small samples do not affect 
findings because the purpose of grounded theory is to create conceptual 
categories that explore relations between categories and discover their 
properties. In the early stages, I began by looking for details of war journalists on 
specific websites, such as the BBC, The Guardian, The Times, Sky News, Channel 
4, and also at research institutions in London. For example, Chatham House, the 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the International News Safety Institute 
(INSI), the Frontline Club, the Institute of War, and the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS). Although I discovered how poor these websites are, 
regarding the availability of updated information on how to reach war reporters, 
it was relatively helpful because I made direct contact with the front desks in 
each organization. In this way I was able to asking them to provide me with 
specific details, such as the names of people who performed war reportage beside 
their official or personal contacts. It was very stressful and time-consuming but, 
in the end, using this method I succeeded in collecting important data about my 
participants.  
 
The first call I made was to Caroline Wyatt of the BBC who was the first person to 
agree to talk about her experiences as a BBC former defence correspondent. 
Caroline was well known for her reports during the Iraq War in 2003 when she was 
attached to several British Army units. To make my first visit to the BBC beneficial, 
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Caroline introduced me to her colleagues Jonathan Beale and Paul Adam. Both of 
them served as defence correspondents at the BBC between 2003 and 2018. 
Following this first meeting, recruiting more participants became much easier 
than at the early stages of the research due to snowballing.  
 
Certainly, I received a positive response when I referenced the BBC interviews 
with potential correspondents, aiming to build trust with my participants and 
offering flexible methods of interviewing: face to face, if possible, or by Skype, 
phone call, or email. Eleven of my interviews were conducted between November 
2016 and February 2018. These interviews lasted 30 minutes to 1 hour. I made two 
more visits to the BBC in London on November 2016 and February 2017 to meet 
Lyse Doucet and Jeremy Bowen. Despite the fact that Lyse Doucet is a Canadian, 
her position as chief international correspondent at the BBC was too valuable to 
the research findings to pass up. In fact, her experience was invaluable in terms 
of how she faced multiple threats when, wearing a male uniform, she sneaked 
into tribal communities ruled by radical clerics like the Taliban in Afghanistan, to 
talk to the people in the late 1980s. David Pratt, a journalist of The Herald, also 
entered Afghanistan surreptitiously in the same period but by wearing a traditional 
Afghani women’s outfit.  
 
The next subsection looks at the ethical concerns from a theoretical and practical 
perspective. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
This project was submitted to the ethics committee for approval in accordance 
with the University of Glasgow ethical policy. As Weber (1946, cited in Silverman, 
2014, p.140) stresses, almost all research is influenced by the values of the 
researcher and, as such, one ethical dilemma is to treat the people being studied 
and their stories with appropriate care and responsibility. Hammersley (1999, 
p.18, cited in Edwards & Mauthner, 2012) points out that researchers in the past 
were more ethically concerned to set boundaries on their research techniques, 
carrying out the process of the research in terms of the quality of information that 
they produced. However, since then a researcher’s ethical concerns have 
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expanded to involve other factors during fieldwork, such as participant treatment 
and knowledge itself, political aims, and personal perspectives (Gillies & Alldred, 
2012). The data was analysed by maintaining a balance between the interviewee’s 
personal and professional perspectives regarding their experiences in practising 
journalism in times of conflicts. Debates on ethical research demand that the 
researcher retains their sense of moral deliberation, choice and personal 
accountability throughout the entire research process (Edwards & Mauthner, 
2002). The ethics of epistemology have been a focus amongst researchers driven 
by general principles such as honesty, responsibility, justice and respect (Edwards 
& Mauthner, 2002) regardless of contrast and tensions between diverse ethical 
approaches.  
 
In order to develop a constructive ethical framework, I created a set of goals to 
achieve during the research process: 
a. To ensure objectivity, impartiality, and responsibility throughout the research 
process by building good relationships with respondents and positively engaging 
with them from the early stages of the research. 
b. To ensure mutual trust with the people studied, by focusing on the value of 
their contribution to the research. 
c. To protect people’s identity and their points of view. 
d. To avoid any harm to respondents or contradicting their ideologies during the 
interview process.  
e. To be aware of biases occurring during analysis. 
 
To achieve these goals, I ensured that the respondents had all the details they 
needed with regard to the nature, aims, and questions of the research. 
Furthermore, the respondents were informed about their rights during the 
interviews, such as data protection, recording, and cancelling or withdrawing from 
the interviews at any time before being asked to sign a consent form.   
 
In addition, to my ethics procedure, the next section will shed light on the 
principles and mechanisms of the data collection. 
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Data Analysis 
 
It is recommended that qualitative data collection should be an ‘ongoing’ or 
‘iterative’ process, which is achievable by combining several data collection 
methods (Dongre et al., 2009). Employing such logically sequenced methods aids 
the researcher to explore and display the strengths and limitations of each 
selected method, and consider whether the chosen method is feasible for 
particular questions. Indeed, data analysis provides the desired knowledge for the 
research project, and is not only cost-effective, adjustable to the resources 
available at a given time, but also based on the overall strategy of the study and 
its conceptual framework (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).  
 
The data analysis for this study begins with interview transcription. Creawell 
(2006, cited by Remler & Ryzin 2011) indicates that analysing qualitative data 
employs three strategies: organising the data, creating codes, and describing 
themes in narrative form. The process of data analysis integrates analysis with the 
collection of interviews and other forms of data until we feel the data reaches a 
saturation level (Remler and Ryzin 2011). Additionally, data analysis involves 
being immersed in the data to identify the exclusive experience of participants’ 
contribution and develop a theory based on people's perspectives (Hennink et al., 
2011).  
 
In fact, my approach to qualitative data analysis was based on the inductive 
strategies of grounded theory. In this section, I will describe the process of 
building the analytical framework, coding, and ensuring the reliability, and 
validity of the research. 
 
The Process of Analysis 
 
This research was extremely focused on exploring the new landscape of wartime 
journalism to study what has emerged in war reporting phenomena in the digital 
age regarding the structure of relations, functional, and technological 
developments. The information requested from participants provided generous 
answers to the set of questions I asked, such as ‘What happened on the warfront?’, 
‘How do reporters plan for their journey?’, ‘What are their motivations?’, ‘How 
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do they experience distance from their home and family?’, ‘How do they manage 
to get out of the dead zone?’, ‘What are the fundamental challenges while 
attached to task forces in foreign assignments?’, ‘How do they respond to 
contemporary issues such as the pressures of news deadlines, competitive media 
culture, and the implications of 24/7 news?’, and finally, ‘What are their concerns 
about safety?’ These collections of queries were important at the beginning of my 
journey when I was about to embark on setting up interviews and schedule 
meetings with my interviewees. The questions were selected to shape our 
conversation with a set of questions that helped participants to recall memories 
about their opinions and attitudes. Moreover, the questions examine how 
reporters are able to present a kind of broad and accurate representation of what 
is going on the ground as it is despite the numerous players in combat zones. 
Indeed, the testimony of my interviewees and their autobiographies provide more 
insights into war reporting so as to understand how this experience could affect 
the strategic behaviour of the state/military in dealing with media operations 
during a time of war – as I will show in the chapters that follow. 
 
Document analysis was employed to provide more insights into the practice and 
ethics of war reporting, and to avoid the risk of interviews lacking depth in their 
perspectives of contemporary war journalism and emerging issues in the digital 
era. I was aware of the subjective discourse that might arise from individuals’ 
testimonies, and their psychological attitudes towards their experiences and 
political ideology. So I decided to remain objective in asking questions and avoid 
engaging in unending debates on sensitive issues. However, in a few cases I asked 
interviewees for more details when I felt their feedback lacked balancing or 
contextual information. 
 
I have to admit that most of the participants showed a willingness to help and 
support my project despite their busy daily lives. Some of them generously offered 
to introduce me to their friends and colleagues, and facilitated my admission to 
their organisation – as most of them required an official pass to get in. One of the 
veteran journalists offered an interview at his house which reflects the high level 
of trust that he awarded to me. Moreover, I originally arranged to meet one of 
the defence correspondents in Manchester, as he lectures at the University of 
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Manchester, but because of a sudden commitment which I couldn't postpone, he 
agreed to an interview by telephone which I really valued and appreciated. 
 
Following my supervisors’ advice, I armed myself with a backup recorder and 
notebook to take the main notes while conducting interviews. Also, I knew from 
my previous experience that technology sometimes betrays researchers, so before 
each meeting I checked both recorders to make sure that they were functioning. 
Moreover, I documented my interviews by taking selfie pictures with my 
participants at the end of each interview as evidence that the interview took place 
between us (see Appendix 4).  
 
The next subsection discusses how the analytical coding was constructed. 
 
Constructing Codes 
 
Coding is the primary method of analysis in grounded theory. It clarifies ‘the 
ongoing process of assigning conceptual labels to different segments of data in 
order to identify themes, patterns, processes and relationships’ (Gilbert, 2008, 
p.87). Coding entails a combination of constant comparative methods and 
researcher engagements to discover the relationship between emergent themes 
and lived experience (Charmaz, 2014, p.321). The process of coding includes two 
types of qualitative data analysis: data reduction and the coding itself. Miles and 
Huberman (1994, p.11) identify data reduction as ‘a form of analysis that 
sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and organises data in such a way that “final” 
conclusions can be drawn and verified’. My coding procedures took different 
approaches throughout this project. Coding began during earlier research stages, 
when the central themes of journalism and war reporting (Chapter Two) were 
identified and enabled me to design and determine the scope of the research. 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) state that the coding process consists of three levels of 
building codes: (a) open coding; (b) axial coding; and, (c) selective coding. In all 
three stages, the researcher compares data, understands connections, and 
chooses the core categories that fit his/her analysis (Kolb, 2012). At an 
organisational level, coding helps to explore participant meaning, to understand 
new actions, and to discover patterns and contrasts (Charmaz, 2014). In addition, 
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it describes what happens in the data by separating, sorting and synthesising these 
data into themes during qualitative coding analysis (Charmaz, 2006, p.2).  
 
With regard to this thesis, my set of research questions are sorted into two 
categories: the first category looks at the general challenges that war reporters 
have experienced while operating with or without military units, particularly in 
Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003, and the war against ISIS in Mosul in 2016. The 
second category emphasises the current challenges that staff correspondents and 
local producers face during the ongoing civil war in Syria, Northern Iraq, and the 
Ukraine. All of these questions aim to answer the major research questions 
outlined at the start of this chapter and in the Introduction. Thematic analysis 
was established to understand personal and media outlet arrangements which 
facilitated the access of military teams to war zones and the journalists’ views 
towards their safety and the safety of their team while operating with the 
professional military or getting support from local fixers on the ground.  
 
Interpreting meaning and actions in the data, by employing thematic coding and 
sensitising concepts, can help to pinpoint the common threads that can be 
obtained throughout a set of interviews (Bowen, 2009). I generated a set of 
analysis codes and divided them into themes, categories, and subcategories (see 
tables 5 and 6). Sensitising concepts provide the researcher with a ‘general sense 
of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive 
concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitising concepts merely suggest 
directions along which to look’ (Blumer, 1954, cited in Bowen, 2006, p.2). 
Sensitising concepts includes ‘action, meaning, process, agency, situation, 
identity, and self’ (Charmaz, 2014, p.117). Indeed, the whole set of open-ended 
questions used in the interviews was designed to encourage participants to self-
reflect on their personal experiences from the front line. As advised by Charmaz 
(2014, p.114), the purpose of coding is to help researchers to remain vigilant to 
all emerging theoretical directions that are revealed by engaging with the data; 
directions that might be different from the initial plan or grant proposal. 
Therefore, one goal of using thematic themes is to create a matrix of patterns 
and interrelationships from the data. As such, sensitising concepts were used to 
shape the conceptual framework as they emerged. 
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Although reliability and validity are more attached to quantitative research, the 
following subsection explains why it is important to use these two terms in relation 
to qualitative research. 
  
Reliability and Validity 
 
In qualitative research practice, reliability, and validity are important issues to 
ensure that the research is considered to be objective, accountable, and achieves 
inclusiveness in its recordings and transcripts (Perakyla, 1997, p.201, in Silverman, 
2014). Questions of reliability and validity for this research are relevant to this 
research, as I have employed semi-structured interviews with a number of 
professional journalists, military personnel, and document analysis. Testing the 
gathered data paves the ground for describing it as reliable and valid. Unlike 
testing reliability in quantitative research projects through pre-catagorised results 
that ideally show the same reading on repeated trials, reliability can be achieved 
in qualitative research in the following two ways: ensuring transparency of the 
research process, and ensuring theoretical transparency, so that the research 
methods can be assessed and repeated by others (Moisander & Valtonen, 2006, 
cited in Silverman, 2014, p.83). Silverman (2014, p.90) stresses that reliability can 
also be achieved by comparing the results of several researchers. Thus, it is 
necessary that the researcher makes his research process and theoretical 
approach clear for other researchers as well as for respondents. For my thesis, I 
tested the reliability of the findings by ensuring transparency in the process of 
collecting data. For example, I allowed my participants during interviews to 
positively interact with the research questions and answer them according to the 
framework of analysis used for recording an emerging codes and creating a 
structure for the data that have been developed based on the main research 
questions. Furthermore, I paid close attention to the quality of technical 
equipment used in recording and transcribing, whether using video or audio 
recording equipment, conducting telephone interviews, or analysing written 
documents. 
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Validating the data of a research project can be achieved by checking if the 
researcher was able to be authentic in asking correct, relevant, and appropriate 
questions (Perakyla, 1997, cited in Silverman, 2014). This point raises concerns 
about the generalisability of the research findings. How can a result that 
represents only a small community be generalised? (Perakyla, 1997, p.201, cited 
in Silverman, 2014). For my thesis, I tested the validation of the findings through 
respondent feedback. As my respondents were considered as highly educated 
professionals in their field it was a valuable exercise to check whether my initial 
findings reflected their own experiences (Silverman, 2014). Primarily, military 
policies in managing media in current conflicts provided other windows to 
validating my findings, as the documents enabled me to compare similarities and 
differences between each document, especially regarding the treatment of 
information and communications in different military campaigns. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the exhilaration of looking for answers in undertaking 
this research journey. In this chapter, I discussed the methods applied, the ethical 
considerations, and the process of research chosen to address the research 
questions. The research is based on a multidisciplinary approach by combining the 
common tools of the military, media, and journalism with a grounded theory 
approach. I developed an epistemological analysis approach to identify, qualify, 
and elaborate on emergent data, which was based on grounded theory. 
Constructivist grounded theory methods are concerned with an inductive, 
comparative, emergent, and open-ended approach to data analysis (Charmaz, 
2006, p.2). The core objective of this research is to provide a relevant critique of 
the practice of wartime journalism in a UK context (in the 21st century), taking 
into account the changeable ecology of journalistic work, developments in 
military affairs and warfare, and the implications of communications technology.  
 
Based on semi-structured interviews and document analysis, my analytical 
framework has been designed to explore how the military and the media have 
adapted to changes in the war paradigm, military doctrines, and communications 
technologies. This will help to identify challenges that war journalists face during 
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foreign assignments, and how they deal with the absence of direct military support 
at a time when an embedded program is not really activated on the ground. In 
addition, the analytical framework will describe the rationale behind existing 
rules and regulations for media operations set up by the UK Armed Forces. As 
briefly mentioned, reflexivity is important in any type of qualitative research 
where researchers wish to improve their professional practice and constructive 
critical approach, as reflexivity involves the researcher presenting a high level of 
awareness in employing their research methods, research questions, a participant 
recruitment strategy, ethical considerations, and subjective perspectives that 
may have an impact on the data being analysed (D’Cruz et al., 2007; Langdridge, 
2007). Samples used in grounded theory are usually small, aiming to explore the 
relationship between themes, categories, and codes rather than to define the 
data’s properties (Langdridge, 2007, p.85; Charmaz, 2014, p.33).  
 
In the following three chapters, I review the findings of this research, connect it 
to the existing literature, and describe emergent war reportage trends of 
significance for the relationship between war correspondents and military media 
organisations. The first findings chapter, Chapter Four, will explore evolving 
military thinking as a result of changes in the ‘new war’ paradigm, such as 
information and communications technologies that have influenced the 
relationship between the military and the media in what has been termed ‘War 
Amongst the People’. I will examine the new tactics that have been devised by 
the UK military to incorporate journalism into the war effort as much as possible, 
and to minimise disruptive forms of reporting. Chapter Five will explore the role 
and character of war journalism after the invasion/occupation of Iraq in 2003, 
Chapter Six will address the development of a hybrid media ecology that has been 
making the role of war reporters vulnerable in fast-changing situations in today’s 
conflicts, before concluding the thesis with suggestions for future research about 
incorporating the mass media into the era of the new war. 
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Chapter Four:  
Beyond a Military Media Operations Doctrine 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the first question of the thesis: how have new tactics been 
devised by the military to incorporate journalism into the war effort while 
minimising disruptive forms of reporting? Here, I consider a selection of existing 
Defence and Armed Forces publications by the UK MoD – for example, military 
doctrines, media projects, leaflets, and digital products concerning relationship 
management, services, and policies that have been structured by the UK military 
to integrate military media strategies into the new war paradigm since the Iraq 
War of 2003. The analysis in this chapter draws on original interviews with key 
personnel involved in the implementation of military media strategies and 
examines other nations’ and organisations’ doctrines carried out by the UK’s 
Armed Forces in overseas deployment campaigns, such as those organised by the 
US and NATO.   
 
Chapter Four therefore focuses on the most recent developments in today’s wars: 
Info Ops, Media Ops, CCS, and communications technologies that have been 
influencing the relationship between the military and the media in what is termed 
‘War Amongst the People’ (WAP). In the WAP, armed forces fight a mix of 
conventional and non-conventional warfare – including insurgency, terrorism, 
cybersecurity, and irregular style of non-state actors – under the scrutiny of public 
opinion, and traditional and social media (Smith, 2006). Despite the vital role of 
the media in communicating what occurs in battlespaces for local and global 
audiences, the military’s policy of organising media access to the frontline pooling 
system in the Gulf War of 1991 and the embedded programme in the Iraq War of 
2003 have affected every aspect of journalistic practices. The control of the 
military over news sources leads to a lack of diversity in reportage, and essentially 
a lack of autonomy and freedom of expression for war reporters.  
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This chapter is comprised of two distinct but related sections. Each section of this 
chapter supports finding out the answer to how the military have dealt with 
incorporation and minimising disruption of war reportage. Section one discusses 
challenges to the adoption of the typology of ‘new war’ in the military’s media 
doctrines, incorporating the changing war paradigm, and the military’s strategic 
context as well as an organisational perspective. Section two examines changes in 
the military’s Media Ops landscape, concerning policies and structure within a 
British military context.  
 
In what follows, I scrutinise the friction in the military-media relationship in 
situations where journalism is challenged by a changing war paradigm, and I will 
also consider the integration process and an organisational perspective.  
 
War Journalism in a Contested Military Space  
 
This section aims to describe the impact the ‘new war’ paradigm has on the UK 
military’s media management doctrines in the Iraq War since 2003. A military 
doctrine is ‘the fundamental set of principles that guides military forces as they 
pursue national security objectives’ (Rand.org, 2018, p.1). It provides a set of 
general guidelines, definitions, concepts, and structure for forces and 
stakeholders in the strategic, operational and tactical levels related to the use of 
forces during times of war and peace. The key purpose of the UK military’s Media 
Ops doctrine is ‘to communicate the principal themes and messages to the 
appropriate audiences in pursuit of the desired effect whilst remaining sensitive 
to media interests’ (JDP 3-45.1, 2007, pp.1–3).  
 
The significance of ‘new war’ is that it offers both opportunities and challenges 
for journalistic work that operates in a contested and highly-demanding 
environment. As the nature of war has evolved, ways of collecting and 
transmitting news have also changed, considering the use of rapid innovations in 
satellite telecommunications, video and image transmission, smartphones, 
military technology and databases (Maltby & Keeble, 2007; Rid, 2007).  
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This analysis discusses issues around the fractured state/military-media 
relationship in the 21st century. To do so I will consider developments in the war 
paradigm, information technology, and organisational structure. From a military 
perspective, information is a substantial asset in today’s wars. Information has to 
be cautiously exploited when the military incorporates traditional and social 
media into their war efforts (Rid, 2007; UKMoD, 2018a). For journalists at the 
frontline who confronted a top-down military culture; ideological clashes, 
disinformation and multi-sourced materials are examples of the day-to-day 
challenges they experienced during the post-embedded system (Kellner, 2008; 
Risso, 2017). Audiences targeted by the military and the media are central to 
these developments because audiences which have been empowered by an active 
role in generating their perspectives on content, are contributing, to some extent, 
to the war stories those that the military wants to present (Harrison, 2013; Sacco 
and Bossio, 2015; Patrikarakos, 2017).  
 
The first subsection investigates the impact of the new war paradigm on military 
doctrines and on the media. 
  
War Paradigm  
 
The main goal of military forces in combat is to divide the enemy and their 
political leadership by establishing a comprehensive Command and Control System 
(CCS) (Smith, 2016; Bassford, 2017). The CCS provides a safeguard for troops and 
military activities. However, the new model of war has added another dimension 
to the classical war paradigm. The new approach states that the war does not end 
with the destruction of the enemy’s CCS, but it continues through other non-lethal 
means, such as diplomacy and economic sanctions (Kaldor, 2007; Smith, 2007). 
Indeed, ‘new war’ refers to the willingness of military leaders to commit to the 
use of force within a complex political context, and to confront non-state actors 
who adopt irregular style of fighting under the gaze of the global media (Kilcullen, 
2005; Smith, 2007). A key component of traditional and online media in this type 
of confrontation is the struggle to access information while maintaining the 
freedom to tell the full story. Thus, the implications of a centralised CCS are that 
it weakens the role of journalistic work because of the evolving security threats. 
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A shift in warfare paradigm has led to a massive transformation in the structure 
and focus of military doctrines to deal with ‘fourth generation warfare’ (4GW) 
that is marked by the rise of non-state actors and the shrinkage of the role of 
states/nations on today’s war (Lind, 2004). Hammes (2004, cited in Echevarria II, 
2005, p. 1) defines 4GW as an ‘evolved form of insurgency that uses all available 
networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince the enemy’s decision-
makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the 
perceived benefit’. This scope of changes in the 4GW stresses that single nations 
are not capable, on their own, to counter global organised violence, as the 
objective of combatants in warfare is to capture the will of their adversaries and 
their civilians (Smith, 2006). At this point, the media take the battle into living 
rooms all over the world, through virtual spaces on the internet and social media. 
Because insurgents aim to weaken the legitimacy of the government to gain 
political power and claim control for themselves over certain areas, COIN, Media 
Ops and Info Ops provide a framework for forces (at strategic, operational and 
tactical levels) to counter the insurgents’ narrative and propaganda. However, 
why do military doctrines continue to treat the media within the context of 
traditional warfare? Indeed, how do modern forces deal with this transformation, 
particularly in the use of media and communications technology, when countering 
unforeseen threats, such as terrorist attacks, cyber warfare, rebellions, civil war, 
counterinsurgency, and guerrilla warfare?  
 
It would be impossible to include all of the strategic concepts utilised in warfare 
into my analysis. However, to consider those that interlink the media with the 
developments in military thinking about recent conflicts, Table 1, below, 
developed based on my findings and the literature review, provides an overview 
of emergent issues in the military-media relationship that overlap with the 
changing new war paradigm.  
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Table 1: Friction Within the Military-media Relationship in Counterinsurgency Operations (War Paradigm) 
 
 
The above table indicates different lines of communications between the military 
and the media concerning their treatment of critical issues in the COIN. The COIN 
operates via a mixture of old warfare procedures and a modified version of 
insurgency operations. It is not surprising that the gaps between military 
leadership and media actors have increased in this type of conflict (Hines et al., 
2015). The strategic discourses between the military and the media during the 
Main 
Themes 
Categories 
Military 
(Media Ops) 
Mainstream Media 
(Print and 
Broadcast) 
Social Media 
(UGC) 
War 
Paradigm 
Main goals 
Breaking the enemy’s 
will is key to achieve 
military success in new 
war, therefore, 
information is a prime 
asset to the MoD. No 
compromise is made 
with operational 
security, but 
communications are 
flexible enough to 
provide sensitive 
information to achieve 
the Info Ops’ goals. 
 
The primary goal of 
mainstream media is 
to inform the public 
about military affairs 
by educating them 
about war and its 
implications, and to 
be received as a 
credible source.  
Breaking news is 
important for 
commercial 
purposes, but does 
not require violating 
operational security 
and national 
interests. It is based 
on a ‘one-to-many’ 
approach, which is 
vulnerable during 
war to the influence 
of countries, 
political parties, or 
insurgents’ militia. 
Social media are a 
platform for political, 
economic, social, and 
entertainment potential, 
which offers accessible 
content and effective 
communications to a, 
potentially, global 
audience. Content is based 
on a ‘many-to-many’ 
approach that is either 
created by firms or 
individuals; however, it is 
vulnerable to 
commercialisation, 
disinformation, fake news, 
trolling, and violence. 
Objectives 
Imposing a denial-of-
access policy by holding 
control over media 
movements (e.g. 
pooling system, 
embedded programme) 
and applying 
restrictions on war 
reporters’ work. The 
military exploits 
traditional and social 
media to serve its 
integration process, 
campaign planning, 
using counter adversary 
Info Ops, and for 
gaining politicians, 
allies, and public 
support. 
On the one hand, in 
the embedded 
system wartime 
journalists negotiate 
their roles on the 
frontline to gain 
access to fulfil their 
obligations as they to 
strive for the ‘right 
for the public to 
knowʼ. 
On the other hand, 
unilateral journalism 
is another way to 
observe a conflict 
from non-military 
viewpoints. 
Flourishes in the form of 
the ‘War Amongst the 
People’, insurgency 
operations, uprising, and 
military coups, as civilians 
become influential news 
sources for day-to-day 
violence. 
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post-Cold War period have created disagreements between both institutions 
concerning access to information and operational security (Tumber & Palmer, 
2003b; Rid, 2007; Boylan, 2011). Therefore, the media are likely to be seen as an 
arm of the state rather than as the fourth estate, tasked with telling the truth 
during this transformative historical period in terms of globalisation, 
communications, and warfare. 
 
To accomplish a mission under military stipulations entails dealing with uncertain 
conditions in contemporary war and, this, an ‘effect-basedʼ strategy by all military 
means, ranges from defence diplomacy to the physical destruction of the enemy 
(Taverner, 2007). Operations security is key factor to protect the mission and keep 
troops safe. As traditional media work in a ‘one-to-many’ or mass communications 
approach (Jensen & Helles, 2017), during times of war they can influence the 
state, political parties or insurgents, and as consequence war reporters, whether 
embedded into regular forces or the opponent’s side, can be treated as a military 
target when violating operation security. However, online journalism has an 
advantage over the traditional way of reporting day-to-day conflicts because of 
the proximity of multiple producers to the frontline. It is based on a ‘many-to-
many’ or networked communication approach, but online journalism is vulnerable 
to commercialisation, disinformation, fake news, trolling, and violence (Jensen 
and Helles, 2016). Certainly, social media offer a diversity of information and 
opinions for paramilitary groups, non-state actors and individuals, for interaction, 
recruitment, spreading ideologies, and disseminating sensitive information away 
from the influence of direct censorship. 
 
To be strategically effective, the military exploits traditional and social media for 
the integration process in joint action. The British Military Doctrine defines joint 
action as a ‘deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of military 
capabilities and activities to realise effects’ (JDP 3-45.1, 2007, p.2). However, 
imposing a denial-of-access policy by controlling media movements (e.g. pooling 
system, embedded programme) and applying restrictions on journalistic work has 
affected the military-media relationship. Social media flourish during the WAP, 
insurgency operations, uprisings, and military coups as civilians become influential 
news sources about day-to-day violence. For example, the implications of tactics 
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used by the military in the WAP have driven non-state organisations, such as 
Hamas in Gaza, Hizb Allah in Lebanon, and Alhoothy in Yemen – with support from 
state powers like Iran and Turkey – to invest much of their effort, not simply in 
developing their insurgent capabilities, but in targeting international media to 
further their cause through information and deception operations (Rid, 2007). The 
changing war environment is catastrophic for regular forces, which struggle to 
achieve their political objectives. For instance, Israel, the US, and the UK have 
not lost any war on the ground in the last three decades; however, they have 
failed to resolve confrontations by military means over the long term: either in 
wars against non-state militia as in Gaza (2004) and Lebanon (2006), or in 
conventional conflicts such as the Gulf War (1990) or the Iraq War (2003) (Smith, 
2006).   
 
The following subsection will investigate the strategic context surrounding the 
integration of journalism into war efforts that support civil-military cooperation. 
  
The Integration Context 
 
Civil-military integration (CMI) has become an essential element in defence and 
security doctrines in order to collaborate with other instruments of national 
political, social and economic power. CMI does so whilst taking into account rapid 
changes in security, economic, social and global systems (The Prime Minister, 
2016). In a democratic system, the defence industry views itself as a legitimate 
institution acting on behalf of the people: either to protect them from threats or 
to defend the nation’s interests. However, ethical concerns over a lack of public 
consensus increases the gap between the military and the people (Hines et al., 
2015), particularly when public opinion is politically divided. 
  
In military doctrines, understanding target audiences is vital for the success of 
operational campaigns and for preserving troop morale when they are exposed to 
an adversary’s propaganda fed to them through their adversary’s military machine 
(USNCS, 2018)). In this instance, a battle employs different combat styles, such 
as conventional warfare, counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian 
operations, which require communicating different messages to different target 
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audiences. Does the military have much choice in how it incorporates the media 
into COIN Operations? Table 2 provides an overview of the emergent issues in the 
military-media relationship that overlap with the changing new war paradigm.  
 
Table 2: Friction within the Military-media Relationship in Counterinsurgency Operations (Strategic Context) 
Main Themes Categories 
Military 
(Media Ops) 
Mainstream 
Media 
(Print and 
Broadcast) 
Social Media 
(UGC) 
The 
Integration 
Context 
Audiences 
The media are 
used as a 
means to 
influence 
public opinion, 
secure defence 
spending, and 
support foreign 
policy. Media 
Ops target five 
distinct 
groups: UK 
citizens, 
international 
actors, allied 
forces,  local 
people 
(citizens), and 
their troops. 
The media target 
local, regional, 
and international 
audiences. They 
fall into two 
schools of 
thought: a) the 
media continue to 
have a strong 
influence in 
political decision-
making, and, b) 
are a tool of 
governmental 
communications 
and security 
strategies. 
Social networks based on 
web-based services. State 
and non-state actors 
reposition themselves on 
either public web sites or 
hidden applications for 
spreading information 
intelligence, ideas, 
ideology, and propaganda. 
Culture 
A rigid culture 
which aims to 
protect 
national 
security and 
promote 
stability and 
solidity. 
Flexible to meet 
emerging 
challenges in war 
zones. 
Online producers practice 
beyond traditional borders 
with limited centralised 
authority are being 
illuminated to spread 
news/information/visual 
materials, or being 
debunked as 
disinformation to enhance 
media literacy 
programmes. 
Values 
Credible and 
reliable 
information 
with a set of 
values and 
codes of 
conduct, 
however, there 
is a thin line 
between 
information 
and 
propaganda 
run by Info 
Ops. 
Credible and 
reliable 
information when 
news is supported 
by evidence and 
attempts to be 
impartial. 
However, pro-
opposition actors 
tend to rely on 
the internet and 
social platforms 
for their news. 
Interactivity in online 
discussion offers the online 
community the ability to 
expand on mainstream 
media stories and create 
new stories. 
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The nature of an insurgency requires a different approach and a different mindset 
from previous forms of warfare. Insurgents usually adopt an irregular approach to 
deal with trained, qualified combatants – utilising decentralised mission 
commands – because they lack sufficient resources (JP 3-24, 2013, 2018). In COIN, 
staff must unify their message, reinforce crediblity of military efforts through 
actions and assessments of an environment operations approach, which includes 
‘realistic, achievable objectives’ and to ‘properly align ends, ways, and means’ 
(JP 3-24, 2013, p.xii). While the tactics of insurgency, terrorism, and organised 
crime may overlap to achieve their ultimate goals, we should not consider them 
together. The reason for this is that, on the one hand, terrorism and organised 
crime employ various combinations of regular and irregular approaches to 
conduct, low to intensive operations to target non-combatants and civilians, and 
justify their violation of local and international law as a means to an end. On the 
other hand, insurgents use whatever tools are available to conduct large-scale 
operations so as to control power and mobilise people, such as diplomacy, 
information, social, military, and economic power (JP 3-24, 2018). 
Counterinsurgents’ operations enforce combinations of coercive and consensual 
methods to deter the risk of insurgency. Among these available tools is the use of 
‘weaponised narrative’ to place emphasis on the legitimacy of the current 
authority (Allenby & Garreau, 2017). The updated version of COIN has replaced 
the phrase ‘counterinsurgency environment’ with ‘operational environment’ (JP 
3-24, 2018). The distinction between insurgents and terrorism and organised crime 
is important here, particularly when insurgents present themselves in the 
international media as freedom fighters, revolutionaries, and activists. 
 
Failure to integrate media into military operations and secure journalistic access 
to the frontline can be critical in combating efforts that allow insurgents to gain 
advantages.  
 
The potential for a weaponised narrative has increased in the new form of war. 
How does this form differ from old-fashioned propaganda or Psy Ops? This can be 
understood if we look at how a weaponised narrative builds on the classic model 
of propaganda and disinformation, which aimed to use information technologies 
to weaken and subvert its adversary’s capabilities. Allenby (2017) explains how a 
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digital mining firm like Cambridge Analytica exploited the weaponised narrative 
to seek to influence public opinion in the US and the UK. He claimed that it is not 
unlikely that the company, which has been associated with both President Trump’s 
election campaign in the US and the Brexit campaign in the UK, possesses 
customised digitally-sourced data mainly from social media platforms such as 
Facebook for influencing voters’ preferences.  
 
The narrative of war has changed from traditional fighting to ‘new war’. In 
conventional war, operational security is the top priority of the unit’s 
commanders, who will not compromise their mission with the considerations of 
journalists. An operation’s planners take any negative media coverage associated 
with reports of casualties among civilians and soldiers into serious consideration 
(Barrera et al., 2017). Psy Ops aim to persuade the enemy or the targeted 
audience to think and act in a manner that will support the operation's objectives 
(UKMoD, 2008).3 The narrative of military actions reported by war journalists 
therefore depends on those journalists’ knowledge of conflicts and the main 
players involved to be able to give the audience a balanced perspective (Barrera 
et al., 2017), and to avoid being ensnared by the military media machine. 
 
Unlike the traditional form of war, to master ‘new war’ Psy Ops units in the 
military bring social media into their virtual domain to win hearts and minds (Flint, 
2015). Given the risks of social media as a platform for intelligence, 
disinformation, and recruitment, few Western militaries have invested in social 
media to engage in asymmetric warfare. This underutilisation of social media 
indicates a clear gap within defence organisations to exploit them with the 
intention of engaging a targeted audience in non-lethal warfare. For example, the 
British Armed Forces realised at a late stage – by which I mean behind the US, 
Israel, and Russia – the role of social media in conducting non-lethal operations. 
The British armed forces created the 77th Brigade on Facebook in April 2015 to 
                                                           
3 The UK Psychological Operations Group (PSYOPS) states that it carries out ‘planned, culturally sensitive, 
truthful and attributable activities directed at approved target audiences within the Joint Area of Operations 
in order to achieve political and military objectives' (UKMoD, 2008). 
 
  
-92- 
 
shape their war narrative (Bradshaw & Howard, 2017; UK Army, 2018).4 The 77th 
Brigade is ‘an agent of change; through targeted Information Activity and 
Outreach we contribute to the success of military objectives in support of 
Commanders, whilst reducing the cost in casualties and resources’ (British Army 
Website, 2018, p.1). This approach is partially a result of the lessons of 
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, hybrid operations in Ukraine, and 
the war against ISIS (MacAskill, 2015). However, the US, Israel, Russia, China, and 
other non-European countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, are heavily 
engaged in funding cyber troops to manipulate public opinion (Bradshaw & 
Howard, 2017). The Israel Defence Forces have been very active in social media 
since Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008 – including Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, 
and Instagram platforms – and have operated in six languages (MacAskill, 2015). 
State actors like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran, have been heavily engaged in an 
online information war to influence regional and international public opinion since 
the Arab Spring anti-governmental protests in 2011 (Caywood, 2018). In addition, 
ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen have dominated cyberspace news over the 
last few years. The news which has focused on the growing threats of terrorism 
and extremism in the Middle East (Caywood, 2018). 
 
These engagements in cyberspace impact on the organisational relationship 
between the military and the media. 
 
Organisational Structure 
 
In order to achieve established goals and objectives for the media and the 
military, organisational processes allow specific collaborations in journalistic 
practice to occur regarding access to information, credibility, and operational 
security. Table 3 defines the boundaries of the working relationship that has been 
agreed on between the military and the media in the context of new war. The 
proliferation of the internet and social media have altered the structure of 
                                                           
4 The primary task of the 77th Brigade is to ‘challenge the difficulties of modern warfare using non-lethal 
engagement and legitimate non-military levers as a means to adapt behaviours of the opposing forces and 
adversaries’ (British Army Website, 2018). 
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relationships between the military and the media in an era of globalisation and 
technology.  
 
Table 3: Friction Within the Military-media Relationship in Counterinsurgency Operations (Organisational Context) 
Main Themes Categories 
Military 
(Media Ops) 
Mainstream Media 
(Print and Broadcast) 
Social Media 
(UGC) 
Organisational 
Structure 
Institutional 
role 
 
A comprehensive 
CCS is essential to 
provide a safeguard 
for troops and 
military activities. It 
incorporates all 
military utilities 
under single 
command and 
control system. The 
military has agile 
and dynamic forces 
to integrate its 
hegemonic culture 
over current changes 
in war and 
communications 
technologies. 
Lacking coherence 
and rationality in a 
war narrative has a 
negative impact on 
strategic 
communications and 
people’s perceptions 
of military actions. 
The role of the media 
in warfare is 
considered a significant 
factor, among others, 
which determines the 
success or failure of 
counterinsurgency 
warfare. The 21st 
century makes war 
reporting much more 
manageable as it 
provides a means of 
transmitting to and 
reaching broader 
audiences in different 
geographical locations 
as an event unfolds. 
Reality differs from an 
ideal situation, so the 
media struggle in COIN 
to access the frontline 
due to high risks and 
unpredictable threats. 
Opened new threats 
to traditional 
wartime journalism 
and operations 
security, but offered 
influential 
windows/platforms 
for groups/non-state 
actors and 
individuals to 
interact with and 
recruit others, 
spreading their 
ideologies, and 
disseminating 
sensitive 
information aside 
from the traditional 
method of direct 
censorship. 
Authority 
A top-down model. 
A tactical 
commander is 
authorised to 
exercise his control 
over non-militant 
organisations and 
war actors for 
security reasons. 
A bottom-up model. In 
newsrooms, journalists 
experience a hierarchy 
of relationships in day-
to-day operations with 
editors and top-level 
management that 
affects their autonomy. 
While embedded within 
military units, 
journalists follow 
military regulations 
and in accordance with 
the instructions in the 
UK MoD’s Green Book. 
A network 
communications 
model designed to 
be decentralised 
and non-
hierarchical.  The 
use of non-military 
instruments in 
today’s conflicts is a 
crucial factor in 
military planning. 
 
Military doctrines emphasise the structure and the quality of the CCS (network 
approach, mission command, and an effects-based approach) to preserve 
dominance over all dimensions of the battlespace in air, land, maritime, and 
space domains, and information environment. The British Army’s Land Operations 
Doctrine (2017) indicates the impact a proliferation of information has had on the 
  
-94- 
 
public’s perceptions of military activity. The public are being influenced by 
different active players, including the national media, allies, and adversaries. At 
this juncture, the military is eager ‘to build a form of trust among social networks 
to acknowledge both formal and informal information that provides a safeguard 
either to the troops or military activities, in order to achieve desired goals’ 
(UKMoD, 2014, p.35). The primary concern of Steven Jolly, the Director of Defence 
Communications at the UK MoD from 2015–2016 – currently the Executive Director 
of World Services at M&C Saatchi (an international advertising agency network) – 
was to ensure that the military acknowledged changes in the media ecology: the 
shift from the hands of traditional media to decentralised networks of individuals 
and social media. He claims: 
I think what I want to say is that the media has never been 
more important than it is in times of war, but that does not 
necessarily mean we are talking about the traditional media. So, I 
think that the ubiquity of smartphones and of the ability to record 
everyday events has fundamentally changed the balance and 
power between those who manage and disseminate the news, and 
those who are the subjects of the news. (Interview, London, 7th 
November 2017) 
 
Steven Jolly’s argument considers the role of the new media in today’s warfare to 
be a significant factor in influencing public opinion compared to the classic part 
of the traditional media in conventional warfare. Military media documents 
outline a set of rules to manage the media and audiences, and to make them 
behave and act in accordance with established operational goals. Certainly, the 
need to combat non-state actors, such as terrorists and insurgents, and to secure 
the homeland from any unpredictable threat, leads national security strategists 
to place more emphasis on winning the ‘war of ideas’ (The White House, 2019) 
rather than combating physical targets. The classical concept of protecting ‘the 
centre of gravity’ in conventional warfare (defined in Chapter 2, under War 
Paradigm), was usually performed by the traditional media, and is a process which 
would be accelerated today through the use of social media. As Lord David 
Richards, former Chief of the Defence Staff, indicates: 
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Now, they won't always be met [the Media Ops] the same as in 
conventional operations. I mean, what I'm saying is, you get to 
create your plan around the requirements of the media, often 
because you are now using, if not the speed of light, certainly the 
speed of sound. Your enemy can receive news through social 
media messages that will upset, distract and confuse them, 
quicker than any bullet which has only a limited range – these 
have a range of thousands of miles. So you've got to see it in a 
different way and you should be organised. (Interview, House of 
Lords, London, 7th February 2018) 
 
The enemy in the US’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (The White 
House, 2019) is neither a person nor a single regime, but terrorists or criminals 
regardless of their ideology or ethnicity. An enemy is one who strives to use 
violence and fear as a means to break the rule of law and attack civilians. 
Therefore, combating terrorism and organised violence can be executed by harsh 
military or non-military actions, including acting pre-emptively to counter a future 
threat (The White House, 2019). In this instance, the military takes control over 
many agencies in times of conflict, including the media, so as to attempt to win 
the hearts and minds of the people and politicians, for instance, by subjecting war 
reporters to strict policies governing their movements and broadcasts. In this 
uncertain environment, policies on war coverage and media management 
programmes create tension in the military-media relationship.  
 
Professional war reporters encounter personal challenges and organisational 
constraints when reporting on high-intensity conflicts from the frontline. These 
challenges range from a denial of access to the theatre of operations because of 
working in a hostile environment where there is a high possibility of being attacked 
as military targets. While embedding with the military units, journalists follow 
military regulations and conduct themselves in accordance with the UK Military’s 
Guidelines (e.g. the Green Book). For example, Steven Jolly indicates that the 
high intensity of violence in Syria, and the absence of troops on the ground, 
prevented the military from providing support to journalists who travelled unaided 
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into occupied territories controlled by irregular forces, such as rebels, local tribes, 
and extremist groups: 
If you look at some of the cities [in Syria], then even the charities 
can’t get there – the donations. It’s a bloody awful civil war, so 
do they expect the British to put a battalion there to keep check 
on a few journalists? I think it is unrealistic. I think we are not on 
the ground there in any numbers; we are overflying Northern Syria 
attacking ISIS. I don't know where their missions will go, given 
recent events. There were people going into the rebel-held areas, 
indeed there were people going amongst the Yazidi, and there 
were even people smuggling staff out of ISIS occupied territory. 
This is nothing to do with the British government that I am aware 
of. (Interview, London, 7th November 2017) 
 
The military has to distinguish between multiple actors whose participation is 
important to the success of the mission, and those who have less involvement but 
nevertheless have a consistent relationship with the troops and feel they are 
entitled to be fully integrated (JDP 3-70, 2008). Integration is certainly achievable 
at a lower level by moving down the chain of command and authority. The 
structure of authority defines the type of relationship inside an established 
organisation and other actors. Hall (1991, cited in Brogan 2006, p.41) indicates 
that organisational values are found in ‘the efforts of the actors, the judgment 
criteria of the decision-makers, and the participation and perception of the 
stakeholders, and obedience is accepted as being in service of a common goal’. 
The top-down hierarchal style of the CCSs present in military organisation gives 
authority to the central command to exercise control over multiple actors, both 
domestically and on the frontline.  
 
The Battlespace Management document (JDP 3-70, 2008) identifies three factors 
which enable joint forces to enjoy full integration: coordination, synchronisation, 
and prioritisation. Integration brings the military and the media together into an 
effective relationship, enabling a respectful coordination and synchronisation of 
their activities in accordance with a precise set of priorities (JDP 3-70, 2008). 
Interestingly, the dynamics of media, information, and communications are 
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recognised as effective actors across all dimensions of the hierarchy of the CCS. 
Lord David Richards advocates establishing a CCS, not just to deal with the media, 
but also to take responsibility for military and security affairs:  
I think today they need national command and communications 
centres or headquarters where the traditional activities of the 
commander would have military responses and security responses 
are fully integrated with the information campaign. (Interview, 
House of Lords, London, 7th February 2018) 
 
The military and the media have exercised different lines of authorisation since 
the Crimean War (1854–1856). This war is regarded as the first instance of war 
reporting in the age of mass communications, the first to be covered widely by 
the daily newspapers, and the first to be telegraphed (Figes, 2010). By the end of 
the 20th century, several changes had occurred in the military’s hierarchy of 
authority. On the one hand, the rise of globalisation and the massive revolution 
in communications and information in the 21st century make war reporting easier 
to transmit and reach wider audiences in different geographic locations as events 
happen; but on the other hand, the same technology makes access to the frontline 
more difficult. The military has developed a new type of relationship with the 
media, to provide journalists with more access to war zones by introducing the 
‘pool system’ in the Gulf War (1990), and the ‘embedded program’ in the Iraq War 
(2003). However, a lack of trust between the military and media, access 
difficulties, copy review delays, and logistical problems were the major challenges 
to war journalism in both programmes (Steuck, 1992; Johnson & Fahmy, 2010; 
Maltby, 2012a). Steven Jolly says: 
I would argue that there are advantages and, as you said, 
disadvantages, because if you are with the military, you obviously 
need that protection and, at the same time, that means they 
control you. From the military point of view, controlling 
journalists is not necessarily about that idea. You don't want them 
wandering around causing trouble or getting into trouble. 
(Interview, London, 7th November 2017) 
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The following subsection discusses a number of limitations concerning the 
integration of the media into counterinsurgency operations. 
 
The Limitations 
 
Every military campaign is different either via its means, ends, or objectives. At 
this point, what affects the process of integration amongst the three components 
of war (the military, the traditional media, and social media) in 21st-century 
conflicts? This analysis identifies two lines of communication in military-media 
collaboration occurring during counterinsurgency operations: at strategic and 
tactical levels. Table 4 indicates each level faces challenges in function and 
structure.  
 
Table 4: Friction Within the Military-media Relationship in Counterinsurgency Operations (Limitations) 
Main Theme Category 
Military 
(Media Ops)  
Mainstream 
Media 
(Print and 
Broadcast) 
Social Media 
(UGC) 
Limitations 
Strategic and  
tactical levels 
Wars are fought 
between people, 
so the domestic 
audience becomes 
an essential 
component of the 
Media Ops 
doctrine which 
must meet the 
consequences of 
the new type of 
warfare such as 
terrorism, 
cyberwarfare, 
organised crimes, 
and immigration. 
The embed 
system, 
counter-
terrorism 
operations 
(asymmetric 
combat), and 
the emergence 
of UGC 
constrains 
professional 
wartime 
journalistic 
work. 
An increase of 
fake news, lies, 
and non-
verifiedmaterials 
puts social 
media and other 
domains on the 
internet under 
pressure to 
secure 
coherence, 
legitimacy, and 
credibility. 
 
At the strategic level, the media industry became vital for a government 
communications strategy that provides more space for political actors to create a 
consensus about security issues, such as terrorism and immigration, that have 
been presented as an imminent threat to the state and, therefore, affect decisions 
that have to be taken in terms of protecting the safety of the people and national 
security (Vultee, 2007; Dolinec, 2010). Today’s conflicts are fought amongst the 
people, so both domestic and international public opinion becomes an essential 
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component of the military doctrine. This has implications regarding the control of 
materials and press freedom in times of war.  
 
At a tactical level, the armed forces need to embed Info Ops teams within their 
troops to analyse local feeds on traditional and social media, and to identify 
strategic targets, such as communications towers and cyber networks, as their 
adversaries are willing to use sophisticated information tools in a military context 
(Pomerleau, 2017). In conventional and non-conventional warfare, war journalists 
usually operate in a multi-agency environment under rules set by others, and 
regulations which control their networking power. I regard these organisations as 
independent agents who have strategies, cultures, structures, values, and 
interests, just like the military, local governments, and non-state actors. The 
media can either accept being attached to these organisations, such as in the 
‘embedded system’ with the military in the Iraq War 2003, or they can choose to 
operate independently with the maximum support they can obtain from other 
players in the battlespace – such as embedding with coalition forces against ISIS 
in Northern Iraq and Syria since 2011. 
 
In the next section, I look closely at the UK’s military Media Ops, considering policy 
principles and policy opportunities.    
  
Integration in the Military-Media Relationship 
 
This section aims to examine changes in the military Media Ops landscape at a 
micro level that concerns policies and structures within a British military context. 
I bring together the perspective of professionals and senior military officers, to 
elaborate on the process of achieving a fully integrated system where wartime 
journalism is located in today’s military media policies and doctrines in 
conjunction with the principles and guidelines of national strategy.  
 
I shall begin by describing the impact the media operation doctrine has in the 
development of war reportage.  
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Media Operations: An Overview 
 
It has been 13 years since the UK MoD issued the Joint Doctrine Publication 3-45.1 
Media Operations (Media Ops), which was a result of operational lessons learned 
from conflicts that the British forces were involved in by themselves or with their 
allies in the last three decades, such as the Gulf War (1991), the Afghanistan War 
(2001), and the Iraq War (2003). It sets out British military strategies including the 
definitions, structure, principles, challenges, and the techniques of 
implementation. 
  
The Media Ops document has to be read in conjunction with the United Kingdom 
Defence Doctrine (UKDD), and other military doctrines such as National Security 
Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Information Ops, Joint 
Doctrine Note Strategic Communications, Understanding and Intelligence (JDP 2-
00,3rd Edition), Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (AJP-3.10.1), 
and the MoD Green Book. Ultimately, these doctrines define the target audience, 
the characteristics of the media as a profession, and planning and execution 
processes throughout the three combat levels: strategical, operational, and 
tactical. 
 
Conducting information and Media Ops in a complex war, such as the WOT and its 
counterinsurgency operations, involves two sets of goals (JDP 0-01, 2014): (1) the 
significance of designing a comprehensive information management approach to 
reach a much wider audience, either in times of conflict or of peace; and, (2) the 
goal of media and information doctrines aims to secure the combat commander’s 
objectives to achieve influence over targeted political decision-makers and media 
outlets. Moreover, a political directive is usually given by the UK’s National 
Security Council (NSC), which establishes a national strategy within the context 
of the state’s instruments of power: diplomacy, economics, military, and 
information (MoD, 2016). The efficiency of the CCS, and its proactive engagement 
with media personnel and other actors in war zones, may influence the conduct 
of military operations, since the distinct contributions of Media Ops within the 
direct lines of a combat campaign are crucial in modern warfare, to secure public 
support within a system of powerful democratic governance that seeks to 
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demonstrate transparency to the people about their military operations (JDP 0-
01, 2014).  
 
The Joint Doctrine Publication 3-45.1 defines Media Ops as ‘that line of activity 
developed to ensure timely, accurate and effective provision [through the media] 
of Public Information (P Info) and implementation of Public Relations (PR) policy 
within the operational environment whilst maintaining Operations Security’ (JDP 
3-45.1, 2007, pp.1–2).5 While my analysis has accepted this definition to a certain 
extent, it has also taken into account emerging limitations regarding the 
execution of integration that may affect the functions of military media approach 
in conflicts. Here, I discuss some implications and challenges concerning the 
implementation of these policies, in both state-to-state conflicts and 
counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, my analysis takes into account other 
factors that may constrain the integration process, with the press and their 
audience, and lead to poor coordination and inefficiency, such as having 
inadequate CCSs, a lack of communication strategy, and taking into account the 
growing risk of cyber warfare.  
 
Before identifying the barriers that constrain the military’s ability to enhance 
their relations with the media, it is worth specifying that the Strategic 
Communication Note states that ‘recent experience in Afghanistan and Libya has 
shown that it can not afford to think about influence and information as a separate 
line of operation’ (JDN 1/12, 2012, p. v). If the Media Ops group attempts to 
embark on media policies within a disputed political space under military 
operational objectives (Maltby, 2012a, p.49), how do they accelerate the process 
of integrating their policies into a changed information sphere in a way that does 
not affect operation security? I have analysed this document from different 
perspectives, taking into consideration multiple internal and external factors that 
influence the decision-making process, to provide a better understanding of how 
established thinking should be integrated into the complexity of the WAP.  
 
                                                           
5 The Media Ops doctrine aims to ‘provide factual information to a number of audiences via the media to 
support the aims of the UK Information Strategy’ (JDP3-45.1, 2012, pp.1-2). 
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Next, I discuss the role of the Media Ops doctrine in securing coherent narratives, 
a comprehensive approach aligned with the operational objectives, and 
safeguarding troops. 
 
Outline of Media Operations: Execution and Implications  
 
Media Ops is grounded in achieving superiority over Info Ops and intelligence in 
modern warfare. This analysis provides a critical view of established documents 
in the UK Armed Forces, by proposing policies and procedures which construct a 
robust bond with the media, the audience, military personnel, and political 
leadership. Of course, my analysis is not intended to provide a complete analysis 
of all existing documents, but to enable me to elaborate on the most important 
strategic themes, key players and messages that the British military has to 
consider when dealing with wartime journalism. It helps to break down the core 
themes into specific categories or elements, which provide a greater overall 
understanding of this document. 
 
Based on Table 4, I have included the following arguments in my analysis, to give 
more depth to the practice of military media management – further supported by 
personal evidence provided by interviewees. 
 
Policy Principles 
 
Since 9/11 Britain has involved itself in conflicts through its close alliance with 
the United States in the WOT, and with NATO and the United Nations on several 
humanitarian, counter-piracy, and peacekeeping operations. The effective 
involvement of the British Armed Forces in most conflicts since 9/11 has ensured 
that the Media Ops approach has been implemented and tested. The Media Ops 
document insisted on the importance of preserving a positive attitude throughout 
operations with local, allied, international, and adversary audiences, but advises 
troops to remain vigilant for unpredictable threats (JDP 3-45.1, 2007). 
Interestingly, Media Ops doctrine was experienced for the first time during the 
joint military exercise Saif Sarea 2 (Swift Sword 2) between the UK and Oman in 
2001, where I participated with a Media Ops team from the Omani side.  
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Angus Taverner, Staff Officer 1 (SO1) Director News (Policy and Plans) in the UK 
MoD from 2000–2004, discussed the period when Taverner and I served together 
in the same media cell at Joint Headquarters in Shafe in the Sultanate of Oman:  
I was the author of the first UK media doctrine (JWP 3-45) and, 
interestingly for you, [Exercise SAIF SAREA] was really the first 
time we used the doctrine to push into practice in a systematic 
way; to see what would actually work, in terms not just of military 
media operations officers talking to the media, but in terms of 
the much broader understanding of the importance of not only 
how the media is reporting on military activity, but also in terms 
of things like information released by authorities at the speed 
which you need it to be responding. (Interview by telephone, 13th 
February 2018) 
 
The execution of Media Ops policy is based on a set of standard principles whereby 
the military has to ensure that the process of implementation is exercised in a 
coherent and coordinated manner within the context of its organisational culture. 
The success of Media Ops in a conflict must combine these following elements: (1) 
an effective CCS, (2) respect for security, and (3) engagement and understanding 
audiences – key themes in constructing a war narrative.  
  
1. An Effective Command and Control System 
 
A command and control system (CCS) is a central part of any conflict. It 
incorporates all military utilities and procedures in a practical framework, such as 
logistics, intelligence, media, electronic warfare, and administration, by giving 
them responsibilities, meaning, and a line of authority (Hahn, 1998). The military 
operations doctrine plays a central role in the UK MoD’s strategic communications. 
The doctrine has gained significance in the structure of CCS, as it provides people 
and the media with reliable and accurate information about security challenges 
in 21st-century conflicts. 
 
Ironically, a shift of focus towards communications technology with the rise of the 
internet – particularly in cyber and social media – has had consequences for 
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carrying out a sophisticated media campaign. The gap between people’s 
perceptions and operational realities can confuse audiences when military 
strategy lacks coherence and rationality (UKMoD, 2012). In the lead up to the Iraq 
War, public opinion in the UK was politically divided towards international 
conflicts (Travis, 2003). People have certainly not been convinced of the geo-
strategic benefits of military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq for the future 
of their armed forces (UKMoD, 2012). The British Strategic Communication Note 
indicates a series of problems within the UK MoD, especially after the Afghanistan 
and Iraq wars, with regard to a lack of a coherent communications strategy with 
their audiences through traditional and social media (JDN 1/12, 2012). As a 
consequence, the impression of division has continued in other international 
military interventions: for instance, the Libya crisis of 2011 and the UK’s military 
forces involvement in airstrikes against ISIS in Syria. The debate over both crises 
was around the lack of transparency when using forces for peacekeeping 
operations which are exempt from parliamentary scrutiny, potentially causing a 
lack of accountability when an operation has no clear objectives, and a lack of 
public support for large-scale military actions particularly after the Afghanistan 
and Iraq wars (Mills, 2015; Knowles, 2016). For example, on 29 August 2013 the 
House of Commons voted against military action in Syria, however, British planes 
took part in the airstrike against ISIS in Syria in 2015 (BBC, 2015). This division in 
British politics about the deployment of British forces for peacekeeping operations 
reflects an ambiguity in the public sphere over what type of forces the UK needs. 
Thus, the absence of a fully integrated strategy – either within the UK Armed 
Forces or their allies – has challenged Media Ops to operate at peak efficiency to 
fulfil their responsibilities.  
 
Lord David Richards emphasises the importance of having an effective CCS that 
can facilitate these processes:  
I think it’s important to fully integrate information operations, 
such as the media and everything else you are talking about, into 
the overall campaign. Then you have to have a command and 
control system that allows that to happen, and a planning process 
which allows that to happen. I’ve said for a number of years, from 
my experience in operations, first and foremost is [that] 
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professionals take command and control, then logistics and then 
tactics. If you don't get the command control right, which now 
includes how you are using the media and how you're going to 
exploit social media, it doesn’t matter how good your equipments 
are or how good your soldiers and sailors and airmen are, you're 
going to lose, and that happens all over the place. (Interview, 
House of Lords, London, 7th February 2018)  
 
The Media Ops doctrine encourages military staff to engage with the media at the 
earliest possible opportunity, and to be as positive and proactive as they can be 
in their thinking and functioning at all levels (JDP 3-45.1, 2007). However, the 
moral obligations of the military towards their key stakeholders in war must be 
shaped by trust, accountability and respect, to achieve strategic goals besides 
having a comprehensive CCS. In small-scale operations such as peacekeeping, it is 
too easy for media officers to get to know every journalist by name and build a 
strong relationship with them, by having some time to catch up at the hotel bar 
or the military camp. However, when there were 775 journalists embedded with 
American and British troops in the Iraq War in 2003 (Rid, 2007) it was impossible 
to maintain this form of symbiotic relationship for long. Tony Cramp, a retired 
Media Ops officer, who currently works for Shell Aircraft in the Netherlands, says: 
What I did find was a lot of media outlets used to send similar 
teams at the beginning of those conflicts. And I hardly got to know 
the guys in successive operations. So, people that I had met in 
East Timor then turned up in Sierra Leone. […] If you establish a 
relationship, be honest with them off the bat or straightaway, 
then that relationship becomes very positive going forward. And I 
made sure that I gave them as much information as I could. I did 
that honestly as I could, and I think they respected that. 
(Interview by telephone, 11th February 2018)  
 
Next, I outline the implication of the Media Ops in operational security.  
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2. Respect for Security 
 
Wartime security reviews meant the introduction of procedures in operations; for 
instance, to review news before transmission to avoid the possibility of legal 
penalties (Badsey, 2009). However, the media-military relationship can not be 
described as a static structure in times of war, but it is an effective means of 
cooperation which functions for the benefit of both organisations. Because of 
post-9/11 trends, there has been a shift to place more effort in countering 
asymmetric threats, resulting in small units like special forces being unable to 
accommodate the press while operating at high tempo in covert operations. 
Steven Jolly states: 
I think what I’d say is whenever you have sharp and pointed 
forces, special forces involved, obviously levels of discretion have 
to be significantly higher. You do not want advantages of stealth 
or secrecy disrupted, and being exposed in the press can 
jeopardise operations and risk lives, so I really would not favour, 
for instance, if you were talking about irregular warfare – meaning 
the uses of special forces – because it is not appropriate to have 
journalists with those people, since they are not going to help 
you. (Interview, London, 7th November 2017) 
 
Old forms of censorship have become less effective in asymmetric warfare, with 
the rise of satellite TV and the internet. Therefore, the military has put more 
effort into reorganising their communications strategy doctrine to integrate it 
with public relations techniques, rather than exerting direct control over 
publications (Badsey, 2009). Indeed, most senior officers have become more 
conscious of the role of media in managing the reputation of their units. However, 
at a tactical level, junior officers need to have confidence in striking a balance 
between transparency with the press and the decision to ban access to sensitive 
information.  
 
Angus Taverner, formerly of the UK MoD, indicates that the British military 
leadership was aware of maintaining a consistent military strategy for frontline 
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reportage, so the only area where the press officer had to take action was when 
military strategy was breached risking the security of the operation: 
The only thing that we are checking is for operational security, so 
if for example a journalist doesn’t like the commander or thinks 
the commander’s judgment is wrong, I can’t change that, that 
was not in the rules. But if he says that HMS Arrow are going to 
start shelling tomorrow at the airport tomorrow morning then I 
can stop them because that is breaching the operational security. 
So, there is no control if I called in editorial tone, any things that 
we exercise power over was the big argument about the security. 
(Interview by telephone, 13th February 2018)   
 
Certainly, as long as war journalists’ primary job in the war zone is to investigate 
fresh information about day-to-day fighting, to feed to their agencies and the 
public, the risk of being independent is considered too high when this means a 
loss of protection by trustworthy forces in conflict areas. Consequently, many war 
reporters compromise their relative autonomy to secure access to operations 
(Briant, 2011). Certainly, wartime reporters have the freedom to operate 
independently in war zones, but in this instance, the military will not be required 
to provide these journalists with protection. Tony Cramp argued: 
So, you have to be careful If you give journalists access so they 
can be embedded within military units, as with the soldiers 
they’re going to come across information that could be very 
sensitive. So, there’ve got to be a lot more controls on that to 
make sure that information doesn’t get into the wrong hands. If 
the journalists want their freedom, then they can have it, but that 
just means they can’t be embedded and have protection from the 
military units. (Interview by telephone, 11th February 2018) 
 
One of the most important principles of military operations is to gain the consent 
of the public for military operations and maintain their continuous support on all 
levels, which is also crucial to the media. 
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3. Engagement and Understanding Audiences 
 
While many critiques have centred on the insufficient approach of the coalition 
forces in civic engagement post-conflict, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq (Jensen, 
2014; James & Krakar, 2015), the media doctrine indicates that they do not expect 
a public audience to be homogeneous, since the public’s responses fluctuate 
according to the volume of information they have acquired from a wide range of 
local and international media sources (JDP 3-45, 2007). In fact, Media Ops targets 
five distinct groups: local citizens, international audiences, joint and regional 
forces, homefront, and military troops (JDP 3-45, 2007). Each of these groups are 
presented with significantly different messages, but these communications may 
overlap in certain situations. Certainly, the capacity of the military to directly 
reach local and international public opinion is limited. However, established 
British media organisations – print, online, and broadcast – remain powerful 
players in shaping people’s perceptions about how they feel about military 
performance in war.  
 
Angus Taverner stresses that public attitudes towards military actions are crucial 
to UK military planners:   
I think that we recognised that maintaining public support for 
operations in the UK was crucial. The people [political leaders] 
giving us [the military] direction often got a lot of what they 
understood about what is going on from the media, and we need 
it for own benefit to be able to deliver the operations we are 
trying to deliver. Therefore, how we engaged with the civilian 
audience in places like Iraq or places like Afghanistan, was 
becoming very important to us, and that again was a matter of 
military engagements. (Interview by telephone, 13th February 
2018) 
 
The Media Ops document has little to say about how to affect public opinion about 
an adversary, or their allies. However, it is held that all means can be legitimised 
when used to influence an enemy’s political and military leadership, armed forces 
and their people. This is critical when the adversary can use insurgent methods, 
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and are capable of using sophisticated information and communications to target 
local and international audiences (Jensen, 2014).  
 
One of the British military’s tactics to reach local people was to approach news 
channels that could be classified as the mouthpiece for terrorist groups or British 
adversaries, such as Al-Jazeera. For example, the British forces moved into Basra 
and Southern Iraq in 2003, where they fought heavy guerrilla warfare against a 
strong local opposition, with a lack of troops in a city ruled by Shia militias 
(Cockburn, 2015). The British Army received an intelligence report indicating low 
morale amongst the defenders of the city who had fought for Saddam Hussein's 
regime, and that they were uncoordinated (Crown, 2013). Therefore, it was hard 
to reach local people without establishing contact with popular satellite TV 
channels in Southern Iraq, such as Al-Jazeera.  
 
Non-Western mainstream media, such as Al-Jazeera and other Arab satellite 
channels, have provided an alternative perspective to the military operation in 
the Iraq War of 2003, and have expanded the news agenda for other crises in the 
Middle East (Bessaiso, 2010). Both US and UK militaries have shown less 
engagement with Arab reporters during the Iraq War in an attempt to win Arab's 
hearts and minds and hoping to conduct a surgically clean war. Arab reporters 
were excluded from embedding either with US or UK troops and were denied 
access to the daily briefings (Mackinlay, 2006). The only Arab media 
representative who was welcomed by the UK forces as an embedded reporter was 
the former British soldier, Alex Gardiner, who worked for Abu Dhabi TV 
(Ackerman, 2007). Al-Jazeera channel received most of America's attention 
because the journalists, particularly on the talk show programmes, enabled the 
voices of extremists and insurgents to reach a wider audience in the Arab world 
(Mackinlay, 2006). This evidence is why Al-Jazeera was considered to be an enemy 
station in the eyes of the US administration. Despite the fact that American forces 
bombed Al-Jazeera offices in both Baghdad and Kabul, killed and arrested its staff 
(Taylor, 2004), the British military approached Al-Jazeera to deliver their 
messages to Iraqi citizens in Basra. Tim Purbrick, an Army Reserve staff officer, 
provided an example where such an approach was used to engage the 
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transnational broadcaster such as Al-Jazeera, instead of local media that operated 
in Basra in post-conflict Iraq: 
When I was in Iraq in 2007 as the head of media operations – I was 
only there for only a very short time – it was very obvious we 
couldn’t engage with the local media, because if they printed any 
story in the media that remotely reflected our view, and the view 
of the allied forces in Iraq, then those journalists would be taken 
and killed. However, we identified that there was an excellent 
route to engage with the local people by Al-Jazeera, so I put an 
Arabic-speaking press officer down to the Doha Media Village, and 
he appeared as a guest of the week on Al-Jazeera. I did it on a 
useful platform because Al-Jazeera is very well covered in south-
eastern Iraq, and you’re able to get messages out to the people 
in Basra. So, it was a useful and practical way of communicating 
in an environment where engaging with the local media was 
impossible, not that they wanted it to be impossible, but it was 
impossible for them because it would have put them in a very 
difficult personal security perspective. (Interview, London, 7th 
February 2018) 
 
Purbrick’s interpretation of the method used to reach local people means that the 
British forces have employed distinctive tactics to engage with the media and its 
audiences. Utilising transnational media appears to be a sensible method from the 
perspective of the Media Ops team as long as it achieves combat objectives. 
Whether the military and the media are in conflict or allied in 21st-century wars, 
handling a coherent communication strategy has become essential for both sides, 
regardless of the political system, to win the support of targeted people. To be 
more comprehensive we should not forget to mention Christian Hill’s book 
‘Combat Camera: From Auntie Beeb to the Afghan Frontline’ in which he 
highlighted the tactics of the British Army's Combat Camera Team (CCT) to show 
the production of their own films or photographs. Hill (2015) claimed that the 
British military hoped the mainstream media would use their exclusive videos and 
footages as another way to attempt to promote their narrative in this 'new war 
paradigm' and to show the world the progress that been made in securing 
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Afghanistan. For example, the BBC broadcast the UK MoD’s documentary 
television series Our War: 10 Years in Afghanistan to mark the ten-year 
anniversary of the war in Afghanistan (BBC, 2011). This documentary programme 
used audiovisual footage techniques taken in real operations in Afghanistan 
between 2007 and 2009 by fixing cameras to soldiers’ helmets. The UK MoD states 
(cited in Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2013, p.1327) the aim of the videos was to ‘offer 
viewers, for the first time, the chance to see as close as possible front line action 
through a soldier’s eyes’. 
 
Certainly, today the media are highly critical and will not accept one-sided 
propaganda because of multiple news sources located on the battlefield (Scholtz, 
1998). The Media Ops document stresses the military’s obligation to provide 
audiences with authentic and accurate information about military business (JDP 
3-45, 2007). Tim Purbrick recognised the importance of connecting with UK 
audiences because it is a national obligation, and a means of promotion and 
recruitment: 
We have understood the obligation to connect with audiences to 
our own people. We’ve trusted our people so that they are 
permitted to do that kind of engagement with the local audience 
and troops. People find it very interesting because they can hear 
directly from people doing various things – whether flying the new 
fighting jet in America, whether it’s the commanding officer of 
the new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier doing sea trials, or 
the commanding officer at the Marine Helicopter Unit, doing their 
snow training in Norway. (Interview, London, 7th February 2018)  
 
The challenges of counterinsurgency operations and WOT have opened the doors 
to discuss the inadequacies of the military’s tactics in targeting audiences with 
the help of technology because the adversaries are capable of using sophisticated 
information and communications system to target local and international 
audiences.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has addressed the first question of this thesis: how have new tactics 
been devised by the military to incorporate journalism into the war effort, while 
minimising disruptive forms of reporting? Overall, I have aimed to analyse the 
revolution in military doctrines regarding military concerns around insufficient 
organisational procedures being in place to integrate traditional and new media 
into the new war paradigm. Additionally, exclusive interviews with senior officers 
in the British Armed Forces provide an alternative interpretation of the current 
military-media relationship from their perspective. 
 
I found a key challenge of this analysis was how to describe the struggle of the 
military and the media to keep pace with massive developments in (a) the nature 
of warfare, and (b) communications technologies. The greatest challenge for the 
military in the new typology of war is to involve themselves in a mix of 
conventional warfare, terrorism, and irregular conflicts against non-state actors. 
Conflicts seen by the public through the eyes of traditional and new media occur 
during real-time coverage. Counterinsurgency strategies may succeed in achieving 
operational objectives, but because of the limitations that surround the WAP it 
can be difficult for armed forces to ensure the safety of war reporters in today’s 
conflicts. However, the demands of 24/7 news, a fractious relationship with the 
military, and coercive competition among traditional and new media outlets to 
access exclusive materials have forced war reporters to negotiate their roles in 
the war zone; specifically by adhering to the rules that were set up by the military 
to protect their safety.   
 
The analysis in this chapter has shown the military’s limitations in engaging the 
media with their new war practices while considering journalists’ autonomy, 
operational security, and press freedom. For the military, eliminating the risk of 
uncontrollable and unmanageable media reportage can only occur if journalism 
becomes part of the military command and control structure. Currently, the media 
are being used as a means to influence targeted audiences, protect national 
security, and support foreign policy. The strategic objective of the military’s 
media operations doctrine is to provide the public and the media with reliable and 
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accurate information about the security challenges in 21st-century conflicts. The 
military addresses social media risks in strategic and tactical communications, 
offering limited space for service personnel to interact, blog, post images, and 
videos on social media and the internet. Nevertheless, it keeps an eye on their 
“trolling” to avoid any damage to the UK national security. 
 
In the next chapter I will address the second question of the thesis: in what ways 
has war journalism changed since the occupation of Iraq in 2003? 
   
  
  
-114- 
 
Chapter Five: 
War Journalism in the Post-Iraq War 
 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I address the second question of my research project: in what 
ways has war journalism changed since the occupation of Iraq in 2003? This 
chapter aims to describe how the new war offers both opportunities and 
significant challenges for the practices of war journalism. This chapter will 
consider different aspects of the military’s media policy that has been structured 
for incorporating the traditional and new media into the military strategies. In 
particular, drawing on original interviews it explores journalists’ perspectives 
regarding their experiences in covering conflicts while they were embedded by an 
established military in traditional conflicts such as the Iraq War of 2003 or 
deploying with local or paramilitary groups in counterinsurgency operations (COIN) 
such as the war in Syria since 2012.  
 
This chapter will argue that war reporters have struggled to bear witness to 
contemporary conflicts because of the complex processes of attachment troops 
and layers of censorship established by the military, or the complexity of securing 
safe passage to some areas in conflict zones controlled by the enemy or 
paramilitary groups. This side of the argument is developed in two ways. Firstly, 
a background of the ethical role of embedded reporters including free access to 
information, journalistic values (fairness, accuracy, freedom of speech), editorial 
constraints, and issues around building bonds with soldiers is illustrated. I 
questioned whether the embedding system has worked, given the ethical basis on 
which journalists report by attempting to freely tell the audience what they can 
see and know. Have journalists comprised their objectivity by reporting the reality 
of war through a deal with the military sources which gives them security and 
safety? Finally, I ask whether the role of embedded journalists has changed. 
Secondly, evidence is provided of various challenges facing war reporters while 
attached to irregular forces in the new war compared to the classic model of 
embedding with regular troops in conventional warfare such as power diffusion, 
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the growing threat of extremism, and the shift in the concept of embedded system 
due to changes in journalist’s perception of news production, the rise of ruthless 
violence in new wars, and the growing interest among war reporters and audiences 
in the humanitarian stories. The conclusion considers the implications of the 
emerging challenges for the practice of war journalism. Table 5 describes the 
format I designed to generate codes that helped to understand the changes in war 
journalism in the post-Iraq War. 
  
    Table 5: A comparsion of two types of embedded journalism used in combats  
Theme Concepts Categories Sub Categories 
 
Coding 
War 
Journalism in 
the Post-Iraq 
War 
 
 
Embedded 
journalism 
The ethical 
dimension 
Frames of 
reference 
 fairness, 
accuracy, and 
freedom of 
speech 
losing 
impartiality 
(conceal or 
exclude more 
than explain) 
conflicts of 
interest 
Access vs 
operational 
security 
strategies 
 
Systems for press 
access: 
implications and 
goals 
limited access to 
civilian, 
censorship, 
propaganda, 
elite sources 
Mutual benefits 
Building bonds 
with soldiers 
The role of the 
embedded 
journalists 
(sets of values) 
Ethical obligations 
Security, access 
and information 
legitimate role 
(independence 
and seriousness) 
Balance, 
Identity, and 
subjectivity 
Post-
embedded 
journalism 
The new war 
The emergent 
trends in warfare 
- Power 
diffusion. 
-The growing 
threat of 
extremism and 
radical people. 
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- Involved in 
covert 
operations. 
 
Old journalism 
beyond new war 
- shifting in the 
concept of war 
journalism. 
-Journalist’s 
perception of 
news 
production. 
- Ruthless 
violence in new 
wars. 
-Human interest 
stories 
Access vs 
reporting 
violent 
extremism 
The rise of global 
extremism 
- Organised 
crimes. 
- Decline of ISIS. 
Frontline access 
-The risk and 
lack of field’s 
experience. 
-Limited 
choices. 
- Pressures of 
the reality of 
war coverage 
Embedding with 
irregular forces 
- Counter 
extremism 
operations. 
- Cultural 
sensitivity. 
Embedded with 
local forces. 
- Challenges of 
reporting from 
the rebel side 
 
 
I shall begin by discussing the impact of the embedded system has on the ethical 
role of war correspondents in reporting conflicts. 
 
Embedded System  
 
In Chapter Two, I indicated that the Western media had to fight a significant battle 
with American and British troops after the Afghanistan War, 2001, to gain access 
to military units when both countries were in the process of invading Iraq in 2003 
(Shanker & Sanger, 2002). Both countries eventually agreed to attach journalists 
to their troops because they believed that it would be difficult to control the 
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access of war reporters to the combat zone as some of them were in Afghanistan 
before the arrival of coalition troops. America and Britain also realised the 
difficulty of fully controlling the flow of information, and to counter the capability 
of the adversary to run disinformation campaigns in an era of information and 
communication (Shanker & Sanger, 2002). 
 
Much of the debate in the existing literature remains controversial and 
problematic on the ethical role of war reporters, for example their responsibility 
to provide balanced war coverage between telling all and respecting the safety of 
troops, particularly when their country is involved overtly in wars (Dodson, 2010; 
Lindner, 2009; Tønnessen & Kolstø, 2012). War reporters were subject to different 
types of restrictions, such as mobility and editorial restraints, and have had to 
adhere to the same rules of engagement as the military and their media operation 
policy while operating with troops (Cockburn, 2010).  
 
This chapter will provide evidence that journalists’ access to the war zone is the 
most challenging feature of traditional and new wars. I will demonstrate war 
journalists’ concerns about how their foreign deployment with troops might 
influence their journalistic values as independent journalists by breaking down 
this argument into two parts that consider the ethical dimensions and access 
versus operational security. 
 
Ethical Dimensions 
 
In this part of the chapter, I consider how an embedded system corresponds with 
war journalists’ ethical grounding. Generally, the ultimate interest of 
newspapers, TV networks, and radio stations is to preserve their reputation as 
credible and reliable sources. They are therefore committed to practising ethical 
journalism in armed conflicts (Butler, 2005), which may conflict with national 
grand strategy or violate the security of operations (JSP 580, 2013). The ethical 
code of journalism in reporting war has sparked a debate about journalists’ 
responsibility when finding themselves in a situation they have to be a participant 
in, instead of just reporting the unfolding violence in front of them (Olsson, 2017). 
This includes understanding the principles and codes of their responsibilities in 
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the theatre of war, by considering political and structural limitations such as their 
own country’s interests, the editorial policy of their organisation, and their 
individual role (Rees, 2007; Serrano, 2013).   
  
In embedded journalism, multiple emerging challenges have been influenced by 
the evolution of technology, military thinking, and the rise of the new media as 
an alternative and influential method of news sourcing. The UK military asked 
applicants to sign an agreement before being deployed with their forces. All the 
terms and conditions of this agreement are explained in the military document 
The Green Book (JSP 580, 2013). Many war journalists’ critiques concern the 
impact of this agreement on practising professional journalism: challenges to 
liberal values, such as the degree of access, frames of reference (fairness, 
accuracy, freedom of speech), as well as editorial interference, losing 
impartiality, and conflicts of interest with the military and other war players.  
 
Jonathan Beale, the BBC's defence correspondent since 2017, had spent two years 
as the BBC's Brussels correspondent as well as covering the 2006 midterm elections 
in the US and the Guantanamo military commssions in 2009. Beale explained why 
the embedded programme had a significant effect on freedom of speech during a 
war: 
I think the problem with embedded journalism is if you’re with 
the British or Americans, you have to abide by strict rules. Which 
for example, they will ask to see your material for operational 
security reasons, to make sure that you don’t compromise [their 
troops]. The British make you sign something called The Green 
Book. And The Green Book is, to be honest, you are signing your 
freedom away because they take control. They will dictate as to 
what you can film and cannot film. They will want to see edited 
items, which the Americans would never do. The Americans would 
never ask to see the end product. The British would. (Interview, 
London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
Beale suggests the embedded programme effects freedom of speech because of 
the sensitive issues surrounding operational secrecy, and because the British 
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military media policy was more complex and strict in scope compared to their 
American counterparts. As Britain was heavily involved in the Iraq War, and before 
that took part in several global conflicts in different geographical locations and 
circumstances, such as the Falklands, Afghanistan, and small wars and 
peacekeeping operations (Badesy, 1996), different degrees of censorship were 
implemented.  
 
Although both America and Britain defended their policies of not embedding 
journalists in Afghanistan to protect the secrecy of operations, both took serious 
steps before the Iraq War to establish a ‘media boot camp’ to train journalists 
who would cover frontline units in Iraq (Shanker & Sanger, 2002). The BBC’s chief 
international correspondent, Lyse Doucet, indicated that the military had lost 
control of the narrative of the war since the Afghanistan War because many 
independent journalists had to get their information from other sources. Doucet, 
who is Canadian, has covered all major wars in the Middle East and had a close 
relationship with the former Afghan president Hamid Karzai (Doucet, 2014). She 
talked about her experience when she worked close to Mujahideen groups in some 
parts of Afghanistan in the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989): 
In Afghanistan, I did a bit of embedding, but mostly with the 
Afghan side, so I didn’t really depend on the military or the Afghan 
government for getting information because I can go and talk to 
the people straight away. I understood the military’s points of 
view and their national duty on providing protection to the troops 
by avoiding any unexpected threat by being into the frontline or 
through mines fields. (Interview, London, 14th November 2016) 
 
Considering Doucet’s concerns of the little chance of embedded journalists had to 
talk to the citizens has implications in presenting an impartial view towards the 
conflict. However, maintaining impartiality in war reportage does not mean that 
a journalist must be neutral in talking about troops or war victims. Impartiality is 
more about seeking multiple methods of collecting information while being 
embedded with the army (Cockburn, 2010). Failure to present diversity in evolving 
conflicts can result in incomplete and biased stories. Therefore, journalists are 
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urged to present balanced perspectives on a conflict. However, it is impractical 
for journalists to cover both sides of a war at the same time.  
 
A few Western reporters did report from the enemy side but in exceptional 
circumstances, like Peter Arnett of CNN who was in Baghdad during the Gulf War 
in 1991, and Robert Fisk of The Independent who has covered most of the conflicts 
in the Middle East over the past 40 years, and was one of the few journalists to 
have interviewed the former Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (Schmitt, 1996; 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018). Sean Smith, a filmmaker from The Guardian, 
joined the 101st Airborne in Baghdad while American forces conducted the Dog 
Days’ Operation in 2008. Their work ‘Inside the Surge’, which recorded the heavy 
fighting with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City and Shulla, Sean and Teresa Smith 
revealed what soldiers thought of military occupation (The Guardian, 2008). The 
film pointed out that independent journalism in times of war should question 
every action being taken by the military, and report the facts as much as it can, 
otherwise it cannot be considered as real journalism. Sean Smith reflected: 
If you’re trying to cover the actions of the military, you can either 
see yourself as part of that mission from a patriotic point of view 
or loyalty to governments, or because you think it’s a just cause. 
I would say as a journalist that’s not really journalism. Your job is 
to question everything, and to try and get as close and observe 
and report truthfully. Obviously, whether it’s in a militia or a large 
power like America or Britain, if you are with them reporting, they 
are wanting you to report things that make them look good. That 
does not mean to say you have to do that [laughs] or you have to 
go along with that. (Interview, London, 6th February 2017) 
 
Both the military and the media may create disputes over strategic and critical 
issues in situations of uncertainty and division. For example, after the fall of 
Baghdad and the capture of the former Iraqi president Saddam Hussain in 
December 2003, the situation changed from war into counterinsurgency 
operations and the British media continued to put pressure on their government 
about the rationality of waging this war, as no evidence of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) were found (Moorcraft & Taylor, 2008).  
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Transparency is key for the military to gain the trust of the public and the media. 
However, embedded journalists were subject to different layers of control and 
censorship by coalition forces (Moorcraft & Taylor, 2008). In the case of the Iraq 
War, a lack of transparency had devastating effects on the future of military 
operations and media management when the conflict did not end at the fall of 
Baghdad but continued when it was deemed necessary to counter radical and 
extremist groups.  
 
Like most war journalists, David Pratt, a foreign correspondent of The Herald had 
moments of uncertainty when deciding whether to work on his own or join the 
troops, especially the Americans. Pratt is an author and broadcaster with a 
particular interest in the Arab and Islamic world, who previously worked for 
Reuters and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. He said about his 
experience of the Iraq War:6  
At the beginning of the war, I was actually offered an embed with 
the Scottish regiment, the Black Watch, in Basra. And I actually 
turned it down. Because I wasn’t a believer in embedding. I 
thought it was contrary to good journalistic practice. So I went in 
unilaterally. […] it was very difficult if you were operating 
unilaterally, because you were kind of ostracised by, not so much 
the British, but the American forces. Their view was you’re either 
with us, or you’re against us. (Interview, Glasgow, 6th December 
2016) 
 
Is independent journalism then crossing the line between journalism’s 
patriotic duty and expectations of the public? Conflicts of interest concern 
wartime reporters when joining troops in foreign deployment. War reporters 
were offered food and accommodation with officers and soldiers in military 
camps as part of the embedding agreement that may have affected some 
journalists’ objective judgement. The BBC’s Caroline Wyatt, who was 
                                                           
6 I interviewed David Pratt on 6th December 2017 in Glasgow, Scotland, just a few days after he returned from 
covering military operations in Al Mosel, Iraq. He was attached to the Peshmerga forces. 
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embedded with British troops in the Iraq War, stressed that a successful 
relationship with the military in the battlefield must involve a high degree of 
trust and respect from both sides to achieve mutual interests, despite the 
complexity of negotiation strategies: 
In order for us to get the story to tell the audience as much as 
possible, we would always try and agree where we would be, 
which unit we would be with. We would try to be with the people 
doing the most interesting things. But it is a trade-off if you 
embed. It is always a trade-off. It is a bargain; it is a deal. 
(Interview, London, 3rd November 2016)  
 
Since journalists agreed to accommodate themselves with the embedded 
system and to be hosted by the military, the following part of the chapter will 
discuss the implications for journalistic values in relation to securing access 
and operational security. 
 
Access Versus Operational Security Strategies  
 
Here I consider whether journalists compromised their objectivity in reporting the 
reality of war whilst making a deal with military forces. The interviewees agreed 
that the most important feature of the embedding program is that American and 
British forces agreed to accept embedding during the Iraq War: there was then 
little chance of war reporters acquiring the perspective of civilians because of 
their restriction in mobility. The BBC’s John Simpson, who reported from more 
than 120 countries, describes his disagreement with any type of embedding by 
saying, ‘I don’t want to spend my whole time with people to whom I owe my 
safety, my protection, my food, my transport, and then be expected to be 
completely honest about them, because there’s always that sense that you're 
betraying a trust’ (Moss, 2010, p.1). Thus, it was important for some big media 
organisations, such as the BBC, CNN and The Guardian, to have several reporters; 
each of them covering different parts of the war.  
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Jonathan Steele, an author of several books on international affairs and a 
freelancer who used to work as a senior foreign correspondent for The Guardian, 
spoke about this experience while he was covering the Iraq War: 
Let me give you what happened. The Guardian had three 
reporters who were covering the invasion. One of them was in 
Kuwait and travelled not as embedded, but sort of just following 
behind the frontline of the Iraqi troops. The other colleague was 
in Erbil in Northern Iraq and was waiting for Saddam Hussain’s 
resistance to collapse and then to come down to Baghdad. I was 
in Amman by the border with Jordan and Syria waiting for the 
official resistance to collapse to move in. Actually at the end, the 
man from Kuwait went first to Bagdad because he followed the 
Americans. We were blocked at the border and the one from Erbil 
was also blocked because Saddam Hussain didn’t collapse on the 
frontline until very near the end. And we had two people who 
were embedded with the British force; coming in also from 
Kuwait; one of them was with the Royal Navy and the other was 
with the army. So the main reporters myself and two others, were 
not embedded but we obviously we talked with our colleagues 
afterwards. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
Certainly, the embedded system was criticised in that it limited journalists from 
exercising their professional judgements as to what to report under the direct 
control of the military. Lindner (2008) indicates that embedded journalists during 
Iraq War were more able to present the military experience of the war due to 
their proximity to soldiers compared to those independent journalists who were 
stationed in Baghdad, Amman, or other major cities. In this sense, embedded 
journalists became socialised into military culture (Stockholm Syndrome) in which 
they developed compassion towards the soldiers (Dodson, 2010). Indeed, this 
embedding with the military was the most compromising circumstances war 
journalists had to offer for reporting conflicts. Jonathan Beale of the BBC stresses 
that the close relationship between embedded journalists and soldiers during 
combat operations has nothing to do with what is called ‘Stockholm Syndrome’. 
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Nevertheless, he urged war reporters to respect the lives of people who protect 
war reporters by not jeopardising the security of operations. He said:  
The question you have to ask yourself is, ‘if I report this, will that 
affect my embed?’ So there is […] people call it Stockholm 
Syndrome. I don't think you suffer Stockholm Syndrome, but I do 
think you worry about access and how reporting an incident will 
affect your relationship with the people that are meant to be 
looking after you. You have to think about that. But you also have 
to think about, ‘is this an important story where people have got 
to see and what’s really going on?’ So you have to make that 
balance. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
However, embedding helped both the military and the media to achieve some of 
their goals, despite the fact that journalists tried to resist information control by 
different means. Journalists legally agreed to accept the rules of engagement set 
by the military, yet this interactive relationship caused tension and disagreement 
among journalists while deployed with military units. Caroline Wyatt of the BBC 
described this as a ‘deal with the devil’. She said:  
Because you sign The Green Book, you say, ‘we agree to embed’ 
and as a result of that agreement, we agreed to abide by the rules 
that are set down by the military, which means that they have the 
right to see something before it’s broadcast. They won’t 
necessarily change it, but they have the right to see it, to make 
sure that we don’t compromise security. It was quite a difficult 
relationship because there were quite a lot of reports about 
equipment failure, not enough helicopters, things that were going 
wrong. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
The UK MoD issued general guidance in The Green Book, which enables 
attached journalists to report on operations. The first version was published 
in 1958.  The latest version published in 2013 engaged British media outlets in 
  
-125- 
 
the process of its production (JSP 580, 2013).7 Interestingly, this policy treats 
war correspondents as civilians who are not allowed to carry arms when 
attached to British forces (JSP 580, 2013). Although the document stated that 
correspondents are free to look for information in the area of operations, ‘they 
have to submit all press materials including written scripts, voice items, video 
recordings, and photographs related to combat activities for security checking 
before broadcast’ (JSP 580, 2013, p.12).  
 
Additionally, some requirements of this agreement were difficult to meet by 
journalists. David Pratt of The Herald, a foreign correspondent for over 20 
years, was surprised that categories classified journalists in accordance with 
their level of training:  
There was a medical criterion. There was the levels of preparation 
in terms of hostile environment training. Various grades run by 
the MoD. So if you’d done an independent hostile-environment 
training course, then that often didn’t match the MoD’s 
specifications or standards. Because, if my memory serves me 
correctly, it was on three levels. The lowest level means that you 
barely leave Camp Bastion or one of the big bases. The second 
level maybe pushes you out into the field. And then the final level 
would allow you to be on frontline duty with the forces, which 
was very, very, very, very rare, and very difficult. (Interview, 
Glasgow, 6th December 2016) 
 
Pratt indicated above that all journalists operating in an unpeaceful area of the 
world whether deploying with troops or travelling in their own should attend a 
hostile environment training course. These courses aim to equip journalists with 
the potential knowledge and skills for dealing with critical issues such as personal 
safety, operational security, mental health, and reaction to hostage and rescue 
operations in a dangerous zone.  
 
                                                           
7 As stated in The Green Book, this document is the result of ‘continuing dialogue between the MoD and 
media organisations and representatives and takes account of lessons learned from past and current 
operations’.  
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The Green Book indicates the media are provided with an accredited briefing, 
access, security, and other facilities including the chance to live with the soldiers 
and accompany them into war-fighting operations (JSP 580, 2013). Lyse Doucet of 
the BBC talked about the importance of war reporters being with soldiers on the 
frontline, where they might emotionally connect with the soldiers by employing 
their feelings, impressions, and emotions in their stories, which eventually has a 
significant impact either on soldiers’ morale or on the genre of war stories: 
When you embedded you get an access you wouldn’t get 
otherwise: you’d be close to the frontline, you’d spend nights and 
days with the soldiers, they will end up telling you new things; so 
you have bonding going on between soldiers and journalists. You 
end up seeing what the people are fighting for. Are they 
motivated? What drives them? You will hear what is their sadness, 
what happened when they lose one of their soldiers. It is a kind 
of an emotional well which is an important part of the story. 
(Interview, London, 14th November 2016)  
 
Despite the advantages offered by the embedded system based on Doucet’s 
testimony, the role of journalism is often influenced by this dependent 
relationship between journalists and soldiers. In fact, there are concerns 
surrounding the loss of journalistic values while attached to troops, such as 
autonomy, objectivity, and accountability.  
 
The BBC world affairs correspondent Paul Adam, who was based in US Central 
Command (Centcom) in Qatar in the Iraq War, pointed out that this form of 
reporting offered journalists certain degrees of security, and in the meantime 
offered the military the opportunity to justify to the world their military actions. 
He said:  
It is kind of a bargain, stuff in which each side gains something 
and compromises with something else. (Interview, London, 3rd 
November 2016) 
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Jonathan Beale of the BBC agreed with his journalist colleagues that the 
embedded system have affected the core business of war journalism: as 
journalists agreed to compromise their values with other incentives such as 
access, accommodation, transportation, and protection during the Iraq War. It 
sounds a contradiction in practising good journalism, but journalists were forced 
to make some concessions by their organisations to meet the demands of 24/7 
news. However, these constraints did not stop journalists from obtaining 
different perspectives. Jonathan Beale claims: 
So you are somewhat compromised, because you are getting the 
picture from a group of the people who you’ve decided to be with. 
And you have to ask yourself whether it is worth that compromise 
because of the access you’re getting. But it doesn’t mean that 
you don’t report what you see. You will always report what you 
see. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
From the military perspective, building trust between the military and the media 
is a key factor in the modern war to enable a more productive military-media 
relationship, one that influences public opinion by effectively engaging the media 
in military operations (English, 2005). Jonathan Steele indicates that journalists 
have a legitimate role to play on the battlefield just like other government and 
non-government actors, so the military has to recognise the evolving role of the 
media in conflicts and support their work:  
Most of the independent journalists are not doing public relations 
or cheerleading for any groups in the war zone, so the military or 
the government, or other parties involved in the conflict, have to 
trust those journalists and facilitate their mission by allowing them 
to collect their information within the limited scope of security 
restrictions. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
Therefore, war reporters have to fight a constant battle to maintain a balance 
between preserving the general standard of journalism at war with what 
military strategies aim to achieve. Jeremy Bowen, who became the BBC’s first 
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Middle East Editor in 2004 and the first British journalist to interview the 
former Libyan president, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011, admitted that: 
So what I try and be is what the BBC calls ‘impartial’. And the way 
I interpret that, essentially is about being fair. Try and show all 
the different perspectives if you can, or the main perspectives, 
but you don’t say, ‘two plus two equals four’. You don’t say, ‘he 
says that and he says this’. The truth lies somewhere in between. 
(Interview, London, 8th February 2017) 
 
Without doubt, journalists’ identity is one notion that war reporters are keen to 
preserve in times of conflict, as they act as mediators of information to the public 
(Tønnessen & Kolstø, 2012).  
 
War correspondents while accompanying the troops, particularly in times of post-
conflict, have committed themselves to record the voices of local people relating 
to international efforts to help them recover from hostilities, prevent the 
escalation of engagements, in building trust to sustain peace, and to restore 
effective governance (Orgeret and Tayeebwa, 2016). For example, when the war 
was over in Iraq and the British troops handed over (Basra) to the Americans, 
Caroline Wyatt indicates that the BBC were able to commission some local 
freelancers to do stories in Basra, while they accompanied British troops to film 
what they were doing. She said: 
So the local journalists almost entirely got negative views from 
local people about what had happened. We almost entirely got 
positive views because we had gone there, and we were with 
people in uniform. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016)  
 
 Wyatt’s interpretation above showed that in some circumstances embedded 
reporters have an advantageous opportunity for accessing territories that were 
controlled by their armed forces or friendly forces than their counterparts. Has 
the role of embeds changed? This analysis showed that journalists recognise 
themselves as a legitimate player in the war zone who must be given accredited 
access, information, and protection. Since conflict situations are complicated, it 
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is challenging for a reporter, whether attached to regular or local forces to provide 
an unbiased story in war reporting because embedding with the military provides 
them with a stable and peaceful method of reporting. 
 
The participants mostly agreed that the embedded system with the Americans or 
the British in 2003 tended to worked well in terms of access and obtaining up-to-
date information. However, war reporters were required to sign an agreement 
while joining troops in the combat zone. The following section sheds some light 
on the challenges that journalists have experienced in gaining legitimate access 
to conflict areas in the post-embedded era. 
 
The Post-Embedded Era: War, Terror, and Journalism 
 
This section discusses the ethical role of war reporters in reporting conflicts in the 
post-embedded era. This period is marked by the fall of Baghdad in 1 May 2003 
until the present in which the war in Iraq of 2003 has transformed into a new form 
of warfare. This analysis aims to understand how war journalists position 
themselves and their ethical practices in reporting 21st century’s conflicts. In 
particular, it will clarify various differences between the classic model of 
embedding journalists with regular forces in conventional warfare, as discussed 
above, and deployment with irregular forces in contemporary counterinsurgency 
operations (COIN). I question whether the classic model of embedding in 
conventional warfare can possibly be employed in other types of wars to meet the 
changes in the ecology of modern warfare.  
 
In this context, the days when war reporters could go to warfare wearing short-
sleeved jackets and carrying only light equipment, such as cameras, ID cards, note 
books, etc., have passed. Today, reporters need to attend comprehensive combat 
training before deployment, they have to wear bullet-proof vests, ride in Humvees 
(Multipurpose wheeled vehicles), hire bodyguards, and obtain life insurance (Ketz, 
2018). Thus, identifying emergent trends in the concept of war will help us to 
understand why war reporters have struggled to deal with the 21st century’s 
conflicts.  
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Emergent Trends in War 
 
The media have been deeply integrated within military strategies and tactics such 
as major military operations, counter-terrorism, insurgency operations, the use of 
drones, and hybrid and Info Ops (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010). This type of 
involvement has exposed the media to different kinds of threats while operating 
without cover in complex conflicts (Carr, 2012). For example, since 2015 
neglected civil wars like Yemen provide evidence of changes in the world’s 
perspectives towards human rights violations, increased risk of famine, and 
targeting civilians under the eye of the international community (Mundy, 2018). 
Angus Taverner, formerly of UK MoD, claims: 
I think Yemen is a fascinating access illustration of what happens 
when you do not talk to the media, and I strongly believe that 
Saudi and the UAE have lost international support over things like 
famine and cholera, allegations of bad targeting and so on. I’m 
actually talking about taking the media into Sanaa (Yemen) or 
other places, and showing them what they were doing and 
showing them how carefully they were working on the targeting, 
and the Emirates maybe spending $1.5 billion on relief. All that is 
completely missing because they are not talking to the media, and 
I think it is a good illustration of what happens when you just don't 
talk, you end up on the wrong side. (Interview by telephone, 13th 
February 2018) 
 
Taverner’s interpretation of the absence of military-media cooperation in current 
conflicts, for instance in Yemen due to a complex situation on the ground, 
provides insights into the role of the media in today’s war. Unlike other current 
conflicts, such as Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine, the absence of official data and security 
challenges have made many international media organisations reluctant to go to 
Yemen (Malsin, 2015; Dessi, 2018). For example, a crew from the BBC only 
managed to stay for a short time in the southern city of Aden in April 2015, but 
other news organisations preferred to cover the conflict from neighbouring 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Eygpt, or Lebanon (Malsin, 2015). The 
BBC’s Lyse Doucet agrees with academic scholars that the nature of war has 
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changed because of many non-state actors involved in asymmetrical warfare. 
Doucet states that the BBC has issued a policy to stop sending its staff journalists 
to hazardous areas because of the threat to their lives:  
The problem now is that we have gone from a kind of classic 
warfare, which is from a fixed position in the trenches. No one 
goes to the frontline to wars which been fought street to street, 
house to house, and we say now it’s not just women and children 
who are on the frontline, they are the frontline, so everyone 
comes under attack. (Interview, London, 14th November 2016) 
 
Her experience illustrates that it is difficult for Western journalists to report from 
the frontline in new war, as the risks of being in the midst of the battlefield are 
becoming more dangerous.  
 
In new war, the state is more concerned with projecting a positive image about 
its foreign policy to win public trust and mobilise forces in its own interests 
(Curran & Seaton, 2003). Accordingly, governments, especially the US, struggled 
after the Cold War to invest in soft power to promote public diplomacy; there is 
a thin line between propaganda and information (Nye, 2010). Nye (2008, p.94) 
defines soft power as the ‘ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one 
wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power 
rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies’.  
 
Middle power countries, those that have sufficient size and capacity, such as 
Canada and Norway, also participate in niche diplomacy on the international stage 
(Henrikson, 2005). Western military doctrines explicitly admit their desire to 
shape public opinion so as to justify their military action as part of Info Ops. 
However, the difference between the strategic objectives and war outcomes can 
damage the relationship between the military and the media and can create as 
many problems between policymakers and operational commanders. For example, 
the US government projected the invasion of Iraq of 2003 as a ‘trigger for a 
democratic transformation across the autocratic Arab world’ (Khalaf, 2013, p.1). 
In addition, NATO’s intervention in Libya of 2011 was presented as a mission which 
encompassed humanitarian protection (Fermor, 2012). Reflecting on the results 
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of both interventions, both combat operations in Iraq and Libya have failed to 
achieve their promises after both countries have fallen into a sectarian conflict 
and counterinsurgency operations (Cordesman, 2016). Moreover, the involvement 
of Western forces, covertly with no clear end-state objectives such as in Syria, 
the war against ISIS, and the war in Yemen, denied journalists the freedom of 
reporting the complete story to their audience.  
 
Lindsey Hilsum of Channel 4 News, has covered major conflicts of the past two 
decades including Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, and Libya, and has reported extensively from Iran, 
Zimbabwe, and China. Hilsum claims: 
As the nature of warfare changes, Western involvement in foreign 
wars changes, so that it becomes this remote thing of drones and 
air strikes and Special Forces. We as journalists find ourselves less 
and less able to cover what our own forces are doing, or the forces 
from our own country, I’m talking about Western journalists. Our 
job as journalists is to inform the population, the citizens. And I 
think we’re not doing that. So in many ways I think that’s the 
biggest challenge we face. (Interview by telephone, 13th March 
2017) 
 
Next, I have identified several major driving forces that motivated war 
reporters to take the risk of reporting organised violence as a career in the 
current globalised era — and recognised the potential threat to good 
journalism those forces can present in the new war.  
 
Journalism Beyond New War 
 
Journalists’ perceptions of their semi-detached role in reporting ongoing events 
shapes their motives, ideologies, and perspectives in selecting news, and how they 
act as gatekeepers in the chain of news production (Rees, 2001). Therefore, what 
drives a war journalist to go to war despite the ruthless violence they witness? Is 
it due to national duty, or to be there as a witness in crucial moments of human 
history?  
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Interviewees have emphasised their personal motives to present their version of 
truth, while deployed with regular or irregular forces, reflecting on their struggle 
with several players on the ground such as citizens, victims, combatants, and 
politicians. Truth-telling is what motivates war reporters to put their lives and the 
lives of their teams in danger to acquire an exclusive story.  
 
Amongst several factors, Fonneløp (2015, p.63) found that personal appreciation 
of journalism is related to a high feeling of responsibility, accountability, and 
maintaining positive relations with the public – the latter being a superior 
motivation for war reporters to enter the profession. The BBC’s Middle East Editor, 
Jeremy Bowen, states that ‘I wanted to report the worst things that were 
happening in the world. I liked being a witness, sometimes to what seemed to be 
important historic events. But the excitement never went away. I liked living on 
the edge’ (Bowen, 2014, p.1). Additionally, they have described what has changed 
in the atmosphere of new war journalism in both structural and contextual 
aspects. Maggie O’Kane of The Guardian, who was awarded the accolade of 
European Journalist of the Year in 2002, explained the reason for this shift in the 
concept of war journalism, especially for women, by saying: 
I spent my time as a foreign correspondent mainly between 1990 
and 2002. And that was a period which I would say was like a tea 
party, compared to what’s happening now. The two key things, I 
think, first, was the war crimes tribunal, in which journalists were 
seen as threats to the protagonists. And that happened as a result 
possibly of the Bosnian War. Bearing witness meant that you could 
be a danger. Whereas prior to that you were seen as a kind of 
novelty. Particularly for women, who were not seen as a threat 
and generally tolerated. I think it’s completely different now 
because of the war crimes tribunal. And secondly, is ISIS, and the 
kidnap value and the propaganda value of kidnapping or killing 
journalists. So for both these reasons, I think, Anthony Loyd who’s 
been kidnapped, would say it’s become impossible to work. 
(Interview, London, 6th February 2017) 
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O’Kane argued that restricting access to armed conflicts can be seen as a major 
threat to journalism in the new war context. War reporters are concerned with 
accessing both coalition-controlled and rebel-controlled territory without being 
embedded with local fighters or with the help of fixers (Dessi, 2018). However, 
personal motives for going into conflict zones aside, what drives journalists to 
take the risk? Other factors, such as international politics, ideology, interests, 
religion, gender, and culture, are not far from their concerns while embarking on 
their adventurous journeys. Jeremy Bowen of the BBC describes his motives by 
saying: 
My job, as I see it right now, is explaining what’s going on in the 
Middle East. Now a lot of that involves wars, in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, 
and Libya. But it doesn’t just involve that, there’s a lot of politics. 
There’s the whole business of religion, and there’s the 
intervention of foreign powers. (Interview, London, 8th February 
2017) 
 
The new wars have attracted many war journalists to challenge their political and 
geographical obstacles and put greater effort into human-interest stories. Despite 
the fact that Livingston’s data shows ‘no correlation exists between the number 
of people at risk of dying and media attention’ (2007, cited in Bajraktari & 
Parajon, 2007), Lindsey Hilsum of Channel 4 News, talked about her interest in 
reporting on guerrilla warfare rather than war between regular forces. She 
insisted that her passion was to question government behaviour and convey the 
voice of people and their struggles. She said: 
But pure military combat is not what I find the most interesting 
thing. What I find most interesting is the broader impact of war 
on people, and the behaviour of governments under pressure, and 
officials and other people under the pressure of war. And in many 
ways I’m more interested in guerrilla wars and informal wars than 
in the actual wars which are fought by standing armies. I’m more 
interested in people who are out of uniform or in half a uniform 
than in people who are in a very smart uniform. (Interview, 13th 
March 2017) 
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These kinds of moral responsibility make life harder and more risky for war 
journalists – similar to the challenges that war journalists have experienced since 
the Crimean War (1853–1856). Reporting conflicts has always had a degree of 
hazard in the battlefield. In an opinion piece in The Herald, David Pratt recalled 
memories of his early journey to Afghanistan in early 1980:  
As far back as the early 1980s, during my own baptism of fire, I 
was promptly left with no illusions about the risk-taking required 
in my chosen profession; not that it troubled me much then. Being 
young and seemingly indestructible, I revelled in the exotic, high-
octane experience of my early wars. (Pratt, 2016, p.1) 
 
Locations that have dominated the news of violence in the last two decades, such 
as Libya, Gaza, Yemen, Crimea, Iraq, and Syria, are recent examples of places 
where war journalists couldn’t get information in areas lacking a clear frontline. 
Because of frontline challenges, the idea of broadcasting from hotels in Baghdad, 
Mosul, Kabul, and Damascus is not really aligned with the challenging business of 
war journalism (Cockburn, 2013) while other actors, such as local producers and 
extremist groups, easily accessed social media, and the mainstream media as well 
(Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010). Sean Smith of The Guardian reporting from the 
heart of an unclear frontline zone noted the enormous challenges for 
correspondents and photographers under heavy fire: 
In Tripoli, Libya, if you’d never heard gunfire and you were locked 
in your flat because you’re frightened to go out, and there’s some 
firing, it could seem like rain. Sorry, it’s really raining, raining 
bullets, you’re going to know about it. There was a lot of heavy 
fighting. Trouble is, in the absence of people having access now, 
and then when they did get access and then coming in from the 
end of the fall of Tripoli, people wanted to hear a narrative when 
you saw people zip-tied and executed outside the compound. 
(Interview, London, 6th February 2017) 
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Therefore, what has changed in terms of reporters gaining access to today’s 
conflicts? The following sheds further light on the challenges that journalists have 
experienced by gaining legitimate access to areas of conflict. 
 
Access Versus Reporting Violent Extremism  
 
This part of the chapter explores the correlation between the rise of radical groups 
like the Jihadis and the growing threat to the lives of war reporters that find 
themselves in situations of high intensity violence. Accordingly, my focus here is 
to clarify the impact of jihadist groups on the characteristics of war, and how this 
manifests itself in wartime journalism. I approach this by considering the rise of 
global extremism, frontline access, and embedding with irregular forces. 
 
The Rise of Global Extremism 
 
Globalisation and extremism share something in common: believing in a world 
without borders. The term ‘jihadism’ in Islamic culture, which has been widely 
used since 9/11 in the mass media, remains a political term. We can understand 
global extremism as a radical ideology within the context of political crisis; an 
extremism that shifts its perception of ‘the enemy’ from local to global, and 
through which groups expand theirs goals and aspirations by establishing their own 
regime (Aslan, 2009). Al-Qaida, ISIS, and other radical groups are examples of 
organisations that have adopted this kind of ideology to achieve their goals.  
 
What type of challenges have war correspondents encountered while deployed 
with irregular forces in the fight against powerful organisations, such as ISIS or 
other extremist or rebel groups, in places like Syria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, 
Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq?  
 
Frontline Access 
 
There is no doubt that the military depends on the efficiency of its soldiers in 
addition to the efficiency of weapons and equipment. Although paramilitary forces 
like ISIS cannot be categorised as regular forces, they can be described as 
effective hybrid forces that combine terrorists and former army personnel, 
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especially from Iraq, and which operate with an estimated $2.38 billion in cash 
and assets (Gerges, 2016; Bennett, 2017). These hybrid forces have  been used to 
control ISIS territory (in North Iraq and Syria) with a high-tech weaponry arsenal 
such as ‘tanks, vehicle mounted rocket launchers, anti-air stinger missiles, 
Howitzer artillery, MiG Fighter Jets and, more recently, weaponized drones’ 
(Bennett, 2017, p.1). As ISIS started to lose its status as a regional power in the 
aftermath of the Battle of Mosul in 2016, terrorist groups adopted other forms of 
decentralised militant approaches (Clarke & Ross, 2016). These approaches 
include carrying out terrorist attacks outside of their territory, such as the attacks 
in Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016, and London in 2017.  
 
Due to the growing risks of travelling into extremist-controlled territory, it would 
be hard for Western journalists to cover all sides of a war in a manner that gives 
all parties equal weight – as used to be attempted in former times of conflict. In 
addition, a lack of experience in countering the risk of being in the midst of large-
scale conflicts without enough training, combined with a lack of protection, are 
reasons why war correspondents – especially young journalists and freelancers – 
have lost their lives in conflict zones. According to the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, 1337 journalists have been killed since 1992, including 299 journalists 
killed in combat and crossfire (CPJ, 2019). Because of a lack of Western military 
protection in contemporary wars, such as Syria and Northern Iraq, Paul Adam of 
the BBC claims that it would be harder for war/defence journalists to see the full 
picture from different sides because journalists can’t gain access to witness 
ongoing military operations. He explains:  
You are not going, for example, to embed with the Free Syrian 
Army, probably. People have done trips with the Syrian Army, but 
that was not a kind of embedding exactly, but it was a kind of 
escorting the task forces in specific operations, like Cleaning and 
Sanitising Operations. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
According to Jonathan Steele, a journalist has to decide which part of the war to 
cover, particularly in a complex conflict like Syria, where access to both sides of 
the conflict is an issue: 
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If you managed to get access then the next problem is getting 
reliable information, like in any places you are reporting from, as 
you have to talk to different people and judge what they are 
saying to you. I have been to Syria about 5 times. It was in 
Damascus. I am sure you know that if you have been to the 
Damascus side, you have to get a government visa, and you will 
not be very welcome on the opposition side, and in fact, you might 
be in considerable danger; kidnapping or some other threats. 
Similarly, reporters who work with the opposition side are only 
allowed to work on that side and they can’t get a visa to get to 
Damascus. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
Many of Steele’s concerns reflect the basic role of journalism to report violent 
extremism to the public. Lindsey Hilsum of Channel 4 News pointed out that 
journalists are not expected to report both sides of the conflict equally. Therefore, 
being embedded with military forces can be seen as an obstacle to realising the 
whole picture. She said:     
So on the whole, you’re with one side and then on another trip 
you’re with another side, or you’re on one side and your colleague 
is on another side. It’s a silly argument, people say you shouldn’t 
be embedded because you don’t see the whole picture. You never 
see the whole picture. It is not possible to see the whole picture. 
You will never see the whole picture. You will only ever see a slice 
of what’s going on. (Interview, 13th March 2017) 
 
Hilsum argues that embedding does not prevent journalists from seeing the whole 
picture of the conflict because other circumstances prevent journalists from being 
able to move around freely. As such, each type of war, requires different strategies 
and suitable networks to deal with the heavy demands of information 
management. I will now discuss embedding with irregular forces in unconventional 
warfare to explain how it differs from embedding with regular forces.  
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Embedding with Irregular Forces 
 
The threat of radical groups has grown recently. A US intelligence report states 
that extremist groups in some parts of the Middle East, Africa, the Russian North 
Caucasus, Southeast Asia, and South Asia have been affiliated with ISIS in Iraq 
since 2015, although their relationship remains symbolic in most cases (Coats, 
2018). To stop the spread of ISIS’s ideology, the US and the UK have worked 
individually and, sometimes, with local forces in Iraq and other countries, in a 
long strategy to counter extremist networks. Has this strategy worked well on the 
ground for war reporters?  
 
A report published by the UK parliament indicates that there is no obvious 
integration of the UK Government policy instruments to achieve the ultimate goals 
of its military operations in Iraq and Syria (The Prime Minister, 2016). For 
researchers, these insufficient strategies are what facilitate the grounds for 
minority groups, such as the Shia, extremists and clerics from the ISIS and Al-Nusra 
groups, to rise into the political system (Aslan, 2009; Gerges, 2016).  
 
Cockburn (2010) claims that the root of this failure originates from the Iraq War 
when occupation forces lacked the knowledge and understanding of the mosaic of 
Iraq’s unique culture, and because information warfare strategies were 
implemented to restrict the flow of news from the frontline. Therefore, the UK 
Government's misinterpretation of important phases of these conflicts created a 
vacuum in regional politics. The lack of an efficient and united strategy following 
the Iraq War has increased polarisation in reporting conflicts, has failed to give a 
voice to minority groups, and has uncovered hidden issues that people would 
rather not confront, such as the distinction between Sunni and Shia in Muslim 
countries, which have then fuelled other ethnic conflicts (Bajraktari & Parajon, 
2007; Mertens, 2016).  
 
Muna Mahmood, a filmmaker for The Guardian, highlighted the sensitivity of 
raising ethnic or sectarian issues among Iraqi people who consider themselves to 
be united by the notion of the Umaa (nation):  
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Just before the war in Iraq, let’s say a couple of weeks or 
something [laughs], the media were so careful to ask the question, 
‘Are you Sunni or Shi’ite?’ Because that was a very sensitive 
question in Iraq. No one would talk about it. The moment the war 
started, and Saddam had gone, they started to ask people, ‘Are 
you Sunni?’ They didn’t ask that question just because of Saddam, 
but people didn’t accept it. (Interview, London, 6th February 
2017) 
 
David Pratt of The Herald agreed that it is crucially important to have a degree of 
cultural sensitivity, even in terms of gender, dress codes, and different customs: 
It’s also a gender issue, I mean I’m not picking on my female 
colleagues here because I’ve seen male colleagues ride roughshod 
over cultural sensitivities. But I’ve also seen female 
correspondents working in Islamic cultures who are unaware of 
the needs, in terms of dress codes or whatever. The more 
experienced obviously do understand that. But it remains an issue, 
I think. (Interview, Glasgow, 6th December 2016) 
 
What does a lack of governmental policy instruments have to do with the attempts 
of war journalists to find their way into war zones with irregular forces? And is 
this type of embedding similar to what war journalists have experienced with 
American and British forces? 
 
Since the outbreak of the war in Northern Iraq and Syria, several war reporters 
who are funded by their own organisation have no objections to being deployed 
with regular forces and militia, as long as by established military. For the 
freelancer, the risk is much higher, even when hired by large media outlets, 
because they don’t receive the same benefits as their veteran counterparts, such 
as expense accounts, security, or insurance (Caesar, 2014). David Pratt was 
attached to the Iraqi security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters like other 
veteran journalists and freelancers during the battle for Mosul against ISIS in 2016. 
He indicated that choices were limited while embedded with militia forces during 
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the fight against extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. He talked about a kind of 
discrimination in joining these forces:   
Obviously the other thing is there’s a favouritism as well. If a 
paper is seen to be sympathetic or at least non-critical, then quite 
often in terms of the selection procedure, some correspondents 
will get that priority position. If they can only take six 
correspondents into a certain place, and give them access, then 
they’re going to be looking at who will give us the widest possible 
exposure, so that means the big media operations who can put 
more pressure on. The other criteria would be, ‘who’s with us?’, 
‘who has a sympathetic ear to our position here?’, I think. That’s 
the crucial thing. (Interview, Glasgow, 6th December 2016) 
 
Gabriel Gatehouse of the BBC was attached to Kurdish forces in the Battle of Mosul  
in 2016. He insisted that it would be impossible for UK forces to run an embedding 
system as it did in the Iraq War in 2003. He said: 
The most serious challenges are to gain access to the ground and 
get an accurate representation of what is going on the ground. 
The involvement of the British military on the ground has been 
very minimal and mostly covert, and that’s the reason we don’t 
have an embedding program. But I should also say that straight 
military embedded journalism, which I have done several times, 
would be very limited in this scope. (Interview by phone, 22nd 
November 2016) 
 
The choices are limited for war reporters to document counter-insurgency 
fighting in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, without full protection from skilled and well-
trained forces.  
 
Consider the experience of the CNN senior international correspondent Arwa 
Damon deployed with the Iraqi special forces in the attack against ISIS on the 8th 
November 2016 (Damon & Laine, 2016). Damon and her photojournalist colleague 
Brice Laine documented the huge offensive by both sides as their convoy was 
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leading the operation through narrow roads with low-hanging electrical cables, 
leaving soldiers and civilians in a terrible situation. Similarly, Gabriel Gatehouse 
of the BBC indicates how important it was to be with NATO forces to witness 
crucial moments in capturing the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi which 
changed the course of war. He describes how horrible it was to see the remains 
of Gaddafi’s convoy smashed by French airstrikes: 
During 2011 in Libya, when the rebels captured and killed 
Muammar Gaddafi, we didn’t witness the catching of the colonel, 
but we saw the remains of the convoy he was travelling in, that 
had been hit by the French airstrike. Very disturbing scene, 
people sat burned in their cars. Those images remain in my mind, 
and brought me to think of the difference between what decision-
making strikes look like from the perspective on the ground, and 
what they look like from the perspective of black and white TV 
footage put out by the military. (Interview by phone, 22nd 
November 2016) 
 
War journalists have encountered challenging issues reporting from government 
and rebel sides. In fact, their stories reveal how their valuable news sources, 
backed by the US and Britain, turned into threats against their lives.  
 
The veteran war reporter Anthony Loyd of The Times was abducted, beaten and 
shot at by a Syrian rebel gang, before managing to force open a car boot and 
escape with his life (Williams, 2014). In Tal Rafat in 2014, Loyd and his colleague, 
photographer Jack Hill, were on their way from Syria to Turkey after covering the 
situation in Aleppo. Loyd (2014) spoke about his abduction and escape story and 
how he was betrayed by his friend Abdelhakim al Yaseen, a local subunit 
commander with Liwa Tawhid, one of the largest rebel brigades in Northern Syria. 
Additionally, Austin Tice of the US newspaper publisher, McClatchy, has been held 
captive somewhere in Syria since August 2012. He was abducted by unknown 
groups in Syria on his way from Daraya, near Damascus, to Beirut in neighbouring 
Lebanon and his whereabouts remain unknown (Greenslade, 2016). The risk of 
being present in this type of conflict is growing in a way that makes it impossible 
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for journalists to report, unless they enjoy full logistical support from trusted 
military forces. The BBC’s Jonathan Beale admitted: 
I think modern conflict, if you think about Afghanistan, if you 
think about Libya, if you think about Iraq, there are threats that 
will always be there for journalists, such as roadside bombs, IEDs, 
indirect fire, mortars, and sniper fire. Things that you cannot 
control. You can mitigate the risk, but there will always be risk. 
(Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter offers an answer to the second research question of this study: in 
what ways has war journalism changed since the Iraq War in 2003? I explored the 
emerging character of journalistic practices in war, including journalists’ ethical 
role in an embedded system in both classic and new war, with more emphasis on 
the distinctive crisis in the Middle East since the Iraq War. My findings were 
derived from interviews with senior war reporters who represent major British 
media outlets, and one also worked on a freelance basis. I found evidence of 
emerging challenges in journalistic practices in terms of reporting non-
conventional war, compared to the old structural relationship with armed forces 
in conventional war.  
 
Overall, these findings tell us much more about the environment of war reporting 
and the challenges that wartime journalists face in getting in and out of combat 
zones. War journalism in the form of the embedded system like in the Iraq War of 
2003 and other types of embedding structures gives rise to two emerging themes: 
(1) the ambiguity of the concept of ‘embedded journalism’ due to the uncertain 
condition around journalistic ethics; and (2) the complex situation in recent wars 
that impairs the ability of journalists to report from the frontline.   
 
The embedded system was a result of operational lessons within military thinking 
in the US, the UK, and NATO during the post-Afghanistan War period. Through 
embedding the military aimed to strategically engage the national and allied 
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media into the war effort as much as they could as part of their troops to minimise 
the risk of unpredictable challenges. Certainly, this approach was not like previous 
forms of the military’s media management approach, such as the ‘information 
vacuum’ in the Falklands War of 1982, the ‘pooling system’ in the Gulf War of 
1991 and other attachments as in Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Embedding was 
comprehensively structured according to an agreement between both sides to 
engage the media into military doctrines.  
 
The findings from my interviews show that my participants agree with most 
academic studies of media and war that there is a period of transition in the 
relationship between war and the media, with regard to access to the frontline, 
communications technology, and the growing threat of radical groups. The 
interviewees also agree that it would be difficult to carry out embedding as 
accomplished in Iraq in 2003 because of the risk of getting killed or kidnapped by 
task forces that operate in the field; especially in the aftermath of the Syrian War, 
the war against ISIS in Northern Iraq, the civil war in Libya and the crisis in Yemen. 
However, some journalists were attached to NATO forces in Libya, and some 
joined local forces such as the Peshmerga in Northern Iraq for the purpose of 
countering terrorist operations and documenting the ongoing fight against ISIS. 
   
The following chapter will outline the impact of developments in the war paradigm 
and communications technologies on journalistic work.  
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      Chapter Six:  
The Ecology of War Journalism in the Digital Age: 
Information as a Weapon  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the third question of this thesis: how has the development 
of a hybrid media ecology made the role of professional war reporters vulnerable 
in a fast-changing situation? The media industry, as a whole, has been affected by 
the consequences of a changing media environment in the digital age. One of the 
key changes is the use of the internet, and social media in particular, not only as 
a global means of mediation during armed conflict, but also as tools for complex 
information warfare. This includes advertising, organised trolling, computational 
propaganda, mobilisation, and framing politics with the malicious intent to 
influence the public opinion. That makes the work of war correspondents 
vulnerable and risky to acquire information dominance due to challenges of 
bearing eyewitness in the new forms of conflicts. 
 
This chapter is divided into two distinct main parts as shown below in Table 6. I 
argue, firstly, that the digital revolution has caused drastic changes in the 
reporting of today’s conflicts and that this brings with it new ethical dilemmas for 
war reporters in relation to war journalism’s credibility. The case of the current 
civil war in Syria will highlight the major challenges that war correspondents have 
encountered on the ground. Secondly, the massive developments in 
communications technologies affect journalistic work and enable individuals and 
groups outside the mainstream media to have a voice in the era of the new war. 
Weaponisation of information is the term I used in this chapter to describe the 
tactics of using internet resources and digital networks for combat purposes either 
from the perspective of the British military or from the standpoint of war 
reporters. Information as a weapon will be analysed by looking closely at the 
current crisis in Ukraine to describe how information operations have been 
managed in the cyberspace domain. 
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Table 6 the ecology of war journalism in the digital age 
 
Theme Concepts Categories Sub Categories 
 
Coding 
The Ecology 
of War 
Journalism 
in the 
Digital Age  
 
Crisis in 
news 
credibility 
The balanced 
reporting of 
war news 
Loss of trust 
The role of gatekeepers 
Inaccurate information, 
bias, post-truth, and 
infotainment 
Digital 
revolution 
Eywitnessing and 
Disinformation  
The consequences of fake 
news, and  the audience 
perception of 
disinformation 
The decline of Professional 
Journalists  
Syria War 
The future 
of 
information 
operations 
The military 
and 
information  
Media Ops 
doctrines 
The use of defensive 
language, lack of access to 
information, and lack of 
logistical support for war 
reporters  
The quality of 
war reporting 
The loss of veteran war 
reporters, netwar and non- 
verified materials, building 
a symbiotic relationship 
with the media, and 
changes in the military 
culture  
Weblogs 
Reliability, citizen 
journalists, cyber troops, 
and 
information/disinformation 
The media 
and 
information 
Weaponisation of 
information 
Fake news and 
propaganda, polarisation, 
fact-checking, and bias 
Decline of professional 
reporters, local reporters 
The User-
Generated 
Content (UGC’s)  
Accountable journalism, 
Text and visual posting 
from soldiers, personal life 
and experience 
The Ukrain Crisis 
 
I begin with a discussion about the lack of credibility in war reporting that has 
occurred within a newly changed media environment. 
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Credibility in War Journalism 
 
This section incorporates intervieweesʼ perspectives and a review of media 
literature about how developments in communications technology can affect the 
quality of war journalism. Audience perceptions of war reportage involve a 
complicated process of measuring news credibility, such as whether consumers 
accept various unverified material. Media scholars indicate that the components 
of news credibility (in traditional and new media) are believability, accuracy, 
trustworthiness, bias, and completeness (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000, cited in 
Abdulla et al., 2002). This section will question the credibility of newsgathering 
in today’s conflicts by looking at how war correspondents have tried to provide a 
balanced reportage of each side by being eyewitnesses to day-by-day events in 
the war zone. Additionally, credibility is at risk due to the deliberate manipulation 
of information. Evidence from the ongoing civil war in Syria will indicate the 
struggle of undertaking accurate eyewitness reporting. 
 
The Balanced Reporting of War News 
 
Balance is a fundamental component of good journalism, yet balance doesn’t 
mean giving each side equal coverage, space, and time, but rather how to report 
accurate and fair judgements of the truth (N.L., 2012). In journalism in general, 
balance is costly and time-consuming to obtain. This section will examine war 
correspondents’ concerns on the loss of trust due to challenges of bearing 
eyewitness in the new forms of conflicts.  
 
Over the last three decades, the internet has become an efficient interactive 
platform for people to share knowledge, information, emotions, advertising, and 
recordings of real-life events, which have challenged conventional media. Abdulla 
et al., (2002) indicate that fairness and accuracy are associated with newspapers 
and television, however, readers also judge online news credibility for 
trustworthiness, timeliness, and bias factors. In particular, intrinsic features of 
the internet offer online users with the ability to establishing constant, interactive 
communication with organisations and individuals in social media platforms that 
provide public and private rooms for discussion such as Twitter and Facebook.  
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They can argue, challenge, share, and comment regarding the complexity of war 
reporting. Similarly, the active presence of war correspondents in social media 
enables them to interact with their followers and accessing sources to deliver 
accurate information to gain trust. However, Sacco & Bossio (2015, p.73) argued 
that ‘reporters also have to face the drawbacks that go with fast, multi-medium 
and multi-sourced information, especially in terms of verification of information 
and contextualisation’.  
 
Thus, professional journalists may act like the old model of gatekeepers in the 
traditional media to verify the information and pinpoint their view. For example, 
Alex Crawford of Sky News was criticised for her biased reporting of the current 
Libyan crisis because of a claim made by a Libyan citizen on her account at Twitter 
on 18 April 2019 that Alex and her team did not report from big cities such as 
Benghazi which had fought the war against ISIS. Alex Crawford tweeted on the 
same day that she has reported from Benghazi several times when Khalifa Heftar’s 
(the head of the Libyan National Army) forces were fighting ISIS there. This online 
interaction has encouraged other professional war reporters, who are reporting 
on the same crisis, to engage with this open dialogue. 
 
Lindsey Hilsum of Channel 4 News has defended the bravery of her counterpart 
Alex Crawford and her team who operate in a difficult time in Libya. She noted 
on the same platform ‘Libya people: @AlexCrawfordSky and her team are doing 
their best to report from Tripoli which is very dangerous and difficult. She is not 
biased. She has spent time in different parts of the country. There are many 
versions of events. She is an eyewitness on the ground’ (Hilsum, 2019). Balanced 
reporting lies at the very heart of war journalism. Lyse Doucet of the BBC indicates 
that balanced reporting cannot be achieved without being physically present to 
monitor the escalation of these conflicts from different perspectives: 
In war reporting the truth is the first casualty, the fog of war has 
always been a problem going back since war reporting began. In 
the heat of the battle, how do you know how many people died, 
who started the conflict, and who won the conflict? And then if 
you were reporting only from one side like in the Vietnam War 
with American troops: how you do really know what it is 
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happening with the Vietcong, how do you present a full picture of 
the war if you only do it from one side? You just don’t know 
because you aren’t there. So for us being there this is about 
journalism, being there on the ground. (Interview, London, 14th 
November 2016) 
 
According to Doucet’s reflection above, the lack of trust in the media has become 
the major concern among war journalists in the era of digital communications who 
could not be eyewitnesses to day-to-day fighting. According to the 2017 Edelman 
Trust Barometer, trust is in crisis in four key institutions – business, government, 
NGOs, and the media (Edelman, 2017). The Edelman report claims that the whole 
social system is falling apart, resulting in a decline in trust as concerns grow over 
major issues such as the pace of innovation, corruption, inequality, immigration, 
eroding social values, and globalisation (Edelman, 2017).  
 
According to Edelman’s (2017) report, trust in critical journalism is threatened by 
the increased amount of inaccurate information, fake news, bias, sensationalism, 
alternative truth, and hoaxes. These disrupt the core of the democratic system, 
as can be seen in the aftermath of the US presidential election in 2016, and the 
debate over the implications of Brexit for the economies of Britain and the EU. 
David Pratt of The Herald claims that the current debate on post-truth has 
impacted the role of war correspondents in reflecting diverse views on war news: 
There is a lot of talk at the moment about the post-truth and fake 
news and whatever. And I’ve always been of the view that there 
will always be journalism. We will always need journalism. The 
formats will change. It will have to be readdressed. A lot of these 
things are often almost cyclical in a sense because people will 
become very aware of fake news and the post-truth. I hate that 
term. Basically lies, and lies have always been around. Lies have 
been around as long as journalism’s been around. And the job of 
journalism is to get behind the lies and beneath the lies and 
through the lies. So the format will change, the need for 
journalism will always be there. (Interview, Glasgow, 6th 
December 2016) 
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Pratt’s argument about his disagreement of the misuse of the phrase post-truth 
across the mainstream media shows that evidence-based information is crucial for 
war journalism to claim accountability for telling the full story. The phrase of 
“post-truth” suggests that world politics are fuelled by emotive statements rather 
than facts (Coughlan, 2017). The Oxford dictionary defines post-truth as an 
ʻadjective relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion that appeals to emotion and personal beliefʼ 
(Oxford dictionary). Post-truth was named the word of the year by Oxford 
dictionary in 2016 because of the frequency of its usage, which increased by 
2,000% in 2016 over 2015, following the international debate on Brexit and the US 
presidential election (BBC, 2016). The world has become concerned about today’s 
warfare as a battle for information, communications, security, intelligence, 
surveillance, disinformation, cyber, and electronic warfare associated with the 
prevalence of CCS.  
 
For some journalists, the backdrop of trust is a global phenomenon rather than a 
problem of journalism. Greenslade (2008) of The Guardian claims that a journalist 
is not the person to hold responsible for the current crisis facing the traditional 
media concerning the digital revolution and the financial crisis. It is a global 
phenomenon, and out of journalists’ control. The BBC's Gabriel Gatehouse 
rejected the claim of a decline in the efficiency of war journalists in contemporary 
conflicts, despite the growing risks in areas of conflicts. He said: 
No I don’t think so. The nature of many conflicts needs reporters 
on the ground. It is becoming harder to work on the ground 
because of the proliferation of the broadcast technology and 
basically everyone with a smartphone can be a broadcaster. But I 
wouldn't call it ‘decline’. It is additional challenges. (Interview by 
telephone, 22nd November 2016) 
 
Considering Gatehouseʼ's statement above, the fundamental role of a war reporter 
is to act as an eyewitness by giving an accurate account of day-by-day tragedy 
without being partially sighted. Yet another critical challenge for war journalism 
  
-151- 
 
is to effectively educate people about matters that are important to their nation 
(Fuller, 2010), and to supply critical reporting about the suffering of civilians, and 
the direction of the conflicts.  
Jonathan Steele of The Guardian claims that both the media and the audience 
react differently to war compared to natural crises like earthquakes: 
War reporting is about politics. We know that war is the most 
destructive thing, the terrible tragedies and we should report the 
suffering. The outside world needs to know what is going on? But 
it is not just an earthquake. In an earthquake you don’t blame 
anybody. Some people are unsafe, some people are trapped under 
buildings, some have lost their husband or children. An 
earthquake is an earthquake, but in a war you need to know why 
it is happening? Who is fighting whom? Who are the dominant 
groups? Is there any chance for political settlements to stop the 
war? It is political things. (Interview, London, 14th November 
2016) 
 
Considering war journalism as a primary source of information in times of conflict, 
the best way for the mainstream media to obtain the full picture of a story is to 
have several correspondents in different places in a conflict zone. It would be 
hard for a journalist in current conflicts to provide a full picture from all different 
angles by himself or herself unless he or she has a secure connection with the 
conflict’s actors, someone in the military, or other journalists or freelancers. 
Lindsey Hilsum of Channel 4 News argued: 
You can’t clone yourself, and you can’t be in more than one place 
at once. So, for example, in Fallujah, I was with an American 
Marine unit in the Battle of Fallujah in 2004. And I said before, it 
was a very, very intense combat but obviously, we did not get the 
story of what was happening to the civilians in Fallujah, apart 
from the ones we saw, the ones who were killed. Well, they 
weren’t mostly civilians, they were the men in half-uniforms, the 
fighters. And then we saw people with white flags and so on. 
(Interview, 13th March 2017) 
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Hilsum refers in her account above to those war journalists who travelled with the 
US and UK Armed Forces in tanks and armoured personnel carriers during major 
combat operations in the period of post-Iraq War. Beyond the US and UK militaries’ 
effort to secure the safety of war reporters in territories that were controlled by 
insurgents and extremists such as Baghdad and Fallujah, war reporters have gained 
a better understanding of the growing risk of operating in severe emergencies. 
War journalists have responded effectively to the complexity of today’s wars.  
 
Despite the growing risk of being in dangerous places like Syria, Libya, Yemen, 
and Iraq without having full military support while reporting from the frontline, 
journalists still show confidence in challenging direct threats to their lives. 
Journalists have established reliable networks with the key players in warzones, 
such as local reporters, fixers, translators, drivers, and other media actors, to 
facilitate their mission and help them talk to local people. Caroline Wyatt of the 
BBC emphasises the importance of skilled foreign correspondents to report 
contemporary wars who are highly trained and strive to provide a more balanced 
perspective with a high standard of discipline in choosing sources and quoting 
people accurately: 
But one reason why we have foreign correspondents is to tell 
stories from a perspective that our audience will understand. So 
much of our audience is not in Iraq or in Afghanistan, they are 
people who watching here, at home, from France, Spain, Italy or 
wherever. And I suppose what we can do is bring them a different 
perspective. All you can hope to do is to tell as much of the truth 
as you can. (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
The Syrian crisis brought up the contested relationship between the media and 
the military regarding the media's potential role in the process of decision-making 
about military action during humanitarian crises (Doucet, 2018). I will provide 
evidence in the next section about war reporters’ concerns on accessing war 
zones, talking to reliable sources, and securing their safety and the safety of their 
team. 
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Reporting Reality in the Syrian War 
 
The unfolding civil war in Syria provides an excellent example of how information 
about the reality of today’s conflict is processed by the media and social media. 
According to the UN Refugee Agency, seven years of fighting in Syria resulted in 
more than 300,000 people losing their lives, and approximately 11 million were 
displaced from their homes (UNHCR, 2019). Three main combatants' groups are 
fighting each other backed by outside forces in Syria. Each of them claims the 
right to control their territories: (a) the rebels who are backed by the US, UK and 
some Sunni countries; (b) the government who are backed by Russia and Iran; and, 
(c) numerous insurgent and militant groups. Each major power operating in Syria 
– Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the US – has its interests and agenda. 
Therefore, it is quite comprehensible that each side fabricates and exaggerates 
war stories about the others, while denying any crimes carried out by their forces. 
 
The complex situation in Syria since 2012 has raised journalistsʼ concerns about 
the failure of the international community to stop what they described as ‘the 
most devastating conflict in this century’ (Doucet, 2018). Journalists also raise 
other concerns around accessing the frontline, gathering reliable data, and online 
disinformation. Due to a lack of sources in some areas held by rebels and other 
extremist groups, in the east and west of Aleppo in Syria most of the Western 
media moved into the conflict area with the permission of the dominant 
insurgents. These armed opposition groups operate in the same style as Al-Qaeda, 
including the Ahrar Al-Sham rebel group and the Salafi-jihadi groups – for 
example, Jabhat al-Nusra (Cockburn, 2017, 2018b). Other journalists preferred to 
operate with a valid visa in government territories to be sure of their safety. 
Jeremy Bowen of the BBC pointed out: 
If I’m in Damascus, I always go on the regime’s side, with a visa. 
I don’t go into the country illegally, like people used to do to go 
to the rebels. But now that’s too dangerous and hardly anybody 
does it. So if I want to go to Latakia, for example, I have to get 
special permission. We don’t always need someone in the car with 
us when we’re driving, but the driver needs to have a piece of 
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paper with all our names on. (Interview, London, 8th February 
2017) 
 
David Pratt of The Herald considers their safety and the safety of their team to 
be as important as the job they are doing. He claimed: 
It is always my top priority, because it’s a top priority in terms of 
personal security, security of those around you, the security of 
fixers and translators, who people frequently tend to forget about 
and who are putting their lives on the line. And they’re often from 
that country, so when I go home, they’re still there. And if they’re 
seen to be stepping out of line because they’re assisting you, it 
puts the fixer and translator, and their family, under tremendous 
duress and pressure. (Interview, Glasgow, 6th December 2016) 
 
Considering the consequences of this restricted access, financial implications and 
diffused, dispersed, multi-dimensional threats on the ground have constrained 
wartime journalists in eyewitnessing events (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). As a 
result, the circulation of unverified or false information without proof or evidence 
poses additional challenges for war journalists when operating under the condition 
of uncertainty in which this information can cause confusion among the audience, 
even after it has been discredited. Emotions such as anger and anxiety may push 
people to respond in a partisan manner when exposed to inaccurate information 
about politics (Weeks, 2015). Greenhill and Oppenheim (2017) indicate that 
people who are living in politically unstable conditions are vulnerable to receiving 
unverified information due to heightened threat perception compared to people 
living in peaceful environments. As such, misinformation about incorrect events 
damages the media’s reputation and, therefore, has negative influences on 
people’s beliefs and attitudes about controversial political issues – if not backed 
by substantial evidence (Nyhan & Reifler, 2015). For example, the picture of 
Omran Daqneesh, the young Syrian boy whose picture travelled around the globe 
as an icon of the brutality of the Assad regime in the Aleppo battle during August 
2016, spread across the internet and got the world's attention (Sanchez, 2017). 
The boy who appeared in the image was sitting on a chair with his face covered 
in blood and dust. His father talked about the attempts of rebel groups and the 
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international media to use his son to attack the Syrian regime (Sanchez, 2017). 
The BBC’s Lyse Doucet describes this picture as an example of a ‘misleading issue’: 
Last month you had the picture of Omran Daqneesh in the 
ambulance in Aleppo, filmed by the opposition group, and that 
one travelled around the world. The little boy stained with dust 
and blood. So the Western journalists used it. Isn’t this terrible! 
Everyone tweeted and retweeted this picture. The Russians and 
Chinese said, ‘It is fake’. This stuff was put on his face, and they 
started to investigate its sources. They found that the same 
photographer who took this picture had taken selfies two weeks 
ago with some Jihadist fighters with beheaded [Abdullah Issa] 12-
year-old child. They said: ‘How can we trust this photographer!’ 
Even Bashar Alasad said, ‘This is a hoax! This is not true’. So you 
have one picture, which nobody can agree on its sources. 
Everyone has his view on it. (Interview, London, 14th November 
2016) 
 
Doucet argued above that the use of unverified information can create a storm of 
criticism from journalists, politicians, and social media users. In this case, David 
Pratt of The Herald indicates that supporting indigenous journalism is vital for 
providing multi-dimensional views of war, but it has to be based on constructed 
ethical norms; even though local journalists might be inextricably tied up with 
what is going on because of their proximity:  
So I think the way forward, you know when I worked for the 
Institute of War and Peace Reporting, a great deal of our work 
was about re-building or supporting indigenous journalism. But 
that indigenous journalism has to have professional standards, 
constraints, ethical priorities, positioning, that any other 
journalism should have in that way. And that’s why I think there’s 
nothing wrong with a Syrian reporting on the Syrian situation, but 
they have to understand that it’s the journalism first, really. And 
that’s a big demand to place on anybody. (Interview, Glasgow, 
6th December 2016) 
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For Jeremy Bowen of the BBC, it is essential to coordinate with the local 
government or the military to facilitate access to the frontline and to report 
without any kind of disturbance. Bowen wrote in an article in the Radio Times 
about the most challenging types of war reporting, and why the war in Syria kept 
pulling him back: ‘Damascus is surrounded by frontlines. I have crossed them from 
time to time. But it’s getting harder. Going out of town is more complicated. Trips 
to the frontline, as in most countries, have to be carefully coordinated with the 
military’ (Bowen, 2014, p.1).  
 
In short, this part of this chapter has discussed the impact of the digital revolution 
has on the practice of war journalism in the era of the new war. In war journalism, 
providing fair, accurate, transparent, and reliable information is always attached 
to ethical codes when journalists put themselves at risk while deployed with local 
forces, militia, aid agencies in areas of violence, or operate independently. The 
ongoing war in Syria has provided evidence that the rise of citizen and web 
journalists who have access to record injustices, violence, and tragedies at a time 
when staff journalists are not able to access some cities controlled by insurgents 
has brought a potent threat to the mainstream media.  
 
In the next part, I will explore under which conditions information is being used 
as a weapon in the context of the new war. The implications of developments in 
military doctrines and communications technologies in the practice of war 
reporting will be outlined. 
 
 Information as a Weapon in the New War 
 
The information revolution has changed the way wars are waged and reported. 
The aim of this part is to describe how the military and the media have responded 
to the dramatic impact that the information and communication revolution has 
had on their business. On the one hand, the military doctrines recognise the 
potential capabilities of the digital technologies to acquire the control on the flow 
of information during military operations. Although the new media challenges the 
old model of Info Ops which becomes irrelevant for today’s conflicts as the 
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character of war has changed, it provides new ways of thinking about the realistic 
methods of supporting the integration system with the traditional and new media. 
An information operations policy is crucial for constructing realities, shaping 
attitudes to actors and audiences towards conflicts, and effecting information 
security (Waltzman, 2017). On the other hand, the mainstream media have to 
balance between providing the public with reliable and accurate information 
about the security challenges and the potential risk of using unverified information 
circulating on the internet and social media which may be intended to manipulate 
war reporters. Information is being used in digital domains as a weapon for 
military purposes. Thus, the aim of the mainstream media is to stabilise their 
business offline and expand their online consumer base. 
   
I will begin by giving more insight into how military doctrines in the British context 
have addressed the issues of changes in reporting new forms of warfare and the 
process of mitigating the risk of information management. 
 
The Military and Information 
 
The military has acknowledged a shifting media space specifically in the new form 
of warfare because the strategic narrative of war has gained more value in the 
eyes of combat commanders than its physical dimensions (Patrikarakos, 2017). 
Indeed, the narrative of war is considered as an effective tool to promote strategic 
communications and to engage with significant audiences according to the Media 
Ops [local citizens, international, joint and regional operations, joint operations 
area local, and military troops] on an operational and tactical level (JDP 3-45.MoD-
UK, 2007; Maltby et al., 2015).  
 
As modern wars have become more complex, certain military’s media policies may 
not work for all cases. For instance, the use of defensive language in media 
doctrines, difficulties in educating war reporters about the dynamic relationship 
between war and the media in modern warfare and getting audiences to 
understand military behaviour about combat efforts throughout the war. Despite 
the remarkable progress of the Media Ops to address the main issues that concern 
war journalists, the threat of the heavy usage of new technology in 
  
-158- 
 
communications and information transmission may affect the conduct of military 
operations, and the means of preserving a positive image of military performance. 
Lord David Richards claims that todayʼs war is being reported, shared and shaped 
by combinations of conventional and new news media in which required different 
tactics to be incorporated into the military effort: 
Well, we need to target those people. I’m not getting into the 
message that you have to create an environment in which what 
the extremists are doing through social media is unacceptable for 
the majority, and again it can be both a combination of social and 
conventional media. So, you might take military-style actions to 
knock out a particular social media vehicle. (Interview, House of 
Lords, London, 7th February 2018) 
 
It is important to bear in mind, that incorporating the media into war effort 
requires a complete understanding of the media’s role in conflict areas, including 
access to information, freedom of movement, and educating journalists about 
military culture. To do so, the military has to push the integration process forward 
to provide access and protection to wartime journalists in war zones, similar to 
the embed system, and to educate soldiers and provide skills at military colleges 
and schools on best practice concerning communications technology, particularly 
social media. For Tony Cramp it is more about building relationships over the long 
term, which depends on the quality of the media outlets: 
It depends on the type of media as well, so if you’re talking about 
the high-end journalists, the broadsheets, the TV companies and 
the rest, I’ve got a lot of respect for them and their integrity. In 
their role, they all look to the long term well often. So they’re 
looking for that long-term relationship and trust is easy to find. I 
think. But when I have exposure to some of the other media 
outlets – the lower end, some of the tabloid journalists – then I 
have to be a lot more careful. (Interview by telephone, 11th 
February 2018) 
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The economic crisis has affected journalistic routine in the traditional media 
industry. The military regards the media industry as being in decline in terms of 
distribution and content in the traditional media.  
 
The restrictions being made by the UK MoD on their service people when 
communicating via offline and online media have had an impact on the role of 
media in covering military activities. Angus Taverner expressed his frustration 
when he noticed some young reporters arrived in the conflict zone knowing 
absolutely nothing about military business, which may have had a negative impact 
on the troops’ morale: 
I think the other thing which has been an important factor has 
been a loss of expertise among the media as well. The old days 
when Max Hastings and Robert Fisk spent their lives covering 
defence and military activities, knew commanders personally, 
attended their weddings and so forth, they’re gone. I am pushed 
to really think of any defence correspondents who have in-depth 
links to and understanding of the way the military does its 
business. (Interview by telephone, 13th February 2018) 
 
Traverner’s interpretation of the absence of veteran journalists is that the 
reporting of military activities has been subjected by young reporters who lack 
the same level of knowledge to deploy to the frontline. This has some substance. 
For example, the British freelancer Christian Stephen became a war reporter at 
the age of 16 (Pfeiffer, 2018). He has produced several films about wars in 
different parts of the world over the last few years, such as Iraq and Syria. The 
best of his work is a film, for which he travelled alone to Aleppo in Syria; it is 
widely recognised as the first virtual reality documentary inside a war zone ‘With 
VR coming in’ (Pfeiffer, 2018). Stephen, who was embedded with Iraqi Special 
Operations Forces in 2016 to take back control of the city of Mosul from ISIS 
powers, states about his deployment ‘when I get on the plane I’m dead already, 
and I have to think that way’ (Pfeiffer, 2018, p. 1). He managed to record a group 
of Yazidi women who had escaped from the tight control of ISIS in Northern Iraq 
in 2016 in a film called ‘The Sun Ladies’ (Pfeiffer, 2018). Interviewees who had 
experienced embedding with troops spoke about the challenges they had 
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concerning access and freedom of expression. British journalists like Robert Fisk, 
who works for The Independent, and John Simpson, who has covered more than 
30 war zones for the BBC, prefer to operate independently from military terms in 
conflict zones.  
 
On the one hand, the hunger for information is what drives journalists to take risks 
for a better story. On the other hand, the military aims to control what 
information journalists share with the public (Smith, 2007). Lord David Richards 
claims it is a form of symbiotic relationship, but with different interests and 
cultures: 
Well, I think this is all to do with training. Actually, if I am an 
example, I have many friends in the media to this day because I 
demonstrated an understanding of their predicament and their 
needs, and they can come to me, whether I’m commander or in 
some other role, to discuss things. I don’t think it’s impossible. 
You have to accept that these terms are a symbiotic relationship. 
(Interview, House of Lords, London, 7th February 2018) 
 
Despite the fact that military culture seems rigid, it has demonstrated that it can 
replace its old-fashioned style with an approachable method. A good example of 
how the military has shifted its mindset with regard to its relations with the press 
can be seen in how the media have been integrated into the military’s operations 
environment, particularly from 1983 to 2003, which began with a ‘denial-of-access 
approach’ in the Falklands War in 1982, and progressed to hosting war reporters 
within the embedded programme in the Iraq War (Rid, 2007). In a survey 
conducted in the US on embedded journalists’ perceptions of the embed 
programme, journalists could understand the rationale behind the military's desire 
to protect the security of operations and the lives of their troops (Johnson & 
Fahmy, 2010). Tony Cramp indicates that it is a beneficial relationship for both 
parties: 
I think a good principle is that the more you trust other people, 
the more they trust you, and then you can have a much more 
beneficial relationship. I think the more walls, the more 
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difficulties you put in there, then people become frustrated 
because they’re just trying to do their job as well. (Interview by 
telephone, 11th February 2018) 
 
The growth of blogs, particularly among soldiers, is fuelled by increased access to 
the internet and low-cost software. As such, how do bloggers who are interested 
in conflicts, intelligence, and national security, approach information which may 
not directly form part of their professional expertise? The availability of digital 
media technology has made the UK Armed Forces create policies and structures 
to manage the use of social media among soldiers and officers for both official 
and private objectives. Although the British Army encourages their workforce to 
blog, post tweets, images, videos, and articles online, it regards social media as 
risky, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and an unmanageable entity (Maltby et al., 
2015; UK ARMY, 2018).  
 
The UK Army instructs its workforce to be conscious about the risk of exposing 
their online accounts either to the public or to the media, which may affect the 
national security of the UK (UK ARMY, 2018). However, the UK Army also aims to 
narrow the gap between the military and the public by offering free space to their 
workforce to engage in debate with digital audiences on multiple issues in relation 
to army activities, as well as military strategies concerning defence capabilities, 
soldiers’ morale, recruitment, and entertainment (Maltby et al., 2015; UK ARMY, 
2018). Tony Cramp highlighted the potential risks of social media for military 
operations and troops, especially when dealing with unverified materials at a 
tactical level, which may affect troopsʼ morale and target planning: 
What you are saying is efficient warfare through the media. Then 
if you look at the military: is there a risk? Are there threats? 
Absolutely, whether it’s the use of social media by your own 
troops or staff and the risk of information getting out, all of them 
being affected by what they read and hear in social media, which 
can be used as a means by your enemy. Getting to our troops. I 
guess this is a big problem, because your soldiers come from a 
society that uses social media, they do not want them to be cut 
  
-162- 
 
off from it, and you don’t want to cut them off. (Interview by 
telephone, 11th February 2018) 
 
However, a substantial finding by Maltby et al.’s (2015) research into the UK 
Military’s DUN Project indicates that the UK MoD intervenes in the techno-
economic online structure of data mining, and that sharing on social media is 
inadequate. The ‘techno-economic’ term is about the exercising of ‘control’ by 
experts over the individual – as opposed to the technology to ensure active 
management of online content. Indeed, Maltby et al. (2015) indicate that the UK 
MoD has a limited understanding of the role of new media for the UK Armed Forces 
because of the remarkable gap between senior officers and younger personnel in 
accessing social media. The DUN Project is an ‘ESRC/DSTL-funded project 
investigating the conceptualisation, operationalisation and measurement of risk 
within strategic communication initiatives in the defence sector’ (Maltby et al., 
2015, p.1276).  
 
The project was based on recommendations from the Blackett Review, which was 
published by the British Government Office for Science in 2018, regarding how to 
identify and assess social media risks on people to avoid strategic surprise (UK 
MoD, 2018b). The review urged government departments to ‘enhance their 
warning systems to better detect early signs of low probability high impact risks 
as a mitigation measure to avoid strategic surprise. In doing this, it should make 
the best use of work and capabilities in government, academia and industry’ (UK 
MoD, 2018b, p.7).  
 
The Military Guidelines leaflet clearly warns service personnel of the potential 
risks of breaching operations security by sharing locations, giving sensitive 
information, posting fake content or stealing someone else’s content (UK MoD, 
2012). Failure to act in accordance with guidelines of acceptable behaviour results 
in disciplinary action. A study conducted by the Partnership for Conflict, Crime 
and Security Research (PaCCS) on the influence of social media in the armed forces 
revealed that the British military has recognised the importance of giving their 
enlisted soldiers access to online social platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Snapchat, and Instagram, while on operations (Smith, 2016). This approach 
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enables soldiers to maintain strong relations with their families, taking into 
account the distractions that can be created by feelings of intimacy with their 
partners (Smith, 2016). 
 
Established think tank blogs provide diverse perspectives on current socio-political 
environment ranging from ʻglobal security in a post-9/11 era to regional alliances 
to violent conflicts between civil and non-state actors’ (American University, 
2014). To name a few: the Atlantic Council; NATO Source; Center for a New 
American Security; The Agenda; Federation of American Scientists; FAS Strategic 
Security Blog; International Security Information Service Europe; and the Small 
Wars Journal. Other blogs that are administered by individual bloggers – such as 
Blogs of War, Slashdot.org, and Brown Mosesare – face fierce competition from 
other social media platforms like Twitter, which have over 335 million users 
(Recchia, 2013).  
 
Generally, it is difficult to measure the impact of weblogs on national security, 
Info Ops and mainstream media, as there is a lack of empirical studies in this field. 
To what extent can war blogs be regarded as important or reliable for military 
Info Ops and traditional newsgathering in the mainstream media? Although 
powerful states tend to give more attention to the anti-hegemonic narratives by 
social media activists toward security events due to its capabilities, bloggers’ 
accounts may not necessarily conflict with government views. Knudsen and Stage 
(2012) indicate in their study of the use of YouTube as a democratic space of 
commemoration after the death of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 28 
videos of their sample presented a kind of endorsement of Denmark’s national 
security. Hellman and Wagnsson (2015) highlight in their study about Swedish 
blogging concerning the participation of their forces in ISAF in Afghanistan that 
bloggers aligned themselves with the strategic narrative of their military. John 
Little the founder of Blogs of War claims: 
Throughout my blogging career, I’ve made it clear that I am not 
here to attack the state. I am not going to publish classified U.S. 
government information in search of a scoop. (Recchia, 2013, p.1) 
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However, the new war paradigm recognises the role of active weblogs during 
wartime, and raises concerns over the stateʼs effective monopoly over media 
content, not just in authoritarian regimes but in democratic countries. We have 
seen this in the debate about the role of cyber troops in manipulating public 
opinion through social media. One study investigated 28 countries and revealed 
that almost all those countries manipulate political opinions targeted at domestic 
and foreign audiences (Bradshaw & Howard, 2017). These countries included 
Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, 
Ecuador, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Mexico, North Korea, the Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela and Vietnam (Bradshaw & 
Howard, 2017). The study pointed out multifarious activities carried out either by 
governments, political parties, or organisations to create and support their social 
media content, such as sponsoring accounts, web pages or applications, and in 
many cases creating fake accounts and computational propaganda (Bradshaw & 
Howard, 2017).  
     
Considering the growth of using social and digital media in mobilising, informing, 
and influencing public opinion, I will now outline the traditional media perspective 
on the usage of information on today’s conflicts. 
 
The Media and Information  
 
In the form of the new war, a sort of ‘weaponisation of information’ has emerged, 
employing words and images instead of bullets and lethal weapons to shape 
people’s perception of information. Each component in today’s conflicts within 
the form of ‘weaponisation of information’ is vulnerable to the emerging threat 
of destabilisation by non-lethal means to generate a state of ‘complexity, 
confusion, and political and social schisms’ (Allenby & Garreau, 2017, p.5). 
Wartime journalists labelled ‘weaponisation’ as a buzzword that was being widely 
used by the military to achieve the war purposes in which includes a mixture of 
propaganda, fake news, and disinformation. Propaganda has always been part of 
the combat operations. Therefore, each side involved in a political and military 
campaign can make claims of his version of the truth by attacking his dissent’s 
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political discourse and denouncing the media of causing misinformation and 
spreading fake news. Lindsey Hilsum of Channel 4 News distinguishes between 
fake news and propaganda in war reporting: 
It is stuff that somebody makes up, and often it’s for a political 
purpose. So we see these websites from Macedonia and so on. So 
that’s the sort of direct fake news. And then you’ve got 
propaganda. And governments and rebel groups have used that 
since the beginning of time. There has always been propaganda. 
And it’s just that the ways that you can disseminate propaganda 
are cleverer now than they used to be. Everybody makes mistakes, 
and particularly when you’re reporting in a war which is a fast-
changing situation and sometimes you misunderstand things or you 
get something wrong. It doesn’t mean it’s fake news, it means you 
got things wrong. That’s completely different from fake news. 
(Interview, 13th March 2017) 
 
Fujii (2010) indicates that much of the discussion in media studies concerning the 
value of reporting conflicts is about to what extent we should trust peopleʼs 
testimonies about their experience of political violence when they are displayed 
in politically sensitive contexts. Under these conditions, Sean Smith of The 
Guardian pointed out the importance of checking facts, such as war casualty 
figures, military statements, and other political narratives, before sending them 
to news agencies. Smith said: 
So even if it’s fighting against ISIS now, people say ‘look, they’re 
cutting off peoples’ heads and putting them on poles’, you still 
have to question everything. You are not part of whoever’s 
fighting them. You have to question […] you’re not trying to be 
horrible to the people doing the fighting, but you’re questioning 
the narrative, the political narrative. (Interview, London, 6th 
February 2017) 
 
Smith argued above that there is always another side to every story. So, the 
possibility of influencing public opinion is higher when the media only resonate 
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official statements without any evaluation. Massive developments in online 
journalism and the active role of online users have provided channels for 
alternative views. Traditional media are urged to effectively merge with 
multi-media platforms on the internet to enhance interactive communications 
with active digital audiences (Barnett, 2011).  
 
Engagements with online users provide traditional mass media with access to 
information and sources, a vast distribution of content, and the power to 
influence public opinion (Barnett, 2011). Kevin Bishop of the BBC attributed 
user-generated content (UGCs) the role of active agency participants in digital 
culture with the emergence of social software or Web 2.0, but he admitted 
that a specific news coverage on wars needs authentic sourcing, in-depth 
analysis and accurate information:   
I think the box has been opened and you’re not going to put it 
back in. First-hand accounts of conflict are now part and parcel 
of news coverage, as they are in many other areas. This can only 
add to the overall picture. Evidently, any use needs careful 
sourcing and accuracy checking, but I can only see this increasing 
in future. A colleague I spoke to recently said one report from 
Paris after the attacks there in 2015 used about 90% UGC material 
in his 10 o’clock news piece. I think Syria has taken this to a new 
level, especially in the reporting Channel 4 have been doing from 
Aleppo using civilian reporters in the city. (Interview by email, 
21st August 2017) 
 
Bishop indicated above that witnessing conflicts is important for accountable 
journalism and verify the information. First-hand accounts of conflict gives the 
journalist confidence to talk to the soldiers and to the victims on the ground as 
long as he or she can maintain a detached relationship with his credible sources. 
In some circumstances such as in humanitarian crises, journalists may act 
unethically in gathering information when they have barely limited time, less 
experience or could not get the consent of victims to share their stories (Marc, 
2015). This impacted on the ethical role of journalism. The advancement of 
technology enables other users outside the mainstream media to have a voice in 
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their wars, aiding war journalists with up-to-the-minute news, exclusive footage, 
and live video clips. The BBC’s Gabriel Gatehouse said: 
I think it has been a huge transformation in the world since the 
presence of the internet and the usage of the camera phone in 
news broadcasting on air. If you think about the kind of massacre 
incidents that happened in Hamah, Syria in 1980 which didn’t get 
enough reporting; it wouldn’t happen these days because of the 
internet and the smartphones which provide a real-time picture 
from the fighting scene. (Interview by phone, 22nd November 
2016) 
 
A key feature of user-generated content (UGC) is the strong communication 
network established by the users: either to cooperate and collect intelligence or 
to disrupt and spread propaganda (Fiore-Silfvast, 2012). Jonathan Steele of The 
Guardian claims: 
Obviously, what they tell you on Facebook or Skype may be 
propaganda, may be being exaggerated, may be untrue, giving 
you part of the story which makes their side looks good not the 
bad part. So you’d be very suspicious of these people. (Interview, 
London, 14th November 2016) 
 
This is why big media organisations such as the BBC have a special unit to check 
on materials generated by local journalists or activists prior to broadcasting. This 
policy is not a matter of achieving a scoop on war stories, but rather about 
preserving accountability when informing the world about an ongoing conflict. The 
BBC’s Lyse Doucet explained why the BBC has to check everything that emerges 
from the battlefield, including footage, videos, and reports from the government 
and the opposition, such as the videos of the airstrike killing more than 11 children 
in Aleppo in Syria on the 26th August 2016: 
The BBC has whole units to check the videos that come out. Are 
they true? Are they not? So for the children’s video they will 
check: do we think this a real attack? Do we think the ambivalence 
is weird? Can we believe what we have seen? So we have to verify 
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everything. If we got something from the media centre from the 
government side or oppositions we should make it clear who has 
sent the video. Where is it coming from? We have to be honest 
with our audiences. (Interview, London, 14th November 2016) 
 
Richard Norton-Taylor, who worked as security editor for The Guardian, indicates 
that the media now devote less time and space to hard news due to a decline in 
revenue (Loeb, 2010). He considered himself an old-fashioned foreign 
correspondent, and commented that ‘the great thing about being a foreign 
correspondent was that the further away you were from the base, the better it 
was. There’s no news desk, there are no bureaucrats on top of you, you can do 
pretty much whatever you like’ (Loeb, 2010, p.1).  
 
Most significantly, reports have found a dramatic decline of professional foreign 
correspondents to want to report conflicts over the last 30 years (Moore, 2010; 
Anderson, 2012; Rasmussen, 2012; IAB, 2016). Maggie O’Kane of The Guardian 
stresses that the classical scenario of sending Western journalists to other 
countries to report, instead of building up a network of relationships with local 
journalists based within those countries, ‘no longer functions’ in modern warfare: 
We can no longer have the traditional Western foreign 
correspondent reporting on the Middle East, it no longer 
functions. And we need to recognise that and enable people on 
the ground much more. And they would probably do a much better 
job than we do. (Interview, London, 7th February 2017) 
 
O’Kane suggests above to encouraging Western journalists to trust the work of the 
local journalists.  
 
Note that not all information being broadcast has the same level of quality, as a 
significant amount of content contains incorrect information, fake images, 
rumours, and lies that cause panic in audiences (Gupta et al., 2013). Greenhill 
and Oppenheim (2017) indicate that rumours can be utilised, in some conditions, 
as a trigger for enflaming violence that included riots, ethnic conﬂict, genocide, 
and war. They pointed out that rumours can be adopted as truth to justify 
  
-169- 
 
violence. For example, rumours had a significant impact during the Kenyan 
presidential election in 2008 that had caused violence across the country in which 
around 1,000 were killed and a half million of people were displaced from their 
homes (Greenhill and Oppenheim, 2017). People are motivated by other factors 
such as emotion and curiosity in their selection of news sources. For instance, the 
internet emerged as an alternative source of information in the war against Iraq 
in 2003 compared to the media coverage of the Gulf War and the Afghanistan War 
(in 1990 and 2001, respectively) which were only reported in the traditional media 
(Steuck, 1992; Gupta et al., 2013).  
 
Media consumers migrated to the internet as they realised that big media 
organisations like CNN showed bias in the selection of events and stories as well 
as the ways they are reported (Choi et al., 2006). Unsurprisingly, Lyse Doucet of 
the BBC pointed out that the BBCʼs policy of supporting local reporters and 
encouraging them to report the developments in war enhances the credibility of 
the BBC and improves its image locally and internationally. She said: 
When someone says to me ‘what the strength of the BBC coverage 
is?’, I said we have six ex-Pakistani correspondents and six Afghan 
correspondents who have worked here for 20 years, so we are not 
coming to Afghanistan for the first time but we lived there, we 
know the language, and lots of people. (Interview, London, 14th 
November 2016) 
 
Reporting reality is a challenging vocation. The Ukraine crisis explains how the 
traditional practices of war journalism has been challenged by emerging 
unstructured cyberspace domains. 
 
The Cyberwar in the Ukraine Crisis 
 
It is hard to understand the rationality behind Russia's behaviour towards Ukraine 
as it revisits the worldʼs woeful memories of the Cold War. For some, Russia's 
behaviour reflects what E. Wayne Merry called the Russian ‘philosophies of state 
sovereignty and interstate relations’, particularly in relation to the EU and former 
Soviet Union countries (Wood et al., 2016, cited in Lain 2016, p.85). Merry (Lain, 
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2016) claimed that Russia does not accept the idea that all countries should have 
equal sovereignty; therefore, all bordering nations originally in the Soviet Empire 
are to be subject to Russia's control. He argues that countries such as Ukraine, 
which signed the EU Association Agreement, have the right make their own 
economic development decisions without consulting Moscow. For other 
researchers, it is not just about trade with the EU and the continuing ideological 
conflict between the two nations, but about Russia’s geo-strategic agenda. An 
agenda that changed Moscow’s geopolitics in the Crimea (Trudolyubov & Wood 
cited in Lain, 2016, p.86). Such strategic goals allow President Putin to restore his 
image as a hero who can freely move outside of international law by annexing 
Crimea by force as a defensive reaction to the US and NATO, which, he said, 
wanted to transform Ukraine into a bastion (Motyl, 2015).  
 
What implications does all this have for the media coverage of the Ukraine crisis? 
What is the interest of Western journalism in this type of conflict? My analysis 
tackles three central themes related to reporting in Ukraine, whether pro-Russian 
or pro-Western reporters which have framed the situation: (1) press freedom, (2) 
intimidation and (3) propaganda. All three themes have implications for news 
coverage in the Ukraine conflict. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) issued a report on Propaganda and Freedom of the Media in the 
context of the conflict in and around Ukraine. Throughout the report, the aim was 
to explore ‘the relation between Article 19 (on freedom of expression) and Article 
20 (on banning war propaganda and incitement to hatred) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its interpretations by the UN 
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC)ʼ (OSCE, 2015, p.4).  
 
The OSCE report (2015, pp.4–5) urged the international community to condemn 
war propaganda, hate speech, and disinformation as an inappropriate norm for 
the democratic system, which provides the legal assurance of freedom of 
expression, the right to report facts, and to enforce media plurality. Are these 
global principles being respected in Ukraine? Kevin Bishop, who is a journalist and 
sports lecturer and was the BBC’s Moscow bureau chief, describes the significance 
of reporting on Ukraine crisis: 
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I think it was one of the first major conflicts in the former Soviet 
Union that gained a lot of reporting attention in the social media 
era. Twitter, especially, as a tool for journalists was still in its 
infancy and thus open to abuse. Both sides in Ukraine were 
exploiting social media as a source of information dissemination, 
with varying degrees of accuracy on both sides. This coincided 
with the increased spread of use of smartphones and tablets for 
access to news by the Russian and Ukrainian public, and the 
popularity of news sources such as LifeNews and Hromadske. 
(Interview by email, 21st August 2017) 
 
Journalists reporting from Ukraine are well aware of the complex situation 
between Russia and Ukraine and the consequences for the violation of freedom of 
information. In fact, whether journalists were pro-Russian separatists or anti-
Russian Ukrainian groups, they encountered various types of intimidation while 
covering Ukraine crisis, such as several attempts at murder, hostage-taking, and 
being detained for spying, physical attacks, deportation and so forth (Greenslade, 
2014). Since Ukraine was classified in 2014 as one of the top five deadliest 
countries in the world for journalists to work in – just behind Pakistan, Syria, 
Palestine, and Afghanistan – it has shown some progress.  
 
In 2018 it was ranked 12th worldwide according to the Global Peace Index (GPI) 
report (Gutierrez, 2016; The Institute for Economy and Peace, 2018). The report 
ranks major countries around the world based on 23 factors including security, 
murder rate, terrorism, and deaths from internal conflict. The BBC’s Jonathan 
Beale claims: 
You are more likely to get caught up in fighting between two sides 
pro-Russian rebels and the separatists, and the Ukrainian forces. 
And you may find it harder to get to the frontline as well, because 
unless you have permission to go to the frontline, often you will 
be stopped. So if you don’t have somebody who can open the 
gates for you, then you will be prevented from doing your job. 
You won’t get a close look at what’s going on. (Interview, London, 
3rd November 2016) 
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Based on a report by Reporters Without Borders (2015), several journalists were 
exposed to different types of harassment in Ukraine while covering clashes which 
erupted between militant nationalists and security forces – for instance outside 
the parliament building in Kiev on 31st August 2015.8 The report of Reporters 
Without Borders (2019) noted also that ‘Ukraine “information warfare” with Russia 
has had negative consequences that include bans on Russian media and social 
networks, the blacklisting of foreign journalists and treason trials’. Jonathan 
Beale of the BBC recalled his memories in Ukraine:  
In Ukraine, I was arrested by pro-Russian rebels, who put guns to 
my head and accused me of being a spy and then took our camera. 
(Interview, London, 3rd November 2016) 
 
The Russian information campaign was designed to target Western countriesʼ 
interests in Kiev, who were trying to move the Ukraine to the West, and 
exaggerate the threat of emerging fascism among anti-Russian Ukrainian people 
(Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016). Audience of Russia’s Info Ops includes the Russians, 
west and east Ukraine, non-NATO audience, and the EU (Szwed, 2016). Of course, 
tactics and themes are differ among targeted audiences. Cyberspace becomes a 
battlefield for an organised trolling such as abusing, bullying, blackmailing, 
labelling, disseminating false information etc. between conflicting parties in 
Ukraine. It is a weponisation of warfare as explained in Chapter One. 
Understanding the consequences of the weaponisation of the internet and social 
media in the context of the Ukraine crisis, which is fuelled by both pro-Russians 
and anti-Russians groups, will provide an interpretation of the impact of Russia's 
information warfare in Ukraine (Stern, 2014).  
 
There is a broad perception in Ukraine and other parts of the world that Russiaʼs 
intrusions into the information system in Ukraine were done by several methods: 
                                                           
8 To name a few of journalists who were captured in Ukraine, Dmytro Bolshakov, a cameraman with TSN; 
Antoine Delaunay, a French photographer working for the Associated Press; and Maksym Voloboyev, a 
reporter for 5 Kanal TV, and his cameraman, Mykola Lebedev. On 25th February 2015, two pro-Russian 
government journalists working for TV stations – Elena Makarova of Pervy Kanal and Andrey Grigoriev of NTV 
– were detained by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). They were covering the March of Truth in central 
Kiev when they were arrested and subsequently deported from Ukraine (Reporters Without Borders, 2015). 
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such as accessing discussion platforms on the internet and using the Russian media 
to attack the EU (Hoskins & OʼLoughlin, 2015). From one perspective, information 
warfare in Ukraine aims to provoke the Ukrainian people and influence their 
perception of Russia’s behaviour towards the Ukrainian crisis. For example, Info 
Ops were carried out through intensive propaganda campaigns that employed a 
mixture of Ukrainian values and Russian culture, such as notions of identity, 
history, language, and the actual threat of Western conspiracy (the war between 
West and East). Szwed (2016) indicates that Ukrainian soldiers are described in 
some discussion platforms as fascists who are fighting only for the government 
side, which proves how the pro-Russian narrative has more influence in 
comparison with the pro-Ukrainian one. In addition, Russia was portrayed as a 
victim of the Western establishment in which had the right to reacting to the 
Western’s hostile actions (Szwed, 2016). From a different perspective, the 
Western media advocate a discourse of democracy and freedom in Ukraine. 
Watanabe (2017) reveals that Russiaʼs narrative about Ukraine was largely 
circulated by some Western news agencies, such as Reuters, The Associated Press, 
and Agence France-Press, which demonstrates the vulnerability of the media to 
bias. Szwed (2016, p.43) shows that the pro-Ukraine narrative portrayed Russia as 
an ‘aggressor, empire building state, directly or indirectly interfering with issues 
in and the function of Ukraine and other countries’. Kevin Bishop of the BBC 
explains: 
I was in charge of the BBC team in Eastern Ukraine on a couple of 
occasions – about 2 to 3 weeks each time. My role involved sending 
teams out into the field to gather news. Often based on what story 
threads were leading that day, or needed further investigation. I 
was then based in a Donetsk hotel and would use social media to 
guide teams on story developments. I recall several occasions 
where reports of helicopters being shot down or bombing raids 
that were circulated on social media proved false. On one 
occasion a claim of a helicopter crash near Slavyansk (I think) was 
in fact video of a crash in Syria. (Interview by email, 21st August 
2017) 
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To sum up, the second part has incorporated the perspective of both the military 
and the media on how developments in communications technologies make the 
role of war reporters vulnerable in today’s conflict. My interviewees have 
indicated that the crisis in information management are associated with three 
emergent themes in the digital era, which are: (1) information is being mobilised 
politically for military purposes; (2) eyewitnessing defines accountability and 
accuracy; and (3) the lack of trust in online content due to the rise of unverified 
materials. The case of the Ukraine crisis has provided evidence that war reporters 
are concerned with the competitive atmosphere of the news market industry, 
considering the unprecedented challenges that professional journalists can face 
in their work compared to what local producers and user-generated content have 
been encountered in war reportage. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered an analysis of the changes in the conditions for reporting 
conflicts in the information era. I have aimed to investigate how the development 
of a hybrid media ecology made the role of war reporters vulnerable in a fast-
changing situation. My analytical framework has centred on the credibility of war 
reporting and the implications of changes in information war tactics in a situation 
where the military-media environment is fragmented.  
 
This chapter has agreed with existing studies that a fragmentation in media 
platforms (broadcast, print, and online) exists regarding sources, content, and 
audiences due to new communications technology, globalisation, and power 
transition. Seeking credibility in reporting conflicts has become a battlefield for 
journalistsʼ in their struggle to preserve journalistic values. The weaponisation of 
information is being widely exploited in today’s conflicts for war purposes.  
 
Economic factors after the financial crisis over the past two decades has caused 
the media industry to reorganise its international reporting and apply strict 
policies to downsize its staff. In addition, the mainstream media offer more space 
for local producers to find alternative ways to report conflicts, especially from 
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affected areas like Syria, Ukraine, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq, to meet the demand 
of 24/7 news reporting where journalists may try to enter conflict zones with the 
support of local governments, politicians, military forces, and aid agencies. The 
strategic objective of the military’s media operation doctrine is to provide the 
public and the media with reliable and accurate information about the security 
challenges in 21st-century conflicts. The military addresses social media risks in 
strategic and tactical communications, offering limited space for service 
personnel to interact, blog, post images, and videos on social media and the 
internet. Nevertheless, it keeps an eye on their trolling to avoid any damage to 
the UK national security. 
 
The 21st century has witnessed the rise of social media, which have brought 
additional threats to the classical form of war reportage such as disinformation, 
and unverified materials. In addition, social media have empowered a new 
generation who produce their own user-generated content, to some extent 
shaking practices. The traditional tactics of warfare, such as intelligence, 
surveillance, sabotage, propaganda, and deception, overlap with the new hybrid 
condition in modern battlespaces, such as Info Ops, cyberwarfare, social media, 
and new military technology. In this context, telecommunications technology 
disrupts the classical form of the state's monopoly in the CCSs of the battlespace. 
Active social media users such as bloggers, Facebookers, Tweeters, YouTubers, 
etc., either work individually or report to an established organisation to some 
extent enjoy a powerful influence over local and global audiences.  
 
The final chapter pulls together the key findings from the thesis. 
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Chapter Seven:  
Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis has addressed the evolving relationship between the military and the 
media in a British context. It discusses the current structure of relations between 
the UK Armed Forces and war correspondents in contemporary warfare while 
considering changes in military doctrines, the war paradigm and communications 
technology. What has been termed the ‘new war’ has been disruptive, making the 
UK military’s decision to incorporate the media into its war efforts much more 
complicated, particularly at a tactical level.  
 
The aim of this research is to provide a significant analysis of the centralised UK 
military’s media operation in conjunction with implications of the post-embedding 
system, which has resulted in a new form of relations between the military and 
traditional and online media in today’s conflicts. Despite the strategic and tactical 
benefits of the embedded system to a military operation’s objectives, it is time 
to drop an old model of media doctrines to manage today’s war journalism 
because we live in a quickly changing world of information and communications. 
War correspondents have been struggling to secure their safety in a situation of 
consistently ruthless infighting that has taken place in fragile security situations, 
such as Syria, Libya, Ukraine, Yemen and Northern Iraq, areas where wars are 
being controlled by a mixture of regular and militia groups with fluctuating 
political interests, ideologies, and ethnicities. What also has been focused on in 
this research is the impact of information technology has on the role of war 
reporters regarding access to the war zone, the level of autonomy and aspects 
around journalistic work. To do so, I have questioned to what extent developments 
in the ecology of the digital media have reinforced a sense of uncertainty and 
ambiguity in the process of war reportage, and in information gathering which can 
create instability in the various roles of media in conflicts. 
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Throughout this thesis, I have been concerned with understanding the policies that 
the UK military have implemented to engage the media into the complex new type 
of war considering the previous models of organising the media’s access in 
conventional conflicts such as the ‘pooling’ and ‘embedded’ systems. Accordingly, 
the framework of the analysis of this thesis was designed to answer the following 
three research questions:  
 
- How have new tactics been devised by the military to incorporate journalism 
into the war effort while minimising disruptive forms of reporting? 
- In what ways has war journalism changed since the occupation of Iraq in 2003? 
- How have developments in a hybrid media ecology made the role of professional 
war reporters vulnerable in a fast-changing situation? 
 
In this chapter, I aim to restate the fundamental arguments, research inquiries, 
methodology, findings, limitations, and practical challenges. This chapter is 
structured into three sections: the context, findings and implications, and 
limitations. I shall begin by outlining the context of this thesis. 
           
The Context 
 
My motivations for understanding this project have derived from personal interest. 
I wanted to understand the factors that have affected the UK’s Defence and Armed 
Force’s engagements with war correspondents – specifically in British media 
outlets within the context of new war. The UK stands has a historical context of 
political and war journalism that ensures safeguarding journalistic freedom and 
liberal values (Fraser, 2017; Viner, 2017; Jackson et al., 2018), however, there 
has often been a censorship on conflict reporting. The UK MoD has developed 
several doctrines to identify the strength and opportunities of its military media 
policies, which aim to secure the UK’s national strategy and protect the security 
of military operations. The Directorate of Defence Communications (DDC) is the 
department within the UK MoD tasked with communicating with the outside world 
(British Government, 2014). However, data from the MoD and other institutions 
indicate a gap concerning the stability of strategic communications command. The 
involvement of British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate poor 
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communication with the public and the media in times of war, particularly when 
a division in public opinion is observed that may develop into a crisis and increased 
uncertainty, by limiting information to the hands of a few people (House of Lords, 
2018).  
 
The embedded system that was introduced by the American and British forces in 
the Iraq War of 2003 has achieved part of the military’s media management 
objectives, and marked a new milestone in the military-media relationship. But 
embedding has several implications for practising journalism. My analysis has 
drawn on other evaluations that show how the dynamic of the embed system is 
driven by two conflicting goals (Paul & Kim, 2004): (1) embedding gives journalists 
remarkable access to the frontline that could potentially violate the security of 
operations, but is necessary for maintaining trusting relations between the media 
and the local population, and (2) embedding provides favourable media coverage 
of troops and positively affects soldiers’ morale. Therefore, it is imperative for 
both the military and the media to be alert to the changeable ecology of today’s 
conflicts, while enabling war to be reported to avoid confusion and the 
mishandling of information that affects the military’s approach. In other words, 
to educate people about its business, taking into account the fragmentation in the 
international system and the implications of communications technologies for the 
security of operations.  
 
Information is a prime asset for war combatants, whether the professional 
military, fighting in regular or irregular warfare, or non-state actors reinforced by 
international and regional powers to fight in high or low-intensity wars by 
employing asymmetric warfare, insurgent tactics, and terror methods. The UK 
Forces have a long history of counterinsurgency operations. Shaping a Stable 
World: the Military Contribution states that ‘balancing the nation’s security risks 
and its values presents a constant challenge for our Government as it decides how, 
when and where to tackle instability at source’ (JDP 05, 2016, p.4). Based on this, 
UK military responses are part of international community efforts to reinforce 
stability, this strategy being required to apply a diverse range of actions to secure 
stability. Indeed, media policy is central to the UK military’s strategy. Failure to 
respond effectively to growing transnational threats in a globalised competitive 
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world is critical to military policy. Therefore, UK military doctrines recognise the 
potential of the media – particularly social media – to be used as a weapon, just 
like physical weapons, in order to influence the perception of its targeted 
audiences and destroy its enemy’s will.  
 
Within these volatile and ambiguous situations, traditional Western media that 
have dominated the scene of foreign news for a long time have been confronted 
with some new challenges. The rise of online wartime journalism gives a new form 
of power to individuals, activists, NGOs, and non-Western media firms to insert 
their political agenda into the narrative of war, either on social media platforms 
or on satellite TV channels which have flourished in the aftermath of a series of 
terror attacks in the US, the UK, Spain, France, etc. This transition in war 
reportage records an interesting gap in the military-media relationship in the 
WAP.  
 
This gap can be ascertained from journalists’ concerns about losing their access 
to authentic data in today’s conflicts and, therefore, the ability to report freely 
from the frontline, because of the restrictions set by the military and other 
powerful forces on the ground. Additionally, there is a risk of being without 
logistical support from state forces, and there are also the implications non-
sourced materials may have on the quality of news feeds, such as trolling web 
pages, blogs, and mobile applications by firms, activists, and NGOs. Ordinary 
people who bear witness to day-to-day fighting make their jobs vulnerable to 
unpredictable and uncontrollable influences because of the lack of training. This 
gap was observed from analysing selected military documents and what my 
military interviewees indicated about the necessity to fill a void in strategic 
communications with the people, to have a sufficient CCS to minimise the 
disturbance of uncontrolled media, and to educate their people about the 
potential of new media in either supporting or negatively impacting the national 
strategy. 
 
The following section elaborates on the main findings of my research, and how 
they align with or diverge from other findings in the existing body of literature. 
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Additionally, it illustrates the implications of integrating the media into war 
efforts for policy and practice.  
 
Findings and Implications 
 
The methodology of this research was based on a qualitative approach. Grounded 
theory was used to analyse semi-structured interviews and government 
documents. A number of key strategies were employed to create a framework of 
categories to develop a theory which includes comparation, coding, and thematic 
analysis. The literature review was an essential method for outlining the research 
paradigm, determining a conceptual and theoretical approach, and developing a 
useful framework for collecting and analysing data (Fram, 2013). 
  
Indeed, the core argument of this research was broken down into three questions 
that helped to identify samples, organise data, and classify codes to develop 
categories within the framework of the grounded theory.  
 
The first question of this thesis – restate it here – has investigated the current UK 
military’s documents which articulate how journalists should be incorporated into 
the war effort.  
 
A wide body of research shows that the relationship between politicians, military 
generals, and war reporters has broken down since the Cold War because of global 
changes in the international system, globalisation and a revolution in military 
affairs (Rid, 2007; Boylan, 2011; Maltby, 2012a; Jensen, 2014; Livingstone & Lunt, 
2014; Corner, 2018). It is important to stress that ‘military doctrines’ were used 
in this thesis as a guide to understanding the military’s view on the process of 
incorporating the media in war efforts rather than to provide new sources of 
evidence on the current war thesis’s debate on the logic of ‘new wars’. It is argued 
that a new type of war has been practised in the 21st century’s conflicts in 
comparison to the classic concept of conventional warfare in which the new forms 
of war are being commercialised, documented, broadcast, and mobilised under 
the gaze of the traditional and new media (Kaldor, 2007; Smith, 2007; Cottle, 
2009; Maltby, 2012a; Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). What is clear from my research 
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is that the form of new war provides the media industry with significant challenges 
in the digital age; traditional models of embedding with troops are being replaced 
with other forms of collaboration between media outlets and war actors with input 
from user-generated content (UGC). Although the use of the internet and social 
media as a source for news has increased (Price, 2015), military doctrines have 
addressed the risks of the proliferation of free and unverified news that can 
damage the security of operation. 
 
My focus was to closely observe the British model of dealing with the media in 
military operations and those that took the form of non-conventional methods. In 
particular, understanding the lessons of media operations learned from major 
conflicts that the British military has been involved since the Falklands War of 
1982 such as the Gulf War 1991, Kosovo 1998, Afghanistan 2001, and Iraq War 
2003, has helped to substantiate my findings. Here, the aim was to explore 
developments when adapting to new circumstances of the military’s media 
management in the new war.  
 
The outcomes of this analysis have stressed the military’s limitations to engage 
the media into their new war considering implications on both policies and 
practices. Firstly, the ultimate purpose of any combat operations is to achieve 
strategic combat objectives by ensuring the development of the command and 
control system (CCS) that provides safeguards for the military operation and 
troops. The critical shift in military thinking from full censorship during the 
Falklands War when a denial-of-access policy was imposed over the media to an 
operational engagment during the Gulf War and Iraq War has helped defence 
planners and policymakers to take the advantage of the new opportunities 
presented by the revolution in information and communications technology. For 
example, in the 77th Brigade, a comprehensive information system which can 
engage and monitor the risk of smart, global, and evolved information 
environment, is dedicated to fighting wars with information in the digital networks 
and social media (Millar, 2018; UK MoD, 2019). Therefore, the concept of 
integration has evoloved to include the traditional and online media as the 
warfare over information itself has changed in the digital era. Given the 
implications of changes in military thinking, I used an analytical framework to 
  
-182- 
 
compare how the military and the media have adapted to the developments in 
the information environment. I have discussed cultural and organisational aspects 
that remained unresolved in military doctrines. 
 
What has emerged in my analysis is that each of the military, the traditional 
media, and the new media has its own unique cultural frame of reference which 
includes values, perspectives, practices, and mind-sets. This frame of refrence is 
constantly evolving, interacting, conflicting, and reforming in the form of new 
war. My findings have agreed with Maltby (2007, 2012a), and Nohrstedt and 
Ottosen (2014) that the military’s culture demanded collectivity, is hierarchical 
in structure, its values have been formed around identity, discipline and security, 
and is influenced by the revolution in military affairs (RMA). However, the military 
has shown the ability to interact, to some extent, with people of different cultures 
– for instance, the local and international embedded war reporters. This includes 
providing information, protection, training, and logistical services that would be 
difficult for independent journalists to attain during war by themselves such as 
recording air bombardments, deploying with the fleet, and attending the daily 
briefing. In contrast, war journalists often work in a competitive and contested 
environment, fighting each another for scoops, operating in a decentralised 
relationship with editors, and oriented on journalistic autonomy but striving for 
recognition. Indeed, the rise of communications technologies has offered both the 
military and the mainstream media with the opportunities to seek out alternative 
methods for communicating the war such as war blogging, but has brought 
additional challenges regarding structural and functional aspects.  
 
Military doctrines are less concerned about the methods utilised to reach targeted 
audiences in the digital era as tactics to reach different audiences vary, are 
centred on the ‘effect-based approach’ and the political situation to influence 
multiple targets, especially in state-to-non-state conflicts. When I spoke to the 
military personnel, they seemed more confident that the command and control 
system has to be fully integrated with the information campaign in order to secure 
the process of handling the media during the war-fighting. Despite the fact that 
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-45.1 Media Operations hasn’t been updated since 
2007, it grouped targeted audiences using five distinct criteria according to the 
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nature of the military operations: (1) UK citizens; (2) international; (3) joint 
operations and regional; (4) joint operations in a local area; and (5) their troops. 
Considering MOD activities at home and abroad, the use of a certain medium to 
convey a specific message has to be justified regarding its content and timing. 
Content in traditional media is based on a one-to-many approach, but in 
networked media it is more about a many-to-many approach. However, military 
policy has addressed the disadvantages of relying on both types of 
communications, because both are more or less vulnerable to insurgents’ 
intrusions for spreading commands, intelligence information, disinformation, fake 
news, trolling, violence, and recruitment. 
 
Therefore, eliminating the risk of uncontrollable and unmanageable media 
reportage can only occur if journalism becomes part of the military command and 
control structure. Currently, the media are used as a means of influencing 
targeted audiences, protecting national security and supporting foreign policy. 
Restrictions have been applied (the pooling system in the Gulf War of 1991, an 
embedded programme in the Iraq War of 2003) to limit casualties and to manage 
the flow of information, which had to be consistent with the official narrative of 
the government and its allies. The gap between people’s understanding of military 
commitments and operational reality can confuse audiences when strategic 
communication by the military is lost, and the military media performance lacks 
accountability and rationality (Boylan, 2011). Educating war journalists about the 
military’s operational objectives, facilitating their mission with fewer restrictions 
on gathering information and ensuring their safety can repair the damage posed 
by the absence of a comprehensive CCS during an armed conflict. According to a 
report by the office of the UK Prime Minister in 2015, the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq (2001 and 2003 respectively) have shown a lack of public support in Britain 
because the political leadership failed to convince people about the geo-strategic 
benefits of both wars. Additionally, a lack of transparency in telling the press 
about the UK Armed Forces’ objectives in conducting a military intervention in 
Libya led to a critical debate about whether it is acceptable for British forces to 
fight ISIS in Syria and Northern Iraq with the coalition forces (House of Commons, 
2017).  
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Secondly, the British military have employed distinctive tactics to engage with the 
media since Iraq War; these range from offering an adequate package of logistical 
support in the ‘embedded system’ to partial assistance in the war against ISIS in 
Northern Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Thus, the present analysis has illustrated that the 
organisational structure in the military-media relationship took three forms on the 
frontline: (1) a top-down model where war correspondents are embedded with 
the troops, where they are subject to combat instructions (The Green Book); (2) 
a bottom-up model where the ideal structure of relations between combat 
reporters and other war actors within the liberal context is to report war without 
direct supervision. However, this ideal world is far from reality, where journalists 
have experienced interference, intimidation, and attacks, which may affect their 
work; and (3) a non-hierarchical network communications model that gives war 
journalists, freelancers, fixers, bloggers, and citizen journalists the freedom to 
operate with limited interference by a structured hierarchy. Yet, there is evidence 
of the influence of gatekeepers on a large portion of items that are circulating on 
social media (Welbers and Opgenhaffen, 2018).     
 
The implications of these three models of organising media access to the frontline 
by military doctrines can be seen in the emerging challenges of incorporating 
journalism into combat operations in a new war context. Overall, the above 
findings suggest that the ‘military doctrines’ should place more effort on engaging 
the media into recognising the new imperatives of new war to consider different 
aspects of collaboration. Firstly, the military-media relationship must be built on 
mutual trust and accountability in both times of conflicts and peace while 
adopting a long-term policy of enforcing partnership and integration. Therefore, 
the media are a professional organisation, which are more useful to be considered 
as a key component in the process of planning and executing a combat operation 
rather than as an extra means to achieve operational purposes. This engagement 
would help war reporters to maintain their autonomy as independent journalists 
while also retaining their close relationships with official sources and avoiding 
vulnerability to military manipulation. Secondly, due to the complexity of 
engaging in what is termed ‘the war amongst the people’ (WAP), the strategic 
goals of military operations must be clearly addressed, since these goals provide 
reliable and comprehensive information about the geo-strategic benefits for the 
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country including the estimated level of the risk. Thirdly, because of the 
limitations that surround counterinsurgency operations (COIN), it can be difficult 
for armed forces to secure the safety of war reporters when they cover these 
operations. However, witnessing a military action is considered an essential 
element for war reporters to report the ‘reality’. Navigating through the lines of 
fire to meet the demands of immediate, reliable, and impartial materials has 
become crucial for war reporting to claim credibility. The poor collaboration can 
make adventurous war reporters find alternative ways of accessing the area of 
conflict either through the aid of their fixers or by attaching themselves to 
irregular forces. Each method can pose a threat to the military operations and 
cause a negative influence at home front particularly in a situation when a British 
journalist is captured, kidnapped, tortured or killed in front of a camera.  
 
My second question - restate it here - provides evidence of the implications for 
the embedded programme to effectively bridge the void in the military-media 
relationship in both conventional and non-convention warfare. 
 
Turning now to how wartime journalism has changed since the occupation of Iraq 
in 2003 it is evident that developments in the war paradigm, communication 
technologies, and military strategies since the Iraq War of 2003 have presented 
emerging challenges and opportunities for journalistsʼ work at the frontline. 
Understanding the impact of these transitions for the military-media relationship 
was approached by comparing tactics used by the British military forces to 
facilitate media access to traditional conflicts such as the ‘embedded system’ 
with other forms of military practice in the period of the post-Iraq War. Both 
methods of organising media work in times of war have contrasting ethical 
dimensions, and journalistic roles.  
 
War reporters have struggled in the long term to accept the term ‘embedded 
journalist’ in a fruitful way, realising its negative consequences on their 
profession. However, the reality is far from ideal because without gaining access 
to the frontline they would face more restrictions on their work.  
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This research has shown that there is a lack of certainty in the concept of an 
‘embedded system’ in terms of ethical perspectives, functional roles, and 
relationships. Criticism of this concept falls into two perspectives within war 
journalistic work: first, those who hold a pragmatic perspective towards solving 
field problems on the frontline, and claim that an unconditional relationship with 
the military would be hard to achieve in an uncertain situation where journalists 
themselves are a physical military target in the new concept of war. Embedded 
reporters had to sign an agreement with the military that was outlined in The 
Green Book; this document covers practical and policy issues including the MOD’s 
security requirements, safety issues, and media facilities. The purpose of this 
agreement is to ‘enable the media to gain a deeper understanding of the operation 
in which they are involved, particularly through access to personnel and 
commanders’ (JSP 580, 2013, p. 9). The ramifications of the Green Book’s 
agreement for war reporting are considerable. The journalists I interviewed argue 
that they achieved some success in integrating themselves with troops for the 
purposes of personal protection, securing access to local people for humanitarian 
stories, building up a trustful relationship with tactical commanders and low-
ranking officers to get exclusive news, especially classified notes. This provides 
an alternative way of eyewitnessing. However, they were conscious of the 
consequences of this agreement for the values of war journalism, as they were 
exposed to a small section of the battlefield by a tactical leadership who are 
powerful enough to impose censorship over materials to maintain their desired 
level of security.  
 
Secondly, another group of war reporters argues that autonomy is vital for the 
practice of ‘good journalism’ within the guidelines of news values and the 
editorial standards of a liberal culture to achieve reliability, credibility, and 
objectivity in war reportage. The quality of journalism is a matter of concern 
when trying to identify the best version of the truth, and avoiding subjectivity 
regarding judgements of military actions. If journalists support a particular war 
narrative, they potentially lack credibility when they discuss controversial issues 
such as false allegations, collateral damage, the deaths of soldiers, and the use 
of drones, and this can also feed accusations of biased reportage. Apparently, 
independent war journalists rejected the claim that making a deal with the 
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military to trade their safety for freedom of speech is inevitable for the sake of 
journalism as a business.  
 
Collaboration between the military and the media has continued during the period 
of the post-Iraq War phase. Soon after the coalition forces captured Baghdad in 
2003, local forces began to fight back by employing multiple insurgency tactics to 
attack and spread violence throughout Iraq. It was too risky for journalists to 
operate in insurgent- and extremist-controlled territory, even if they chose not to 
be embedded with American or British forces, or to move outside central Baghdad 
without military protection. Given the challenges of covering travel expenses and 
insurance, some war reporters have chosen to deploy with other war actors such 
as the Iraqi security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. Thus, it has become 
too expensive to run continuous journalistic war reportage because of risks to the 
lives of staff and the high costs of having translators, fixers, and bodyguards to 
protect them. Few media outlets can afford to have a foreign press office in 
Baghdad or Kabul.  According to Cockburn (2010), the BBC was the only British 
media outlet that had a permanent office in Baghdad at that time. Certainly, the 
absence of the international media in some of today’s wars has implications for 
war reportage. As an alternative to running a press office, media organisations 
deploy ‘parachuted-in’ journalists who either risk following soldiers or report from 
the hotel where they stay (AlSafi, 2017). This encourages local people who are 
active in journalism to document crucial events in short videotapes to disseminate 
them on the internet or through mainstream media. 
 
To sum up, the second research question has demonstrated two major issues which 
characterise war reporting since the Iraq War: (1) in theory, the traditional 
embedded system aimed to secure journalists’ safety and operational security. 
However, interviewees were concerned about the implications of embedding for 
their journalistic values and democracy: of losing their autonomy, a lack of 
credible information, and editorial restraints. The US and the UK placed different 
obstacles in the way, particularly the British forces which had very strict rules 
that affected journalists' ability to freely report the real story to their audiences, 
and (2) the embedded system had little chance of implementation in the period 
of the post-Iraq War due to the rise of global extremism and organised violence 
  
-188- 
 
that were adopted by non-state actors such as insurgents, criminals, and radical 
groups.  
 
The post-embedded era has been marked by increasing hybridity such as in 
Ukraine, Syria, and Yemen. The massive usage of an asymmetrical style that 
generates emerging challenges for national security has implications for war 
reporting because of the limited resources available for war reporters to gather 
information and report full stories of the conflict without being targeted. War 
reporters have been struggling for official embedding with UK Armed Forces which 
have been engaged in covert operations in several locations during the last two 
decades such as Iraq and Syria. However, Journalists have managed to secure 
access with the aid of distinctive militia and local forces on the frontline. In some 
circumstances, war reporters have had help from local people who have 
facilitated their mission.  
 
The deluge of unreliable news has made journalism vulnerable to claims of a lack 
of credibility in the information era, which brings us to the development of a 
hybrid media ecology. 
 
Here, I have interposed my interviewees’ views into the wider debate on the 
impact of digital revolution on the ethical role of war journalism. This analysis has 
revealed that the classical form of war reportage is vulnerable to new types of 
threats in the 21st century. Although wartime journalism faces a surge in 
asymmetric threats at home and on the frontline, particularly in unstable 
countries, it is clear that the old rules of embedding don’t apply to today’s 
conflicts.  
 
The extensive criticism of journalistsʼ professionalism in the digital era, especially 
when covering conflicts, has fuelled a heated debate over credibility in reporting 
war. The ethical role of war reporters carrying out frontline coverage is 
underpinned by limitations on frontline access, economic pressures, the 
proliferation of broadcasting technology, and a lack of logistical support by regular 
forces. In the digital age, more emphasis is placed on the competitive atmosphere 
of the news industry, taking into account the unprecedented challenges that 
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journalists face in comparison to the rise of the role of local producer- or user-
generated content (UGC) in war reportage.  
 
New communications technology and the information revolution offer more spaces 
for web journalism to reach global and diverse audiences. The unique form of web 
journalism places more importance on the quantity rather than the quality of news 
content. New technology has two distinct aspects: (1) it helps war journalists to 
obtain exclusive information, footage, and video clips from several sources; and, 
(2) user-generated content (UGC) establishes strong communication networks 
such as blogs, regardless of whether materials are being displayed in the public 
domain or a hidden platform, to cooperate or to collect intelligence, or to disrupt 
and forge propaganda.  
  
Criticism of the lack of professionalism in reporting conflicts is distorting 
journalistic values in the mainstream and social media. Evidence is crucial in a 
climate of uncertainty for questioning the credibility of content and sources, 
whether in times of political stability or times of confrontation. While information 
is being used as a weapon for military purposes, the increase in fact checking, 
either in established media organisations or on the internet is an indication of a 
growing interest amongst media outlets to check facts, debunk disinformation, 
and counter deception and lies. War correspondents demonstrate their courage 
by defending their profession in a contested arena of world politics; however, the 
role of the wartime journalist is to question any materials, documents, images, 
statements, etc., that might be used in war stories, whatever or whomever the 
sources are. As there is a thin line between information and propaganda in war 
reporting, audiences vary in their acknowledgements of the information being 
relayed by war reporters about humanitarian issues, the use of lethal and chemical 
weapons, and the implications of the political process on the course of military 
action. However, an audience’s emotions play an essential role in selecting their 
desired news. Veteran journalists toil in the market as professionals who have to 
fight for reporting the truth without being biased in their stories. 
   
In a fast-changing situation, disastrous mistakes where civilians are attacked are, 
unfortunately, common in the new form of asymmetric war, and are sometimes 
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considered as collateral damage. Spreading fake news or distorting information to 
influence enemies is part of the military’s deception plan, however, this strategy 
differs from disinformation and telling lies because in hybrid warfare, such as the 
Ukraine crisis, and in civil war, such as the Syria conflict, it is normal that each 
side claims its right to defend its legitimacy, and then fabricates and exaggerates 
war stories about their adversaries. However, trolling traditional and social media 
with false information, lies, and hoaxes, via sponsoring accounts, web pages or 
applications, and in many cases creating fake accounts and computational 
propaganda, is what some powerful state and intelligence organisations do to 
manipulate public opinion. Fake news spreads instability in countries’ foreign 
policies and affects national interest and democracy. 
 
Soldiers’ blogs provide diverse perspectives on the current socio-political 
environment, ranging from global security in the post-9/11 era to regional 
alliances in violent conflicts between civil and non-state actors. Bennett (2013) 
claims that blogs assist journalists in finding alternative sources of information by 
accessing ordinary people and facilitating visits to remote places that are difficult 
to reach. Blogs are also used as evidence when airing live coverage of breaking 
news stories by interviewing people and focusing on issues like humanitarian 
crises. Because of the climate of war, such as in Iraq, and Afghanistan, blogs act 
as interactive platforms and help to shape people’s experiences of conflict 
(Semaan et al., 2010; Harris & Williams, 2019). However, texts and visual postings 
from soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan on some popular video sites such as YouTube, 
Instagram, and Snapchat have opened another window with regard to 
understanding the brutal, violent and dark face of modern warfare, and what 
motivates soldiers to post sensitive photographs (e.g. the discovery of graphic 
photos depicting guards abusing detainees in Abu Gharib prison – a US 
Army detention centre which held captured Iraqis from 2003 to 2006) and videos 
from the frontline (Papadopoulos, 2009). 
 
To conclude, this research aimed to describe the evolving military-media 
relationship in a British context by considering developments in military 
strategies, international system, and communications technologies. I have 
discussed issues around changes in the concept of the war paradigm, the military's 
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media management on the frontline and the ethical codes of war journalism. I 
have questioned how British combat reporters and military doctrines have adapted 
to complex situations in the post-Iraq War concerning the ethical aspects of the 
embedded system, emerging frontline challenges, and the effect of the digital 
revolution on classic and online war reportage. This research suggests that the 
British military has to push the process of the integration system forward so that 
to confront strategic and tactical challenges. 
  
The idea of integration is not new in the military culture. It is part of the defence 
management system that the British armed forces are frequently reviewing to 
keep with the pace of changes in the art of war. These processes require moving 
to jointness in organising war effort either within services or between other 
governmental organs, including the media and the people. The embedded system 
was a desirable method for the British military to engage with the media during 
traditional conflicts considering its significant role as an instrument of war (Payne, 
2005). Controlling the flow of information was among other military objectives 
during conflicts from the Falklands War to the First Gulf War to Afghanistan and 
Iraq Wars. While there has been disagreement among the war reporters I have 
interviewed on the ethical implications of being under the military control for 
providing impartial and balanced perspectives, I have argued that the embedded 
programme is regarded as less necessary for the agenda of the military leadership 
in the form of counterinsurgency operations.  
  
Today's wars are more likely to take the form of a non-conventional style where 
insurgents aim to weaken the legitimacy of the current government so as to seize 
political power such as the case of ISIS (Smith, 2007).  If the UK military were to 
succeed in its ambitions to control the flow of information, it would need to 
engage with the media in either strategic or tactical levels. Although the 
embedded system offered journalists some access to the local people, intel 
information on combat plans and tactics, sufficient access to military 
communications, secure transportation via troops (whether on land, air or at sea), 
accommodation and security, the system had implications for their journalistic 
values and commitments to the public. For instance, interviewees expressed their 
feelings when talking about their experiences, whether with troops or working 
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independently. Reflecting on embedding, they were concerned with particular 
challenges that affected their jobs such as losing impartiality and lack of trust, 
and they experienced conflicts of interest whilst getting close to the soldiers, 
which had the potential to result in incomplete and biased stories. However, being 
independent, the freelance journalist had more freedom and autonomy, and an 
understanding of the suffering inflicted on local people by the forces.  
 
The questions then become as to whether the critical role of the media and armed 
conflicts has implications to the structure of the military-media integration in 
either strategic and tactical levels, whether this relation can be sustainable for 
the long term considering the emerging challenges in today's conflicts including 
the revolution in military affairs (RMA), cyberwarfare and developments in 
communications technologies. 
  
On the strategic level, the maintenance of trust is the most challenging factor in 
war reporting. On the one hand, the military needs to have confidence that 
journalists are not going to violate the roles of embedding regarding the security 
of operations and the safety of troops. On the other hand, journalists need to have 
confidence that the military will not undermine their independence or censor 
what they report or broadcast. For many journalists I interviewed, journalistic 
work has been affected when working under tightly controlled media operations. 
Perhaps most striking was the loss of journalistic autonomy and lack of diversity 
in gathering information. In a time when the world becomes more connected due 
to globalisation, news of events can reach audiences across the globe at a glance. 
In fact, what happens in the west, for example economic crises, affects countries 
in the east in one way or another. The proliferation of cyber-warfare poses much 
more significant threats to privacy, business, democracy and national security. 
The cyber-attack comes in various forms from state-sponsored attacks, 
disinformation campaigns, and espionage to military operations on critical 
infrastructure. Thus, it is crucial that the strategic objectives of the military 
operations must be explicitly addressed to avoid confusion and counter anti-
information warfare. 
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On the tactical level, embedding is a kind of protection for journalists where they 
can develop a better understanding of the progress achieved on a physical 
battlefield. Proximity to soldiers can make the report more authentic and credible 
in the eyes of audiences. Citizen journalism becomes a permanent part of the new 
ecology of war reporting. The argument of the post-truth has raised concerns on 
the statues of testimonies in reporting the truth and whether any other 
testimonies can be believed. Being responsible for the damage that unverified 
materials can make into the notion of the legitimacy of the armed forces to engage 
in a high-intensive confrontation against illegitimate groups in times of 
uncertainty, having a comprehensive a command and control system (CCS) as well 
as enforcing the cooperation process with the media that can avoid the risk of the 
leakage of classified information, and the publishing of sensitive data including 
'fake' news and its opposite. While the quality of war journalism has been 
questioned in the digital age due to the decline of professionals and the the 
reduction in the numbers of editorial positions (Simon, 2017), excluding non-
western journalists from the embedded system was a mistake especially when the 
only way to speak to the domestic audience is through other local reporters, 
activists on social media or transnational TV stations. Indeed, the tension in the 
military-media relationship in the new condition of war is not an easily resolved 
dilemma because this attention has been inherited in the military-media 
relationship in which the complexity of 'new war' paradigm has to make it more 
challenging to control the flow of information.  
 
The following section discusses the limitations of this research. 
   
Limitations of this Research 
 
Since all projects have limitations, I should make it clear that I intentionally 
limited the scope of the research to explore the intersection of the UK military 
Media Ops policy along with the challenges that war correspondents who work for 
UK media outlets have encountered in the post-embedded system and within the 
context of the typology of the new war. Taking into account the political context 
in the period after the WOT was essential to understand the geo-strategic 
situation of the British government towards critical issues in the new world order 
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that has reshaped the environment of international relations amongst 
superpowers in the 21st century.  
 
The first limitation concerned the research paradigm. The most critical and 
interesting part of the research has been to determine a position in an ongoing 
debate, which in this instance was about the new characteristics of war in the 21st 
century and to ask whether war has changed or not. Focusing on the new type of 
warfare directed my research methodology and analytical framework to question 
the existing relationship between traditional media and the military in today’s 
wars, and to make a connection with the rise of social media users, local 
producers, and bloggers in the way that war has been reported and broadcast.  
 
My methodological approach imposed a limitation on this research. Due to the 
complexity of the research questions, the methods used attempted to avoid 
oversimplifications that could lead to unhelpful results. Thus, grounded theory 
was chosen to provide a comprehensive research approach and to generate an 
analytical framework with a significant contextual foundation. Research questions 
were grouped into three themes outlining the key methodological arguments: (1) 
document the revolution in military affairs; (2) changes in the practice of war 
reporting; and (3) the impact of the digital revolution on reporting in a new war 
context. Thus, the analytical framework was designed to construct a set of themes 
that utilised comparative methods and coding to compare and contrast these 
themes with other categories so as to identify similarities and differences.  
 
Finally, this researcher’s individual personal reflections counted. To obtain 
reliable data from both sides of the military-media relationship, my sample of 19 
interviews represents positions current in both the military and the media to 
ensure a realistic representative distribution of the population. The journalists in 
my study were engaged with the UK’s military Armed Forces as war reporters in 
covering crises, particularly in the Middle East. It was vital to speak to some senior 
officers in the British Armed Forces who had served in different conflicts and had 
direct contact with local and international media at the frontline. An analysis of 
military documents was intended to bridge the gap in military officers’ 
testimonies who are reluctant to talk about sensitive issues that they consider to 
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be off the record. Military documents are usually hard to access, particularly those 
considered to be classified. Interestingly, the British Ministry of Defence has made 
many of its military doctrines and media policies available on the internet. 
However, other documents that are classified or under investigation were not 
available in the public domain or on request. As such, this restricted access had 
an impact on the scope of my research. Other interpretations in the academic 
literature were also taken into account. Semi-structured interviews with military 
officers helped to clarify other aspects of military media practices and their 
challenges in times of war. But presumably these were not without challenges 
because military officers were reluctant to discuss certain topics. 
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Appendix (1): The list of military and governmental documents used 
in this research. 
 
 Organisation Military Doctrines 
1 
United Kingdom 
Media Operations. Joint 
Doctrine Publication 3-45.1. 
2 
Joint Warfare Publication 3-80: 
Information Operations 
3 
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 
UK Defence Doctrine 
4 
Strategic Communication: The 
Defence Contribution Joint 
Doctrine Note 1/12. 
5 
National Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security 
Review 2015 - First Annual 
Report 2016 
6 
The Future Character of 
Conflict 
7 
Parliamentary approval for 
military action 
8 
The National Security Strategy 
and Strategic Defence and 
Security Review 2015 
8 Annual Attitude MoD Survey 
9 
Blackett Review of High Impact 
Low Probability Risks 
10 
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-70 
Battlespace Management 
11 The Green book 
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12 
Morale, Psychological Wellbeing 
of UK Armed Forces and 
Entertainment 
13 
Modern Media Operation 
A Guide 
14 
Contact with the Media and 
Communicating in Public 
15 
Shaping a stable world: The 
Military contribution (JDP 05) 
March 2016 
16 
JSP 579 
Policy and Processes for Non-
News Media Projects – 
broadcast, manuscripts, digital 
and features 
17 
United State 
Information Operations 
18 
An analysis of The National 
Security Strategy of the United 
States of America Analysis 
19 
National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism 
20 
NATO 
NATO Military Public Affairs 
Policy 
21 
Allied Joint Doctrine For 
Information Operations 
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Appendix (2):  Journalists interviewed for this project 
 
  
 
 
Name Organisation Date Place 
1 
Jonathan 
Steele 
The Guardian 3 November 2016 London 
2 
Caroline 
Wyatt 
BBC 3 November 2016 London 
3 
Lyse Doucet 
 
BBC Chief 
International 
Correspondent 
14 November 2016 London 
4 
Maggie 
O’Kane 
The Guardian 6 February 2017 London 
5 David Pratt The Herald  6 December 2016 Glasgow 
6 
Jeremy 
Bowen 
BBC 8 February 2017 London 
7 Paul Adam BBC 3 November 2016 London 
8 
Jonathan 
Beale 
Defence 
correspondent, 
BBC 
3 November 2016 London 
9 
Lindsey 
Hilsum 
Channel 4 13 March 2017 Telephone Interview 
10 Kevin Bishop BBC 21 August 2017 Email Interview 
11 Sean Smith The Guardian 6 February 2017 London 
12 
Muna 
Mahmood 
The Guardian 6 February 2017 London 
13 
Gabriel 
Gatehouse 
BBC 22 November 2016 Telephone Interview 
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Appendix (3): Military personnal interviewed for this project 
 
 
 
 
Name Occupation Date Place 
1 Tim Purbrick 
Army Reserve staff 
officer in the 
Concepts Branch at 
Army HQ 
7 February 2018 
Telephone 
Interview 
2 
Patrick AG 
Jackson 
Lieutenant Colonel 
SO1 CGS Media 
Adviser 
Army Media & 
Communication 
7 July 2017 
Telephone 
Interview 
3 Steven Jolly 
Executive Director, 
World Services 
M&C Saatchi. 
The Ex-Director of 
Defence 
Communications 
7 July 2017 London 
4 
Angus 
Taverner 
Staff Officer 1 (SO1) 
Director News (Policy 
and Plans) in the UK 
MoD 
13 February 2018 
Telephone 
Interview 
5 
David 
Richards 
The former Chief of 
the Defence Staff 
7 February 2018 London 
6 Tony Cramp 
VP Aircraft, Shell 
Aircraft 
The Netherlands 
11 February 2018 London 
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Appendix (4): Photographs with research participants 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2: Jonathan Beale  
Picture 1: Caroline Wyatt and Paul 
Adam 
Picture 5: Jonathan Steele 
Picture 3: David Pratt 
Picture 4: Lyse Doucet 
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Picture 6: Lord David Richards 
Picture 9: Tim Purbrick 
Picture 7: Maggie O’Kane 
Picture 8: Jeremy Bowen 
Picture 10: Sean Smith 
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